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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Setting the research problem area 
The realm of public policies is in a perpetual flow of change. These changes 
exert sometimes disruptive, sometimes more incremental impact on the affected 
citizens’ everyday life. A better comprehension of the above changes surrounding us, 
promises the potential of an improved accommodation capability to the new setup for 
the citizens, and facilitates a smoother and more efficient change-management for the 
policy makers. Therefore it is important to gain a thorough understanding of the 
phenomenon of policy change, i.e. what are the circumstances under which the need 
for policy change gets articulated; what are the sources of the newly set policy choices; 
how the policy change process evolves. As such, comprehending the factors 
facilitating (or, conversely, hindering) change is similarly essential in the quest of 
studying public policy change. The general research area of the dissertation is public 
policy change.  
While there is abundant literature on the public policy change topic, the theory 
is fragmented and it consists of a number of streams. These do not constitute yet a 
coherent and general framework though. Each of these streams of thoughts has the 
underlying ambition to provide plausible explanations to the questions: What factors 
drive policy change? How the policy change process unfolds? The theories’ answers 
are aligned to the particularities of their actual choices concerning the approach and 
the framework. The dissertation argues that ultimately these answers are not so far 
away from each other. As such, the dissertation argues that it is a viable enterprise to 
build a comprehensive policy change theory by bringing together existing ones onto a 
common platform. To start the task of theory-buling, it is advisable though to narrow 
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the policy change types and concentrate on a special type of policy change for the sake 
of setting a common scope. The dissertation’s selected the area for the above purposes 
is large scale policy change (or policy reform) under external constraints.  
As a macroeconomic analyst1 I have been deeply involved in the research of 
the economic developments over the past two decades. My research area has been 
primarily the Hungarian economy, however I studied in depth the regional peers2, the 
Euro-Area, and other global developed and emerging markets. I have witnessed ample 
evidence for that the content and the quality of national level policy making has 
essential influence on the overall economic performance of the individual countries. 
The qualitative characteristics of economic policies  affecting the macro-level and the 
change of these policies over time (i.e. fiscal policy in general, and various policy 
areas, such as tax policy, education policy, health care policy, industrial policy in 
particular) have been always in the forefront of my professional attention.  
Not solely professional economists should be interested in the development of 
the various macroeconomic indicators of a given country though (such as inflation, 
unemployment rate, real GDP change, the size of the budget deficit, public debt-to-
GDP ratio, the balance of the current account etc.) - the changes in the macroeconomic 
environment are essentially reflecting the changes in the quality of life of the citizens. 
The 2008-2009 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign-debt crisis 
(2011-2012) brought about distinctive break vis-à-vis the previously accepted modus 
operandi in the realm of the economy (see Appendix 2. GDP change over the previous 
year in EU member-states between 2004-2014) and financial markets. The crises also 
generated meaningful repercussions in the field of (both national and international) 
politics and resulted in new mechanisms in the governance within the European Union 
(Alesina, 2012; Blöchliger at al 2012, De Grauwe, 2013, Sutherland et al 2012; Ongaro 
2014). Several countries – including a number of EU member states - got into severe 
                                                          
1 I am the Head of Research at Raiffeisen Bank Hungary since 1997. My main task is to analyse 
and forecast macroeconomic developments and financial market trends in Hungary and in other 
relevant countries. 
2 The regional peers are: Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Croatia and to some 
extent Austria and Slovenia. 
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financial distress as a consequence of the financial and economic crisis due to their 
previously accumulated imbalances provoked by policy malfunctioning (see Appendix 
5. IMF program countries in 2009 by program types). The 2008-2009 financial crisis 
was followed by the sovereign debt crisis in the European Union that had the potential 
to threaten the proper functioning of same basic pillars of the European integration in 
2011-20123. The previously designed governance structures proved to be inefficient 
to prevent and manage the crisis. The sovereign debt crisis was manifest in a steep 
increase of public budget deficit and public debt in several member states (see 
Appendix 3. Public budget balance in EU member-states between 2004-2014 in GDP 
percentage and Appendix 4. General Government Debt in EU member-states, 2004-
2014 in GDP percentage). This provoked the need to cut budget deficit and reduce 
public debt.  
Hungary was clearly one of the most severely affected country of the financial 
crisis and its aftermaths in the European Union. Because of my job as a 
macroeconomic analyst, I thoroughly studied the run-up period ahead of the financial 
crisis and the sudden hit of the crisis starting first with difficulties of the public debt-
refinancing4 (also see Appendix 6. The benchmark yield of Hungarian Government 
3-month Treasury-Bill). Later on I analysed the direct and indirect impacts of the 
crisis on the Hungarian economy and the crisis management from the side of both 
public and private sector actors. Having professional contact to some of the most 
relevant figures in public policy making5, I had the opportunity to gain an insight. 
                                                          
3 The viability of the common currency, the euro-system was questioned by both financial 
markets and political actors, and even the unity of the EU got endangered by various centripetal forces 
pointing to potential exits.  
4 In October 2008 the Hungarian Debt Management Agency had a series of unsuccessful 
government bond auctions – meaning that market demand completely dried up for Hungarian 
government debt securities, while on the OTC market (i.e. the secondary market of government 
bonds) the yield of the 3-month treasury bill jumped from 8.91% (23 September) to 13.29% (28 
October) – a 50% increase within one month. 
5 Commercial bank economists used to have active personal relationship with the Finance 
Ministry, the Central Bank, the Fiscal Council, the Prime Minister Office – including the highest 
echelons of public administration and political decision-makers and also with the representatives of 
the EU and IMF missions in Hungary.  
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Notwithstanding, my curiosity was not fully satisfied. There were several areas of 
interest, where a more in-depth analysis were needed in order to get a better 
understanding, such as: What is the interplay between national policy making and the 
general global trends in the realm of public policy design? How do external constraints 
shape policy outcomes under circumstances of conditionality? How did the country-
level decisions over policy questions get influenced by the fiscal consolidation and 
what was the influence of the EU (and IMF) on the domestic fiscal consolidation? How 
did the fiscal measures affect public sector reforms and administrative reforms?  
In September 2015, an international research project6 was launched to 
investigate the politics of fiscal consolidation – the domestic government’s political 
decision-making about consolidation, and the influence of the EU (and the IMF) on 
that. The research project was interested in how the fiscal consolidation measures 
affected public sector reforms – in social security, health, education, etc. – and reforms 
within public administration itself. The ultimate ambition of the research project was 
to analyse how the EU (together with IMF) affected public sector reforms in countries 
under the conditions of fiscal crisis and consolidation. The project was led by Edoardo 
                                                          
6 Scholars from Estonia, Latvia, the Netherlands, Hungary, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and 
Ireland participated in the project. There were two workshops convened by Walter Kickert and 
Edoardo Ongaro, the first in the autumn 2016 in Milan, and the second in spring 2017 in the Hague. 
The list of participants is the following: Joaquim Filipe Araujo (Portugal, Professor, University of 
Minho), Diego Badell (Spain, Assistant Professor, ESADE, Barcelona), Aleksandrs Cepilovs (Latvia, 
Latvian civil service and PhD, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia), Niamh Hardiman (Ireland, 
Professor, University College Dublin), Muiris MacCarthaigh (Ireland, Lecturer, Queen’s University 
Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK), Tiina Randma-Liiv (Estonia, Professor, Tallinn University of 
Technology) , Calliope Spanou (Greece, Professor, University of Athens), Francesco Stolfi (Italy, 
Lecturer, University of Nottingham, UK), Zoltán Török (Hungary, Head of Research, Raiffeisen Bank 
and PhD student, Corvinus University Budapest), Tamyko Ysa (Spain, Professor, ESADE, 
Barcelona). 
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Ongaro7 and Walter Kickert8. As my research interest was largely similar, I felt 
honoured to have the opportunity to participate in the research team’s work. 
The research project was a follow-up of earlier research (COCOPS WP7)9. 
COCOPS WP7 research project focused on national governments’ political decision-
making on fiscal consolidation and reform, (Kickert and Randma-Liiv 2015). The 
Kickert and Ongaro led new research project explicitly investigated the influence of 
the EU (and the IMF) on the domestic decision-making (Kickert and Ongaro, 2019). 
The research work developed in two streams. One with a relative focus on the effects 
of EU (and IMF) on public sector and administrative reforms and another with a 
relative focus on the influence of EU (and IMF) on consolidation. 
My contribution to the first stream was a publication titled: ‘Unintended 
outcomes effects of the European Union and the International Monetary Fund on 
                                                          
7 Professor Edoardo Eriprando Ongaro is a Professor of Public Management at The Open 
University, UK and a Visiting Professor of Management of International and Supranational 
Organizations at the SDA Bocconi School of Management of Bocconi University, Milan. Previously 
he held positions at Northumbria University, as Professor of International Public Services 
Management.  
Since September 2013 Professor Ongaro is the President of EGPA, the European Group for 
Public Administration. In the 2006-2009 period he chaired the EGPA Permanent Study Group on 
Intergovernmental Relations, and in the 2010-2013 period chaired the Permanent Study Group on EU 
Administration and Multi-Level Governance. 
8 Walter Kickert is emeritus professor of Public Management at the department of Public 
Administration, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands. 
9 COCOPS (i.e. Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future) was a public 
management research consortium consisting of 11 universities in 10 countries, funded by the 
European Commission. COCOPS was one of the largest comparative public management research 
projects in Europe. Work Package 7 (COCOPS WP7) investigated how the financial crisis affected 
government’s managerial and policy making capacity - in particular concerning resource allocation - 
and formulated policy recommendations with regard to successfully cope with the long-term 
consequences of the financial crisis savings. 
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Hungary's public sector and administrative reforms’. The article was published by 
Public Policy and Administration (SAGE Publications) in April 201910.  
My contribution to the second stream is an article titled: ‘The politics of fiscal 
consolidation and reform under external constraints in the European periphery: 
Comparative study of Hungary and Latvia’ published by the journal of Public 
Management Review (RPXM)11. The article was written together with Aleksanders 
Cepilovs12. 
After having studied the influence of external agents on the fiscal 
consolidation, and public sector reform, I got increasingly interested in the topic of 
policy change under external constraints. I continued to further investigate the 
combination of factors facilitating large scale policy shifts with the broad aim to test 
and potentially refine existing theories of policy change, to compare their explanatory 
power. Therefore I commenced another research. I studied a specific policy area in 
Hungary with the target to uncover the various stages of the change process; the 
rationale behind the choices of national elite decision makers; the influence of external 
agents; and the interplay between the considerations of fiscal consolidation need and 
policy reform.  
My selected case was the change of the Hungarian tax policy in the 2009-2018 
period. A lengthy time-span of relative stability regarding the overall revenue structure 
of the tax system was followed by large-scale changes in Hungarian tax system starting 
from 2009 in Hungary. This was signalled by a dramatic shift of the tax burden from 
labour and capital income to consumption. The 2008-2010 time period was 
                                                          
10 - DOI: 10.1177/0952076718789731, 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0952076718789731 
11 DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2019.161838411. Article ID: RPXM 1618384 
12 Aleksandrs Cepilovs is a project manager at the Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and 
Governance, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia. He received his PhD in Technology 
Governance from Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of 
Technology. His research interests include innovation policy and innovation in public administration, 
as well as policy transfer, in particular focusing on the region of Central and Eastern Europe. Both 
authors contributed equally to the article. 
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characterized by an IMF-bail-out program13 with its conditionality criteria, and a deep 
economic crisis. Hungary was also the subject of the European Commission’s 
Excessive Deficit Procedure in the 2004-2013 period. I was interested in that under 
the given circumstances what factors could explain the large-scale change of the 
Hungarian tax policy and how do anwers relate to policy change theories’ findings? I 
found that academic discourse had only insufficiently covered the questions raised. 
Therefore I prepared a conference paper to the 2nd UECEP14 conference and wrote the 
article which is titled ‘Necessary Factors Facilitating Large Scale Policy Change 
Hungarian Tax Reform 2009-2018’15. The article focuses on the combination of 
factors facilitating large-scale policy change in ligh of the stipulations of the various 
streams of policy change literature.  
All the three papers are embedded into the academic field of public policy 
change. They equally share the ambition to test and refine existing theories of policy 
change and to contribute to the emerging stream of public administration applied 
research agendas on public sector reform by making visible and understandable the 
main contexts and the interacting processes shaping public policymaking.  
The selected case of the dissertation is Hungary – all three articles deal with 
the Hungarian developments. In the same time, other EU and OECD16 countries are 
also looked at for comparisons. The EU, the IMF and the OECD are considered by the 
dissertation as external agents. The case selection is partly driven by my professional 
experiences as a macroeconomic analyst described above: I considered my familiarity 
                                                          
13 In 2009 altogether 42 countries were participating in an IMF program – these were mainly 
poor and developing countries in Africa, South-America and Asia. 3 EU member-states (Hungary, 
Latvia and Romania) was also in IMF bail-out program in 2009 – see Appendix 5. IMF program 
countries in 2009 (by program types) 
14 UECEP stands for Undestanding East Central European Politics, Budapest 17 May 2019. 
15 Political Science Online published the article in December 2019. One opponent of the draft 
dissertation suggested to revise the original article including the reconsideration of the title with 
regards to using the word “necessary”. In the rest of the dissertation I will refer to this article as 
Factors Facilitating Large Scale Policy Change Hungarian Tax Reform 2009-2018. 
16 OECD stands for: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - an 
intergovernmental organization with 36 member countries (including most EU member-states). 
Hungary is a member of the OECD since 1996. 
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of the case as an advantage. The other reason for the case selection is that Hungary 
was a definitive basket case for the research interests: in the critical years the country 
witnessed external influence coming from the EU in the form of the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure; participated an IMF-bail-out; experienced land-sliding political changes, 
deep economic crisis; and went through a series of fiscal consolidation and public 
sector reform attempts. As case studies typically strive for explaining the features of a 
broader population, they aim to be something larger than the case itself (Gerring, 2004; 
Gerring and Seawright, 2008). The Hungarian case is considered here an apt choice 
for the above considerations to elucidate large scale policy change and national policy 
reform under external constraints in general.  
The time frame of all the three article is the financial crisis and the crisis 
management years, strictly speaking the 2008-2012 period plus the pre-crisis and post-
crisis years. The time-span is not necessarily always precisely bounded though17. The 
European Commission’s Excessive Deficit Procedure (in case of Hungary the 2004-
2013 period) is considered by the dissertation as an explicit source of policy influence 
coming from an external agent. Therefore, this time period needed to be fully engulfed 
by the research. Moreover, for facilitating comparative exercises, it is meaningful to 
look at periods without the attribute of the explicit external influence such as the pre-
2004 and post-2013 periods. Accordingly, the dissertation’s broad time frame is the 
past two decades (2000-2019). 
The following dissertation is a portfolio dissertation: the above mentioned three 
scholarly articles (all published in 2019) are edited here, and they are amended with 
an introduction in the beginning and a conclusion at the end. The central theme of each 
of the articles is policy change under the circumstances of external constraints with the 
focus on the influence of external agents on national policy making. A special focus 
was put on the domestic fiscal consolidation, the fiscal measures affecting public 
                                                          
17 The financial crisis hit the European markets in the autumn of 2008 and significantly eased by 
mid-2010. The euro-area debt crisis fell to the 2011-2012 period. European crisis management 
therefore was particularly active in the 2008-2012 period, though it was still running to some extent in 
the post-2012 years. Hungary’s crisis started early and lasted longer though. From a public finance 
perspective, the crisis and the subsequent crisis management is identical with the EDP that is 2004-
2013.  
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sector reforms and the influence of external agents on the decisions on particular policy 
outcomes.  
In the remaining sections of Chapter 1, the key terminology is established and 
the relevant academic literature is presented (1.2. Policy Change – Concepts and 
Theories), then the research approach is introduced, the research theme is 
contextualised and the methodological considerations are presented (1.3. Research 
Approach and Methodological Considerations). Finally, comes the section on the 
structure of the dissertation (1.4. The Structure of the Dissertation). This section 
highlights the objectives and the findings of the individual articles’ while also delivers 
an explanation on how the individual articles relate to each other, and how they relate 
to the broader (policy change, policy reform) and to the narrower (policy change and 
policy reform under the circumstances of conditionality by external agents) research 
areas.  
1.2. Policy change – concepts and theories 
Policy change lies at the centre of the interest of the dissertation. The focus of 
the dissertation is narrowed to a special type of policy change: fiscal consolidation and 
public sector reforms amidst the circumstances of an economic crisis, initiated and 
supervised by external agents (i.e. international organizations) in a form of coercive 
policy transfer. The dissertation is embedded in the scholarly literature that aims to 
explain the policy change process.  
1.2.1 Key terminology   
Public policy change refers to shifts in existing structures deriving from a 
change in attitude or in principle (Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Cerna 2013). It can refer 
both to incremental refinements in existing structures and the introduction of new and 
innovative policies replacing existing ones. Accordingly, it posits a change in attitude 
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or in principle of the decision-makers (Hogwood and Peters, 1983; Polsby, 1984; 
Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Cerna, 2013).   
Policy reform normally refers to a significant policy change. In the scholarly 
literature there is an uncertainty about the notions of ‘policy reform’ and ‘large-scale 
policy change’ though. Some scholars claim that the term ‘policy reform’ generally 
refers to a major change that goes beyond day-to-day policy management. Policy 
reform potentially involves structural changes (Alesina et al, 2006), and it is 
understood as a ‘deliberate attempt (…) to change the system as a whole’ (Fullan, 
2009: 102). Others argue that such a categorization is unsatisfactory, and claim that 
there is no clear difference provided by the literature between the terms ‘policy reform’ 
and ‘large-scale policy change’, therefore they should be treated as being inter-
changeable (Cerna, 2013).  
While one can claim that every policy reform is also a policy change, obviously 
not every policy change is a policy reform. Nevertheless, it is indeed highly 
challenging to determine the exact attributes of a policy change process in order to 
qualify it as a policy reform. Apparently, the above definition-type inquiry has not 
been reassuringly answered by scholars. I argue that the underlying reason for such a 
hiatus is that the myriads of policy types and their changes are just simply 
incomparable given their widely different characteristics those vary alongside the 
dimensions of time, place, actors, goals, techniques, content etc.. Moreover, reform is 
indeed inherently political as it represents a selection of values, a particular view of 
society and is has distributional consequences vis-à-vis the allocation of benefits and 
costs (Reich, 1995).  No wonder, in political communication the term ‘policy reform’ 
is attached with various political values18, and the usage of the term is burdened with 
adherent political biases. The dissertation text consciously reflects the imprecision of 
                                                          
18 Hereby it is noteworthy to mention that while political communication normally attaches a 
positive value content to ’reform’ – there are instances when this is the other way round, especially 
when there is a ’reform-fatigue’ typically followed by a massive wave of policy reforms perceived 
negatively by the population. One example for such a case was the 2008-2012 period in Hungary, 
when politicians preferred to avoid to use the term ’reform’  
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the academic literature and uses the terms ‘policy reform’ and ‘large scale policy shift’ 
– as suggested by Cerna - interchangeably.  
Public sector reforms (or large scale policy changes), government-wide in 
scope and cross-cutting all public services are understood as changes to the structures 
and processes of public sector organizations, i.e. re-form previously existing 
arrangements by the attributes of a new structure, form, or process, driven by specific 
considerations and by political actors’ interests (Barzelay, 2001; Ongaro, 2009). 
Accordingly, there is no normative attribute involved in the policy change process, in 
the policy reform exercise. Policy change does not necessarily equal improvements 
with regards to efficiency or quality of the public services or by any other 
considerations. In this sense, the dissertation considers the terms policy change/policy 
reform as they are value free ones.   
Nothwothstanding, it is far from easy to accomplish policy reforms. Large-
scale change is considered as ‘not the norm’ (Wilsford, 1994:251), moreover ‘difficult, 
if not impossible’ (Birkland, 2005:41). Why policies change and when, is indeed a 
challenging question and a rather poorly understood phenomena (Rodrik, 1996). 
Evidence also suggests that many policies - even dysfunctional ones – are going 
through long periods of stability before they change. 
As such, it is well justified to pose the questions: Why can policy change 
eventually happen? What are the circumstances under which policy change can come 
about?  What are factors those facilitate policy change to happen? The axiom that 
‘policy change can and does happen under the proper conditions’ (Birkland, 2005: 41) 
gives little practical help in answering the above questions. Nevertheless, a detailed 
description of these ‘proper conditions’ is offered by the policy change theories. Public 
policy theories – ie. path dependency; multiple streams; punctuated equilibrium; 
policy learning / policy diffusion; advocacy coalition framework - are centred around 
the challenge to uncover the ways how the policy agenda is constituted and to find 
those factors – or rather the interaction of multiple factors - from where the change of 
those policies emerge (Cerna, 2013; Sebők, 2014). In their quest, scholars looked at 
the role of new ideas and arguments in the above processes.  
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While there is a certain degree of heterogeneity with regards to the above 
theories’ scholarly ambitions, their actual scopes, and their academic approach, they 
are the key building blocks in the academic enterprise of fostering policy change 
studies. In the following section the paper gives a brief overview of the various policy 
change theories, with the explanation how they relate to the current research.   
1.2.2. Mapping the theories on policy change  
The approach to study the interplay of individual agents, ideas, institutions and 
external factors (i.e. multiple streams) approach was a major step in understanding 
policy formation. This was initiated by Kingdon in his seminal book “Agendas, 
Alternatives, and Public Policies” (Kingdon, 1984). Policy formation was understood 
by the multiple streams approach as the joint combination of the streams of problems, 
policies and politics. The particular circumstances where they congregate and result in 
policy change decisions is labelled by Kingdon as the policy window. Kingdon argued 
for continual change and adaptation of public policies as opposed to the stability of 
decision-making in policy communities.  
‘History matters, and it matters a great deal’ (Wilsford, 1994: 279) – this is 
centre thought of the theory of path dependency (Wilsford, 1994; Pierson, 2000; 
Mahoney, 2000). According to the theory, the policy process within an existing 
institutional framework is subjugated to the ‘decentralized interaction of policy actors’ 
(Wilsford, 1994: 281). This can lead to the lengthy survival of certain - even 
suboptimal - policy outcomes. As such, public policies and formal institutions are 
difficult to change by design: decisions made in the past encourage policy continuity. 
Because institutions are sticky and actors protect existing models, it is difficult to 
change policies (Pierson, 2000; Greener 2002).  
The historical context - such as the strength of the welfare state, civil society 
organisations and public-sector unions, as well as the nature of civil service regulations 
- is considered to be a key factor shaping the process and content of policy change. 
Thus, for example in case of a comprehensive fiscal consolidation program, the 
decisive implementation of administrative reform is difficult in a country with strong 
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public-sector unions, regulations limiting the possibility of severe pay cuts and lay-
offs in the public sector. In a country with historically strong welfare state, the 
government is more likely to face opposition in a form of protests whenever targeted 
program-specific cuts announced and implemented (Christensen and Laegreid, 2017; 
Randma-Liiv and Kickert, 2018).  
Still, under certain conditions, a big change that departs from the historical path 
can be possible. ‘By developing the interplay of structure with conjuncture, the 
occasional accomplishment of big change can be systematically understood’ 
(Wilsford, 1994: 253). To introduce a major change, policy makers have to wait for a 
critical juncture (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007) or a window of exceptional 
opportunity called conjuncture (Wilsford 1994). The theory of path dependency helps 
to explain why policy continuity is more likely than policy change, but it also reveals 
that ‘critical junctures’ facilitate policy change to come about (Cerna, 2013).  
A critical juncture (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) or a window of exceptional 
opportunity called conjuncture (Wilsford 1994) is identified by the literature as an 
independent variable facilitating policy change. However, to develop a working 
concept for a situation of ‘critical conjuncture’ is rather challenging -  especially as the 
risk of being tautological may emerge (i.e. policy change comes when there is a critical 
conjuncture or a window of opportunity – window of opportunity or a critical 
conjuncture results in policy change). It is possible to avoid the above caveat though, 
as the thoeriy does not postulate an explicit assertion that the relation is true in every 
case.  
How can such a critical moment (i.e. conjucture) emerge then? What are the 
necessary circumstances of such a policy window or window of opportunity? Theory 
claims that such a critical juncture/conjuncture is provided by the constellation of a 
crisis sitaution. How does it facilitate policy change? The window of opportunity - 
provided by a crisis situation - ‘delegitimizes long-standing policies underpinning the 
status quo’ (Kickert and Randma-Liiv, 2017: 91). For example, economic crises by 
nature deliver welfare losses. A deep economic crisis may deliver policy reforms 
because the perceived political costs of not reforming (i.e. policy continuity scenario) 
is larger than the costs of the reform scenario (Drazen and Grilli, 1990). The hypothesis 
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that crisis leads to fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms has become part of 
the ‘conventional wisdom’ (Tommasi and Velasco, 1996). Public sector policy change 
scholars (Kickert et al., 2015) argue that the depth and immediacy of the crisis would 
influence the selection of specific measures (e.g. hiring freezes, lay-offs, or program-
specific cuts) and the approach to cutback management (e.g. cheese-slicing or targeted 
cuts). I would argue though for a broader understanding of the critical juncture: the 
window of opportunity applies when the previous stickiness of existing policies gets 
damaged either by internal (i.e. by the arrival of new elite decision makers with 
different policy concepts versus the outgoing ones; by the unviability of the earlier 
policy because of financial constraint or technological advancement etc.) or by 
external factors (i.e. policy change as a condition of financial assistance).  
Scholars found empirical evidence for a usual pattern of policy change 
cyclicality: long periods of stability are followed by major (fast - and sometimes 
dramatic) policy changes. This pattern is described and unfolded by the punctuated 
equilibrium theory. According to the theory, once an idea gets attention, it will expand 
rapidly and become unstoppable (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991; Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1993). Punctuated equilibrium is the process of interaction of beliefs and values 
concerning particular policy (termed policy images) with the existing set of political 
institutions or venues of policy action (Christensen, Aaron and Clark 2003, 
Christensen et al. 2006). Punctuated equilibrium theory connects to both path 
dependency (regarding the recognition that existing policy frameworks have a long-
serving characteristics and tend to be sticky) and the policy learning and the advocacy 
coalition stream of thoughts (regarding the acknowledgement of the transferability of 
policy ideas from one place to another and the emphasis on policy images and the 
value and the belief system of elite decision makers). Punctuated equilibrium model 
connects institutions with ideas. Institutions enclose a set of political participants into 
the policy process, while ideas are the elementary building blocks of the various policy 
agendas.  According to the punctuated equilibrium theory, policy-makers’ perceptions 
and the institutional framework determine the way policy problems are defined. 
Policy learning deals with the question how ideas can be transmitted from one 
place to another. The terms ‘policy-oriented learning’ or ‘diffusion’ is used by the 
theory as a major determinant of policy innovation and change (Sabatier, 1988; 
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Sabatier and Jenkins-Smiths 1993; Cairney, 2015; Rose, 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh, 
1994). Policy diffusion is a process in which policy innovations spread from one 
government to another (Shipan and Volden 2008). Policy diffusion occurs when one 
government’s policy choices are influenced by the choices of other governments - the 
‘knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions in one time 
and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and 
institutions in another time and/or place’ (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 344). Policy 
makers rely on examples and insights from those who have already experimented with 
the relevant policies (Shipan and Volden 2008; Shipan and Volden, 2012). Policy 
diffusion and its role in public policy formation can take various forms (i.e. political 
leaming, government leaming, policy-oriented leaming, lesson drawing and social 
leaming). These concepts are used to describe the process by which programs and 
policies developed in one country are emulated by, and diffused to others (Rose, 1991; 
Cerna, 2013).  
Policy transfer refers to the process whereby actors borrow policies, 
administrative arrangements, and institutions developed in one setting to make them 
work within another setting (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Policy transfer can refer to 
policy goals; structure and content; administrative techniques (i.e. policy instruments); 
institutions; ideology; ideas or concepts (Robertson and Waltman, 1992). Dolowitz 
and Marsh defined in their seminal article ‘Who learns from whom: A review of the 
policy transfer literature’19 that external influence eventually is the transfer process of 
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, and ideas from one entity to another 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Policy transfer occurs on a continuum between ‘purely 
voluntary’ policy transfer and ‘purely coercive’ policy transfer (Bennett and Howlett, 
1992; Heclo, 1974; Rose, 1991). Most cases fall along the continuum rather than at 
one pole. Nevertheless, when conditionality is involved in the relationship between 
two actors, (as this is the case in bail-out programs between the IMF and the bailed-
out country) then there is inherently a certain degree of coerciveness. Coercive policy 
                                                          
19 Dolowitz, D., Marsh, D. (1996): Who learns from whom: A review of the policy transfer 
literature. Political Studies XLIV: 343–357. 
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transfer – also termed as facilitated unilateralism or hierarchical policy transfer - 
occurs via the exercise of transnational or supranational authority; when a state is 
obliged to adopt policy as a condition of financial assistance (Bulmer and Padgett 
2014).  
Some scholars argue that the importance of foreign pressure is overstated and 
in reality it has only a weak effect (Alesina 2006, Mahon 2004). Others claim that in 
IMF-supported programs’ conditionalities are critical to fiscal consolidation, but the 
eventual success depends on the individual governments those are responsible for 
policy selection, policy design and implementation (Crivelli and Gupta, 2014). Public 
sector policy change scholars argue that countries facing external pressure in a form 
of conditionality related to financial assistance (i.e. by the IMF, the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank), are forced to implement swift and 
radical policy change (Christensen and Laegreid, 2017; Randma-Liiv and Kickert, 
2018). Bulmer and Padgett (2014) claim that the quality of the coercive policy transfer 
and its eventual outcome depends on variables such as the degree of authority accrued 
by supranational institutions and the density of rules and the availability of sanctions 
and incentives. Concerning policy transfer capabilities of governments under the 
circumstances of coercive policy transfer, Bulmer and Padgett (2014) distinguish the 
muddling through and the problem solving type of attitudes of the political executives. 
While the muddling through process brings about a weaker form of policy transfer, 
problem solving results in stronger policy transfer outcomes. 
Policy transfer can happen alongside qualitatively different mechanisms, such 
as copying, emulation, hybridization, synthesis, and inspiration (Rose, 1991). 
Emulation refers to a case where not every detail is copied. Hybridization and 
synthesis describe the process of combining elements of programs found in two or 
more cases, in order to develop a suitable policy for the actual problem, while the 
domestic policy legacy is taken into account, and expert decision making is prioritized. 
Hybridization and synthesis assumedly work better under peaceful circumstances in 
general then under crisis situation. 
 The success of policy transfer depends on the actual qualities of the process. 
Generally, it is helpful if the domestic policy legacy and institutional/cultural setting 
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is taken into consideration (hybridization, synthesis) and/or if the domestic agents 
internalize the policy change process (inspiration). In other words, reform (or policy 
change) ownership of elite decision makers is crucial vis-à-vis the success of the policy 
transfer process. These qualitative features (i.e. levels) of the policy transfer process 
are going to be scrutinized in the dissertation.   
Changes in the main aspects of a policy usually result from shifts in external 
factors such as macro-economic conditions or the rise of a new systemic governing 
coalition. This latter is termed as the ‘Advocacy Coalition Framework’ (Sabatier 1988, 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Policy change can be understood through the 
examination of political subsystems (advocacy coalitions) those seek to influence 
governmental decisions. The theory recognizes that there are various competing sets 
of core ideas about causation and value in public policy. Coalitions form around these 
core idea sets because certain interests are linked to them. The members of advocacy 
coalitions are coming from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest 
group leaders, researchers etc.) and they shape the particular belief system - a set of 
basic values, causal assumptions and problem perceptions (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith, 1991). Policy options are therefore the function of the position of 
the particular advocacy coalition vis-à-vis the elite political decision makers: shifts in 
the government have an impact on the advocacy coalition. The scholars of both the 
advocacy coalition framework and the punctuated equilibrium theory pay ample 
attention to the relevance of discursive factors in policy change, the role of beliefs in 
shaping policy ideas. Sabatier uses the term devil shift to describe the situation when 
policy actors inflate the malevolence of their policy opponents (Sabatier et al., 1987). 
In punctuated equilibrium theory, reframing plays a key role in changing the policy 
image (Baumgartner, 2013; Princen, 2013).  
The form of political executive affects – among other things – reform 
ownership (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Top-down reforms driven by elite decision 
making – influenced by ideas and pressures– constitute the core of the reform process. 
Shifts in the locus of authority is recognized as a highly critical component of the 
policy change process (Hall, 1993). Hall makes an important distinction between first 
order change (i.e. incrementalism, routinized decision making – usually associated 
with the policy process – involving neither the change of the policy goals, nor the 
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insrtuments employed to reach them), second order change (change affecting the 
policy instruments but not the policy goals) and third order change (i.e. radical shifts 
both in the hierarchy of policy goals and in the policy instruments employed to reach 
them). Using the Hallian conceptualisation, especially the distinction between second 
order and third order policy changes, is particularily useful in explaining the different 
policy reform trajectories through a comparative lens and interpreting the relation 
between ideas (paradigmatic beliefs) and the actually chosen reform trajectories. 
A public sector reform is more likely to happen if one political group (or 
advocacy coalition) becomes a dominant player (Alesina, 2006). This political group 
is understood as being mainly domestic – however in some cases external players 
(mainly supranational institutions) also perform critical role. Empirical evidence has 
been found that fiscal consolidation and broad reforms are more likely to occur when 
new governments take office; when governments are politically strong; and when there 
are fewer institutional constraints (Reich, 1995; Alesina, 2006). Large scale policy 
shifts are more likely to occur immediately after an election, presumably when the new 
government enjoys a mandate and when new elections are a long time away (Alesina, 
2006). The form of the political system influences also the decision-making patterns: 
one-party governments in majoritarian systems are able to implement quick and 
decisive reforms, while coalition governments tend to engage in long negotiations 
often without a result (Kickert, Randma-Liiv and Savi, 2015). Broad reforms are 
possible when there is sufficient political will and when changes are designed and 
implemented by capable actors. The larger the number of institutional constraints on 
the executive, the more delayed and less successful policy reforms become (Hamann 
and Prati, 2002).  
Table 1.1. compiles the theories on policy change (alongside their identified 
factors and mechanisms facilitating policy change).    
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Table 1.1. A typology of the policy change theories: factors and mechanisms  
  
Path dependency / 
Multiple streams 
Punctuated 
equilibrium  
Policy learning 
Advocacy Coalition 
Framework 
Factors and 
mechanisms 
facilitating 
policy 
change 
 
window of 
opportunity 
policy window 
(conjuncture/ critical 
juncture) 
change of policy 
images (values and 
beliefs) 
reframing 
 
policy diffusion  
 
belief system of 
advocacy coalition 
econonomic crisis 
 
arrival of new elite 
decision-makers 
 
shifts in external 
factors (e.g. 
macroeconomic 
conditions) 
policy transfer 
(policy goals 
structures 
content 
technique 
concept) 
(voluntary or 
coercive) 
ecoomic crisis 
 
shifts in systemic 
governing coalition 
devil shift 
 
delegitimize long-
standing policies  
capable managers 
with new policy 
images 
one government 
influences the 
other  
copying 
emulation 
hybridization 
syntetization 
inspiration 
(reform ownership) 
reform ownership 
(strong political 
mandate, fewer 
institutional 
constraints)  
Source: Author 
1.3. Research approach and method 
The politics of fiscal consolidation, policy change and public sector reform 
under external constraints, and the influence EU (and IMF) on domestic government’s 
political decision-making is the main theme of the dissertation. The research covers 
the politics of fiscal consolidation and reform under external constraints and the effects 
of the European Union and the International Monetary Fund on Hungary's public 
sector and administrative reforms, with a special focus on the factors facilitating large 
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scale policy change of the Hungarian tax system. The following section first gives an 
account on the general EU-wide developments in order to contextualize the Hungarian 
case and to shed light of the general research approach of the compiled articles (1.3.1. 
External inducements - EU and IMF influence in national policy making). Then the 
case protocol is presented that describes the methods and data used in the analysis 
(1.3.2.).  
1.3.1. External inducements - EU and IMF influence in national policy 
making  
This section provides an account on the development of the mechanisms of 
external inducement during the crisis-management period in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis in the EU. The purpose is to give a general background knowledge for 
the dissertation’s case studies.  
The global 2008-2009 financial and real economic crisis was the most severe 
crisis since the Great Depression started in late 1920’s. The crises in the post World 
War 2 period were restricted to either sectors (i.e. banking sector crisis in Scandinavia 
in the early 1990’s), or markets (i.e. the stock market’s dotcom bubble in the early 
2000’s) or regions (i.e. the Mexican “tequila” crisis in 1994; Asian and the Russian 
crisis in the late 1990’s etc.). These crisis episodes provoked intensive academic 
debate. The commonly shared lesson was that macroeconomic imbalances and policy 
mistakes both played key role in the run up to the crisis (Radelet and Sachs 1998; 
MacIntyre, 2001).  
Macroeconomic imbalances may take many forms: they could appear as large 
differences of inflation, cost levels, unemployment rates, income levels, 
competitiveness, external and internal balances, stock of debt etc. between regions and 
between countries. In international economics, imbalances are mainly associated with 
balance-of-payment items, such as current account deficits/surpluses and capital 
flows, which translated into the changes of foreign currency denominated loans (Borio 
and Disyatat, 2011). 
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In the seminal publication of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) - “Is the 2007 U.S. 
sub-prime financial crisis so different?” - the argument was made that economic 
policies (mainly monetary and exchange policies) generated the toxic mix of credit 
market distortions. These market distortions eventually were responsible for the build-
up of global imbalances and laid the foundations of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Especially global current account imbalance is identified as one of the fundamental 
reasons of the global financial crisis. Current account imbalaces had contributed to the 
liquidity glut (i.e. excess savings in countries with current account surpluses flowing 
abundantly into countries with current account deficits) and therefore generated 
significant distortions in financial incentives (Obstfeld and Rogoff. 2009; Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2010). Three main factors were identified having contributed to the build-up 
of financial imbalances, such as global imbalances reflected by capital flows, 
inappropriately loose monetary policy and finally inadequate supervision and 
regulation (Nier and Merrouche, 2010). In economists’ debate the axiom is clearly 
made that policy mistakes, global imbalances and the financial crisis are closely 
interlinked with each other.  
Looking at the interpretations of the European crisis, it was pointed out that the 
slack in financial conditions generated the global credit boom, and crisis is embedded 
in the discontinuation of the previous financial flows from North to South (Gros, 
2012). The focus of the mainstream interpretations is primarily on imbalances in 
macroeconomic fundamentals, such as budget deficits and current account imbalances 
between member states. The European Commission also argued that large 
macroeconomic imbalances made the finances of EU member states more vulnerable 
to economic shocks (EC 2010).  
Having recognized that macroeconomic imbalances matter, the scope of 
interest of European policy makers got broadened. Previously the attention of EU 
institutions’ responsible for economic policy (most prominently DGEcfin) was 
predominantly centred on fiscal policy and the promotion of sustainable public 
finances. The usual recipe to overcome the problems of overly lax fiscal policies was 
fiscal austerity – i.e. the consolidation of the public budget by the implementation of 
painful reforms. This was supposed to serve the purposes of fundamental remedy and 
to help rebuilding trust and confidence in financial markets.   
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Crisis literature’s axiom stipulates that policy mistakes, global imbalances and 
the financial crisis are closely interlinked with each other, current account imbalances 
reflect unsustainable national macroeconomic policies and a lack of competitiveness. 
This had been evidenced in the Euro-area also: member states with difficulties 
regarding public (Greece, Portugal, Italy) or private (Spain, Ireland) debt were 
challenged by deteriorating competitive positions, ran large current account deficits 
(Collingnon at al. 2008) and eventually became the ones most prominently affected by 
the crisis20.  
The 2008 financial crisis was followed by a severe economic recession in most 
EU member states with detrimental social and political implications. The first reaction 
of national governments – with some notable exceptions21 - was fiscal policy 
loosening, i.e. the introduction of counter-cyclical measures designed to ease the 
negative domestic developments. However, the result was surging budget deficits and 
swelling public debt, with an increasingly poor outlook vis-à-vis the debt metrics in 
several member states – especially in the problem-ridden periphery of the EU. This, in 
turn, provoked the European debt crisis in 2011-2012 whereas the viability of the 
public debt servicing in the longer run was evaluated negatively by financial markets. 
Moreover, even the very existence of the Euro was questioned first by several players 
in the financial and capital markets and later on by a much broader public audience – 
with certain negative implications to the functioning of the European Union and with 
concerns raised over the future of the grand European political project.  
These dangerous trends prompted the European Commission to counteract and 
to introduce measures designed to reverse the negative financial market sentiment and 
the negative economic trends alike. These measures were complex, and targeted a wide 
array of related fields starting from pure politics ranging to the tightening of the grip 
of financial regulation as well as to the details of monetary policy engineering. Part of 
the policy package was strengthening European economic governance (i.e. increasing 
                                                          
20 See the unattractive abbreviation PIGS referring in financial market and media to this group 
of countries, i.e. Portugal, Italy, (Ireland), Greece, Spain.  
21 Most notably Hungary, where – due to the country way already in the EDP since 2004 and 
had to bailed-out by the IMF in the autumn of 2008 – such an action was ruled out totally. 
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the influence of the European Commission over member states) including (1) imposing 
tighter rules adopted for the already existing Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) – 
aimed at reducing government deficits and public debt levels where they exceed 
established thresholds – and (2) installing new mechanisms designed with the purpose 
to detect, prevent, and correct macroeconomic imbalances.  
Having learnt the importance of a wide set of macroeconomic indicators’ role 
in the emergence of the crisis, DGEcfin acknowledged that fiscal policy should not be 
viewed in isolation, the principles of sound and competitive macroeconomic policies 
need to take into consideration a bigger scope of macro variables. In order to address 
this issue, a new policy framework, the so called Excessive Imbalance Procedure was 
established. The Excessive Imbalance Procedure was designed with the purpose to 
monitor, prevent and correct unsustainable imbalances and persistent distortions in 
competitiveness, with the ultimate aim to prevent economic problems from getting 
worse and affect other EU members - i.e. to fend off the contagion, or the spill-over 
effect. 
Macroeconomic imbalances were persistent in several member states in the 
pre-crisis years. Such imbalances are considered to be as the main source of financial 
vulnerability and responsible for the depth and the length of the economic recession 
itself. Macroeconomic imbalances are considered being toxic as they have important 
cross-border spill-over effects. Resolving them is thus a matter of the common interest 
of all the member states (especially that of the members of the European Monetary 
Union i.e. EMU). According to the European Commission this could only be managed 
if there were some constraints on national policymaking, including the possibility to 
impose certain sanctions on consistently misbehaving members-states. In order to 
identify and tackle these imbalances, the European Commission (i.e. DGEcFin) 
established in 2011, a new complex framework, a surveillance tool incorporating rules 
to prevent future imbalances: the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). MIP 
was modelled on the EDP in its architecture. MIP consists of selected indicators which 
are considered to be vital for the purpose of tracking the development of macro 
imbalances. Numerical thresholds are set in order to decide whether the indicators can 
be considered as healthy or not. DGEcFin prepares analysis on each and every member 
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state in order to evaluate their economic trends to assess whether they comply or not 
to the MIP rulebook.  
The European Commission took several measures in 2011-2012 in order to 
more thoroughly monitor and control the economic and fiscal policies of member-
states such a new fiscal and economic policy framework, the ‘European Semester’, the 
‘six pack’ (automatic penalty for countries breaching deficit and debt rules), the ‘two 
pack’ (stricter monitoring and control) and ‘fiscal compact’ (intergovernmental treaty 
ratified by parliaments)22. Accordingly, Brussels’ role expanded: the DGEcFin does 
not solely intervenes in fiscal and economic affairs any longer but also provides with 
structural reforms recommendations, public sector reform policy blueprints (in policy 
fields such as labour market, pension system etc.). Member-states therefore need to 
submit besides the ‘stability/convergence program’ also a ‘national reform program’ 
outlining structural reforms those promote economic growth and employment. The 
magnitude of EU influence was determined by the severity of the economic, financial 
and fiscal crisis in a given member state. Accordingly, in cases when a member state 
had no excessive deficit problems, there was no EU-intervention. However, in case a 
member-state did not comply with the EU’s budget rules (i.e. violates the rules of the 
Stability and Growth Pact - SGP), then the ‘Excessive Deficit Procedure’ (EDP) is 
brought into effect. The Commission and Council then present ‘country specific 
recommendations.23 
                                                          
22 The procedure is the following. In November: EU Commission presents priorities and 
guidelines; In February: EU Commission presents report for each country; March-April: member-
states submit national reform program and stability/convergence program; May-July: member-states 
receive specific recommendations; August-October: member-states incorporate recommendations in 
their budgets. 
 
23 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) contained the ‘Excessive Deficit Procedure’ (EDP). Its 
basic principles were (1) public budget deficit below 3 percent of GDP, (2) public debt to GDP ratio 
below 60 percent, (3) countries have a medium-term objective (MTO). When a country’s deficit 
became excessive, the procedure of the ‘corrective arm’ of the SGP was enacted. The sequence is set 
as follows: In April the member-state needs to submit ‘stability and convergence program’. EU 
Commission and Council formulates an ‘opinion’, which is a recommendation for country’s next year 
public budget. In October  the member-state submits draft-budget to Brussels. If it deviates from SGP, 
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DGEcfin’s analysis of a broad range of economic data serves the purpose of 
monitoring member states’ economic developments and identify potential problems 
(i.e. risky or unsustainable policies; deterioration in competitiveness; etc.). The reports 
labelled as Annual Growth Survey, and Alert Mechanism Report contain the findings 
of the monitoring exercises. Annual Growth Survey focuses on the long-term, strategic 
priorities such as employment and general macroeconomic trends. Alert Mechanism 
Report concentrates on potential internal and external imbalances and identifies 
problem-prone countries and issues based on a scoreboard – the so called 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) scoreboard. The findings are presented 
by the Alert Mechanism Report. Then further examinations and consultations (also 
with the member states) are exectued and finally the European Commission decides 
whether which member states face with the problem of excessive imbalances. In the 
cases of excessive imbalances are recognized, the potentially harmful macro 
imbalances are further scrutinized, their origin, their nature and their severity assessed 
by the In-Depth Reviews. 
The member states inspected by In-Depth Reviews have to submit corrective 
action plans with a clear roadmap and deadlines. EMU member states can be fined for 
failing to address serious macroeconomic imbalances, if these are considered to have 
spill over effect and therefore evaluated as damaging to other member states. Once the 
European Commission has formally qualify a member state’s imbalances “excessive” 
and the European Council has agreed to it, a non-interest bearing deposit (equalling 
0.2% of GDP) can be imposed. This deposit could be transformed into a fine in the 
event of non-compliance with the Commission’s recommendation to correct the 
imbalance at later stages. The decision to fine a Member State is proposed by the 
Commission and can only be blocked if a large majority of governments oppose the 
measure. If a member state repeatedly fails to act on recommendations or does not 
present a corrective action plan sufficient to address excessive imbalances, it will have 
to pay a yearly fine. The fine would equal to 0.1% of GDP of the member state 
concerned. Therefore the corrective arm looks fairly constraining.  
                                                          
EU Commission and Council formulate an ‘opinion’, which is discussed in Euro-group (ministers of 
Finance). 
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As explained above, at the beginning the principal target was fiscal 
consolidation i.e. the reduction of budget deficits and debt accumulation. First it was 
a predominantly economic exercise focussing on to cut the policy sector expenditures 
and to decrease the running costs of administration. The key actor in domestic fiscal 
consolidation at the national level is normally the Finance Ministry, while at the 
European level it is the European Commission’s Directorate-General of Economic and 
Financial Affairs (DGEcFin). At this early stage public sector reforms or 
administrative reform were not in focus. The primary role of both on the national and 
the EU level policy makers was to restore confidence in the financial markets. 
Accordingly, the main actors’ rationale was narrowed to reducing deficits (and debt 
accumulation) in the most effective way (without harming economic recovery too 
much). There came the reduction of wages and staff size, and increasing cost-
efficiency in public administration. Spending-based fiscal adjustments are not only 
more likely to reduce the deficit and debt than tax-based adjustments, they are also 
less likely to trigger an economic recession. (Alesina and Ardagna 2010; Alesina 2012; 
Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi 2014; Sutherland et al. 2012, Blöchliger et al. 2012).  
If the financial situation in a member-state gets out of control and the danger 
of a debt-default is getting priced increasingly by the financial markets through 
massively elevated credit default swaps (CDS) then a sovereign debt crisis is looming 
(see Appendix 7. Development of Credit Default Swap in selected EU member-
states, 1 January 2008 - 1 January 2014). This situation can be settled through an 
appeal to the IMF and EU to provide a temporary loan (bail-out) - the term Troika 
refers to the consortium of the European Commission the European Central Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund that provides financial assistance together in a 
bailout-case. Nevertheless, the loan program is provided upon strict conditions. The 
Troika intervened in fiscal and economic affairs, and also required to carry out 
structural reforms in e.g. labour market, pensions and tax administration24. In bailed-
                                                          
24 The IMF has a range of lending instruments, of which the Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) is 
commonly used in middle-income and advanced economies. The SBA’s duration is usually one or two 
years. The IMF loans are provided upon conditionalities, the most important being that a country 
recovers its finances and economy in order to pay back the loan. The IMF has developed a number of 
more specific loan-conditions, such as ‘prior actions’ a country has to take before getting a loan, 
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out euro-area member states like Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the Troika, in bailed-
out EU member-states which were not members of the euro-area, like Hungary, 
Latvia25 (then) and Romania, the EU (more precisely the DGEcFin) the IMF and the 
Worldbank urged structural reforms in pension system and the rationalization and 
modernization of public administration as conditions for loans. IMF loans in general 
are provided upon ‘conditionalities’. These include (1) ‘structural conditionalities’ 
consisting of measures to improve the financial sector, and (2) public financial 
management reforms (such as accounting, reporting and auditing, expenditure control, 
legal frameworks, etc.). Evidence was found, that the IMF was more interested in 
short-term fiscal and financial conditions, while the DGEcFin focused on medium-
term structural reforms agenda (including public administration, health, labor market, 
the judicial system etc.) with detailed structural conditions (Pisany-Ferry et al 2013).  
The timing of stabilizations may be affected by external factors. A binding 
agreement with the IMF may increase the costs of delaying actual policy adjustments. 
However, theoretically it is also possible that an agreement with the IMF that provides 
more resources to the country and does not force the country to commit to any 
particular set of policies may delay the stabilization as it decreases the cost of delay 
by providing easier access to borrowing (Alesina at al., 2006).  In the stand-by loan 
agreements (SBA) conditionality covers both the design of IMF-supported programs 
– i.e. macroeconomic and structural policies - and the specific ways to monitor 
progress towards the goals. While formally the bailed-out country has primary 
responsibility for selecting, designing, and implementing the policies that will make 
the IMF-supported program successful – in practical terms these are typically closely 
and strictly aligned to IMF recommendations. The program’s objectives and policies 
depend on country circumstances, but the principal goal in each case is to restore 
macroeconomic stability (Crivelli and Gupta, 2014). 
                                                          
‘quantitative performance criteria’ related to economic, monetary and financial variables, and 
‘structural measures’ to implement in key policy-areas, and the regular ‘reviews’. The ‘structural 
conditionalities’ vary and e.g. consist of measures to improve the financial sector, and public 
(financial) management reforms.  
25 Latvia joined to the Euro-zone in 2014. 
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1.3.2. Methodological consideration  
This section explains what the dissertation tries to achieve and how it plans to 
achieve it. Moreover it provides a link between these research tasks and the data 
needed to answer them. It also describes how the data collected and analysed.  
The dissertation has the underlying ambition to uncover the politics of fiscal 
consolidation under the circumstances of economic crisis, to study the external 
inducement in making policy reform at the national level in the wider area of the public 
sector and in the narrower case of tax policy in Hungary. The dissertation looks for 
causal mechanisms in qualitative in-depth single case studies, it has theoretical 
ambitions that reach beyond the case; it is concerned primarily with causal inference, 
rather than with inferences that are descriptive or predictive in nature. The reseach 
includes both systematic mechanisms and case-specific mechanisms in the explanation 
and makes within-case inferences about how outcomes come about.  
Process tracing is treated as one method in the case study method literature, 
usually a component of case study research. It relies heavily on contextual evidence 
(Gerring 2007). Process tracing method is assumedly makes possible the study of 
causal mechanisms (George and Bennett, 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2013). Therefore 
it is considered to be an adequate case study tool in deciphering the causal mechanisms 
of the given sequence of policy changes. Accordingly, the articles apply the process-
tracing method for within-case analysis in order to establish causal relations (Bennett 
and George, 2005; Beach and Pedersen, 2013). The first and the third articles (Chapter 
2. and Chapter 4.) apply within-case analysis, while the second article (in Chapter 3.) 
utilizes the most similar system design and adopts a two-country comparative case 
study methodology. They are comprised of exploratory and explanatory research. The 
dependent variable is ultimately the policy outcome of the policy change procedure. 
There are a series of independent variables, such as the influence of the EU and the 
IMF; economic crisis; reform ownership of elite decision makers etc. (see more 
detailed description in the relevant chapters).   
In order to establish causal relations (Bennett 2004; George and Bennett 2005) 
four data sources were consulted during the empirical research. First, extensive desk 
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research was conducted, analysing publicly available official reports issued by the 
national institutions (e.g. National Reform Programs and Convergence Program); 
Country-Specific Recommendations issued by the European Commission (EC); EC 
staff working documents; World Bank, OECD and IMF reports. Second, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with representatives of ministries and public 
agencies, former and current members of parliament, and fiscal council 
representatives26. Third, in order to incorporate the broader public debate into the 
picture, relevant media sources were consulted. Fourth, statistical and financial market 
data were collected in order to fully track the developments and the policy outcomes 
of public sector reform and fiscal consolidation. The statistics on the macro 
developments were sourced from Eurostat, and where applicable from national 
statistical offices database. Financial market data was sourced from Bloomberg, while 
the tax statistics was sourced from OECD and Worldbank database. 
Altogether, 10 persons were interviewed in the 2015–2017 period in Hungary 
(by the author of the dissertation) and 9 person in the 2013-2016 period in Latvia (by 
the co-author of the article ‘The politics of fiscal consolidation and reform under 
external constraints in the European periphery: Comparative study of Hungary and 
Latvia’- see details in Appendix 1. List of interviews). The interviewees were selected 
with the intention to get a broad account of the case both horizontally (public sector 
representatives, central bank and fiscal council representatives, EC and IMF 
representatives) and vertically (junior employees, executives, high level decision 
makers, experts and political appointees). A peculiarity of the interviews was that in 
most cases the interviewed persons changed their positions throughout the time period 
                                                          
26 Hungary: Interviews were conducted between November 2015 and February 2017 with 
representatives of National Bank of Hungary, the Fiscal Council, the IMF Resident Representative 
Office, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of National Economy, European Commission. 
Latvia: Interviews were conducted between January 2013 and July 2016 with representatives of 
the Bank of Latvia, Ministry of Finance, Finance and Capital Markets Commission, State 
Employment Agency, State Social Insurance Agency. Some of these were conducted as part of the 
project, Understanding policy change: Financial and fiscal bureaucracy in the Baltic Sea Region, 
supported by the Norwegian–Estonian Research Cooperation Programme. 
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under investigation, and therefore they could report relevant information from multiple 
viewpoints. 
1.4. The structure of the dissertation  
This section introduces the three individual articles; it presents their goals, their 
findings and the actual ways how they had reached their results. The section also 
explains the relationship between the articles; and the articles’ relationship to the 
broader (policy change, policy reform) and the narrower (policy change and policy 
reform under the circumstances of conditionality by external agents) research areas.   
1.4.1. EU and IMF influence on public sector reforms 
Chapter 2. contains the article ‘Unintended outcomes effects of the European 
Union and the International Monetary Fund on Hungary's public sector and 
administrative reforms’. The article covers the period 2004–2013, an era that the 
country spent under the EU’s Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and investigates 
European Union (EU) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) influence on Hungary’s 
public sector reforms in the period 2004–201327.  
In Hungary public sector reforms deviated from the externally proposed 
trajectory and took the opposite direction: instead of fostering decentralization of the 
state administration and deepening the Europeanization process Hungary’s 
restructuring of the public sector delivered centralization and a ‘power grab’ that 
eventually impinged on some core values of the EU ‘constitution’. This is the puzzle 
the article studies by in-depth analysis of how external influence was exerted and 
became interwoven with dynamically changing domestic factors in circumstances of 
                                                          
27 EU’s Excessive Deficit Procedure started in 2004 and ended in 2013. The IMF bailout 
programme started in 2008 and ended in 2010. 
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conditionality. The article examines the applicability of policy transfer and the 
relevance of public sector reform theories.  
This article aims to (1) uncover the connections between fiscal consolidation 
and public sector reform to map their processes and their substantive content, (2) 
analyse the instrumental role of domestic factors of elite decision making on the reform 
process and reform content, (3) identify EU and IMF influence on public sector 
reforms, and (4) interpret the interaction of the two (i.e. external influence and 
domestic decision making) in light of the literature on policy transfer and on public 
sector reform. The research question (RQ) posed in the article is: How applicable are 
existing policy change theories for interpreting the empirical puzzle embodied in the 
Hungarian case?  
Policy transfer theories and the scholarly literature centred on explaining the 
policy change process constitutes the theoretical frame. The study applies the process-
tracing method for within-case analysis in order to establish causal relations (Bennett 
and George, 2005; Beach and Pedersen, 2013). Four sources of data are used: (1) 
relevant media sources; (2) publicly available official reports issued by the national 
and supranational institutions (e.g. national reform and convergence programs, 
country-specific recommendations, IMF documents); (3) interviews with 
representatives of ministries, the central bank, the fiscal council as well as the IMF and 
the EC – both on expert level and on decision-maker level; (4) macroeconomic 
statistical data (from Eurostat). 
The analysis supports the thesis that the success of a policy transfer is a 
function of the actual qualitative features of the policy transfer process and echoes 
mainstream texts on public management reform, especially those that postulate that 
the nature of the executive government affects perceptions about the desirability and 
the feasibility of policy reform; the actual reform content; the implementation process; 
and the eventual extent of the achieved reform. The main finding of this study is that 
the Hungarian case gives evidence of how EU-influenced public sector reforms could 
eventually produce outcomes with consequences that are the exact opposite of what 
was intended. The article argues that the deviation from the public reforms prescribed 
by EU policy models and values in the post-2010 period is well explained by the 
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particular socio-economic, political, and administrative factors and the form of the 
political executive. Therefore it is worthwhile to amend and refine policy transfer 
theories with the findings of the study, i.e. public sector reform content is aligned to 
the dominant elite decision makers’ agenda.  
1.4.2. The politics of fiscal consolidation and reform under external 
constraints  
‘The politics of fiscal consolidation and reform under external constraints in 
the European periphery: Comparative study of Hungary and Latvia’ can be found in 
Chapter 3. 
The paper looks at fiscal consolidation in Hungary and Latvia with a special 
interest in the influence of the EU and IMF on the national government’s decision-
making and their impact on fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms. The paper 
approaches the topic from the aspect of the politics of the consolidation. Fiscal 
consolidation outcome is understood here, as the dependent variable. The financial 
crisis had major impact on the economies of many EU member states, but a significant 
variety of effects as well as country responses were observed. This paper discusses the 
different factors that explain the variety of responses in Hungary and Latvia. These 
countries were hit severely by the financial crisis and became the first candidates of 
an IMF bail-out in the European Union. Hungary and Latvia apparently shares lots of 
similarities regarding their background (both are new member states of the EU; both 
were part of the Communist bloc before the regime change; both outside the euro-area 
when the crisis hit; both are relatively small and relatively little known cases etc.).  The 
role of external agents in program design, policy prescriptions, conditionalities, and 
monitoring were similar during the bailout program period in both cases, however the 
outcome of fiscal consolidation and public sector reform turned out to be remarkable 
different.  
The two countries exhibited rather different crisis management trajectory. 
While Latvia overcome the economic problems relatively fast and eventually joined 
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the euro-area in 2014, Hungary stepped out of the IMF program pre-mature and had a 
lengthy, fragmented and cumbersome fiscal consolidation lasting altogether for 8 
years28. Latvia became the poster child of successful IMF stabilization and fostered 
the Europeanization drive. In contrast, Hungary made a U-turn vis-à-vis the earlier 
path of Europeanization and moved towards the centralization of the public sector. The 
question the article aims to investigate what are the explanations for such strikingly 
different routes and outcomes.  
This article, which utilizes the most similar system design and adopts a two-
country comparative case study methodology, is comprised of exploratory and 
explanatory research.  
The research questions of the article are: (RQ1) How did the international 
institutions affect fiscal consolidation and reforms? (RQ2) Why were the outcomes of 
the crisis so different despite the seemingly similar initial conditions?  
At the first stage the background information is provided for both countries. 
Here the attention is paid to the political context and to the socio-economic 
developments before the bail-out. The two countries are then compared, the major 
differences highlighted: in Latvia the regime change delivered national independence 
and sovereignty; in Hungary the regime change was viewed as an extension of personal 
freedom and opportunity for economic prosperity; Hungary had long history with 
public debt issues and various IMF programs previously vs. Latvia without similar 
episodes; the European Commission launched the Excessive Deficit Procedure against 
Hungary just after EU membership was gained in summer 2004 – Latvia had more 
fiscal discipline as it was an essential element of newly born independence. 
 
The paper investigates fiscal consolidation step by step especially with regards 
to how did EU and IMF affect decision-making: the sequence and the time-frame and 
the actual trigger and the content of the fiscal consolidation. The conditionalities of 
                                                          
28 At least not until 2014 when GDP growth was 4.2%. In the 2006-2013 period average GDP 
growth in the Euro-area was 0.6% versus only 0.2% in Hungary. In the core crisis year (2008-2012) 
the respective data are -0.3% (Euro-area) versus -1.0% (Hungary) Source: Eurostat Database 
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the bail-out program were looked at, the two countries were compared: how the 
conditionality was applied (the consequence of no-compliance) and how did it evolve 
over time? How receptive the IMF (and the EU) was on domestic issues, political 
characteristics, local sensitivities? The article examines how the fiscal consolidation 
were received by the domestic actors (parliament, political parties, civil organizations, 
trade unions, population) and how did it shape the domestic political landscape. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with with representatives of ministries and 
public agencies (both key and middle-ranked decision-makers involved). Publicly 
available official reports issued by the national institutions, by the European 
Commission (EC), by the World Bank, OECD and the IMF were as well as relevant 
media sources consulted. Statistical and financial market data were collected in order 
to fully track the developments and the policy outcomes of public sector reform and 
fiscal consolidation.  
This article argues that socio-economic structures and key political decision 
makers’ reform ownership is crucial in the explanation of the different trajectories 
Hungary and Latvia displayed during their fiscal consolidation and reform under 
external constraints.  
1.4.3. Factors facilitating policy reform 
The third article is to be found in Chapter 4: ‘Factors Facilitating Large Scale 
Policy Change - Hungarian Tax Reform 2009-2018’ 
The paper aims to investigate the causal mechanisms and identify the factors 
facilitating large shifts in public policy and therefore it aims to contribute to the 
emerging stream of public administration applied research in public sector reform. The 
paper provides a weak test of existing policy change theories and proposes the 
synthesis of the findings in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of the 
nature of policy reforms. The paper also aims to provide a better understanding in the 
main contexts and in the interacting processes those shaping public policymaking for 
practical policy analysis purposes; to uncover the drivers, the mechanisms and the 
processes of tax policy change.  
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The case under investigation is the major change of tax policy that took place 
in the past decade in Hungary (2009-2018). In order to achieve better contextualization 
of the topic, the study looks at the previous history of tax policy changes in Hungary 
(i.e. the 2004-2008 period), and examines the tax policy developments in other (mainly 
EU and OECD) countries as well. The time period under investigation is segmented 
into four episodes of the four consecutive governments.  
The hypothesis of the article is that the coexistence of economic crisis, strong 
external influence and reform ownership of the domestic elite decision makers 
facilitated the causal mechanisms leading to the large scale tax policy shift in Hungary.  
After a long time period characterized by relative tax regime stability, a major 
revamp of the tax system had taken place in the 2009-2011 period in Hungary. This 
consisted of radical income tax cuts with flat personal tax introduced, massive increase 
of consumption related taxes amended by the introduction of special sector taxes and 
other innovations. Comparably, this was the largest change of the tax revenue structure 
in the EU. What factors can explain such an abrupt and fundamental change of the 
Hungarian tax policy? The ambition of the paper goes further than tracing the single 
case under investigation, and aims to transpose the topic into a more universal one: 
that is the terrain of policy change theories. The broad aim of the paper is to provide a 
weak test of existing theories of policy change.  
The dependent variable of the article is the outcome of tax policy change in 
Hungary in 2009-2018. The research question (RQ) of the paper is the following one:  
What combination of independent factors facilitated the Hungarian tax reform 
in the 2009-2018 period?  
Derived from the exhibited scholarly literature and utilizing Mahon’s 
propositions (Mahon, 2004) the following factors are operationalized as independent 
variables:  
1. Domestic cleavage structures which define reform ownership through 
the political capabilities of elite decision makers and the belief system 
of the advocacy coalitions.   
45 
 
2. The window of opportunity in the form of economic crisis as it 
delegitimizes previous long-serving policies and undermines the status 
quo. 
3. International influence that makes policy learning, policy diffusion and 
policy transfer happen either in voluntary or in coercive form.  
The research is organized in an embedded case study design purporting within-
case analysis. In doing so, the paper utilizes various statistical datasets, official 
documents and semi-structured interviews with key players. The analytical work was 
based on macroeconomic datasets (Eurostat; OECD, Worldbank; KSH, MNB, 
Hungarian Government), official government documents, official reports and working 
papers of international organizations (IMF, OECD, European Commission), advocacy 
coalition policy papers, as well as semi-structured interviews with members of various 
advocacy coalitions.  
The finding of the paper is that the coexistence of all the various identified 
independent factors facilitated major policy change or policy reform - that goes beyond 
day-to-day policy management and involves structural changes. It is that the theories 
of path dependency, punctuated equilibrium, policy learning and advocacy coalition 
framework have already developed individually the elements of the big puzzle of 
policy change. The paper proposes to bring on a common platform of the existing 
streams of thoughts to develop the framework for a policy reform theory. 
1.4.4. The relation between the articles  
The chapters are embedded into the terrain of policy change theories (i.e. the 
theory of path dependency, multiple stream, punctuated equilibrium, advocacy 
coalition framework, policy learning and diffusion). They equally share the ambition 
to test and refine existing theories of policy change and to contribute to the emerging 
stream of public administration applied research agendas on public sector reform by 
making visible and understandable the main contexts and the interacting processes 
shaping public policymaking. The paper proposes to bring on a common platform of 
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the existing streams of thoughts to develop the framework for a policy reform theory. 
In order to facilitate such an enterprise, the paper suggests continuing to study the 
causal mechanism of large scale policy shifts in other cases. The main aspects of the 
three chapters are exhibited in table 1.2. These include the research topic (EU and IMF 
influence on public sector reforms - Hungary, fiscal consolidation in Hungary and 
Latvia; and Hungary’s tax reform); the research ambition; research question; data and 
method. The eventual results of the chapters led to the proposals to (1) to refine 
existing theories (i.e. chapter 2. and chapter 3.) and (2) develop a general framework 
for a policy reform theory.  
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Table 1.2. The map of the chapters 
Chapter Chapter 2. Chapter 3. Chapter 4. 
Article title 
Unintended outcomes effects of 
the European Union and the 
International Monetary Fund 
on Hungary's public sector and 
administrative reforms  
The politics of fiscal consolidation and 
reform under external constraints in 
the European periphery: 
Comparative study of Hungary and 
Latvia  
Factors Facilitating Large 
Scale Policy Change  
Hungarian Tax Reform 
2009-2018 
Research 
Topic 
EU and IMF influence on public 
sector reforms - Hungary (2004–
2013) 
Fiscal consolidation in Hungary and 
Latvia (2008-2013) 
Hungary tax reform (2009-
2018) 
Research 
Ambition 
  
  
  
Uncover the connections 
between fiscal consolidation and 
public sector reform / map their 
processes and their substantive 
content 
Uncover the influence of the EU and 
IMF on the national government’s 
decision-making  
Identify the factors 
facilitating large shifts in 
public policy  
Analyse the instrumental role of 
domestic factors of elite decision 
making on the reform process 
and reform content 
Uncover the influence of the EU and 
IMF the impact on fiscal consolidation 
and public sector reforms 
Explore the causal 
mechanisms of large policy 
change 
Identify EU and IMF influence 
on public sector reforms 
  
Test existing policy change 
theories 
Interpret the interaction external 
influence and domestic decision 
making  
  
Better understand the context 
and the processes of policy 
change 
Research 
Question 
  
How applicable are existing 
policy change theories for 
interpreting the empirical puzzle 
embodied in the Hungarian case?  
How did the international institutions 
affect fiscal consolidation and reforms?  
What combination of 
independent factors 
facilitated the Hungarian tax 
reform in the 2009-2018 
period?  
  
Why were the outcomes of the crisis so 
different despite the seemingly similar 
initial conditions?  
  
Method 
Process-tracing method for 
within-case analysis  
Most similar system design / a two-
country comparative case study 
Embedded case study design 
purporting within-case 
analysis 
Data 
Sources 
  
  
Official reports issued by the national and supranational institutions 
Interviews with policy-makers   
Relevant media sources   
 Statistical data  
Finding 
  
Public sector reform content is 
aligned to the dominant elite 
decision makers’ agenda 
Socio-economic structures and key 
political decision makers’ reform 
ownership is crucial in the policy 
outcome   
The coexistence of all the 
various independent factors 
facilitated major policy 
change / reform  
 Suggests to refine existing theories 
Proposes to develop the 
framework for a policy 
reform theory  
Source: Author 
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Chapter 2. 
Effects of the EU and the IMF on Hungary’s public 
sector and administrative reforms 
2.1. Introduction 
This article analyses the influence of the European Union (EU) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms 
in Hungary in the period 2004–2013. The Hungarian case – although it gained some 
fame internationally – is relatively unknown in detail, but it provides an interesting 
insight into how external influence is actually exerted in circumstances of 
conditionality. The case is especially remarkable because in the last phase of the time 
period under investigation (i.e. post-2010) there was a reversal in the direction of 
public sector reforms and a divergence from Hungary’s earlier Europeanization drive. 
This empirical puzzle is investigated here. The research process is mainly inductive in 
its thrust and provides a thick description of the main features of the reforms. The 
doctrines behind the trajectory taken are then examined and the effects analysed. The 
research topic lies at the interface of the streams of literature dealing with policy 
transfer and public sector reform. The study focuses on (1) the applicability of policy 
transfer theories whose aim is to explain how public policy models or existing policy 
practices (or models) are transferred from one place to another and (2) the relevance 
of public sector reform theories, arguing that reforms are shaped by multiple factors, 
including various socio-economic forces, the political and the administrative system, 
and even chance events (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).  
Hungary, a country with 10 million citizens, is a unitary state with a unicameral 
parliament and a majoritarian political system. The government administration is 
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composed of three plus one layers: central level, county level, and municipality level, 
with the additional regional level (between national and county level).29 Hungary’s 
public administration system had its roots in the centralized and hierarchical traditions 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Nunberg, 2000). After the fully-fledged 
centralization of the post-World War II Soviet-type communist regime, the political 
changes from 1989 onwards brought the decentralization of public administration. 
Hungary became a member of the EU in 2004. The process of adopting the acquis 
communautaire in the pre-accession period is labelled as a general Europeanization 
drive (Shimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2004; Hughes et al., 2004; Bruszt, 2007), 
whereby the doctrines underlying the public sector reforms were derived from the 
Washington consensus in general and the new public management (NPM) approach in 
particular (Csáky, 2009; De Vries and Nemec, 2013). Public sector decentralization 
led to a high degree of independence from central state administration for 
municipalities and for various state agencies. This also resulted in increasing 
functional inefficiencies, the proliferation of state organizations on all levels, financial 
waste, and an environment that hindered central decision makers’ ability to facilitate 
change (Hajnal, 2014; Vass, 2001). Central governments made recurrent attempts to 
reverse the previous trends throughout the 2000s, but the centralization breakthrough 
(i.e. cutting state agencies’ authority, hollowing out the functions of mezzo and local 
governments) did not happen until after the 2010 elections when Fidesz30 gained an 
absolute (two-thirds) parliamentary majority that allowed the government party to 
change most rules of the political game, to rewrite the constitution, and to dismantle 
the strong system of checks and balances (Hajnal, 2013; Hajnal and Kovács, 2015; 
Greskovits, 2015; Kornai, 2015; Körössényi, 1999). This latter metamorphosis of the 
Hungarian public administration constitutes the main interest of this study.  
                                                          
29 The regional level was created in order to comply with the EU’s NUTS 2 regional category – 
it is not rooted in Hungarian administrative traditions and serves mainly as a statistical and planning 
body (Bruszt, 2007; Hughes et al., 2004). 
30 Fidesz is an abbreviation of Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Young Democracts) 
– an initially radical democratic political party formed in 1987. Later on, Fidesz changed its political 
stance, and by the 2010s it had become a populist party. 
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The article covers the period 2004–2013, an era that the country spent under 
the EU’s Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). In 2008–2010, Hungary participated in 
an IMF bailout program. The EDP is an action initiated by the European Commission 
(EC) against those member states whose public budget deficit runs above the set 
threshold.31 According to EDP rules, the national government is responsible for the 
content of the program designed to eliminate the excessive deficit, whereas the role of 
the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DGEcFin) is to formulate 
country-specific recommendations on the necessary policy measures (including public 
sector reforms) and to track their implementation. If a member state fails to comply 
with the approved fiscal consolidation trajectory and does not reduce its public sector 
deficit accordingly, a financial penalty may be imposed. The macroeconomic situation, 
the level and the intensity of external influence on national level decision making, and 
elite decision makers’ ownership of public sector reforms were rather heterogeneous 
during these 10 years. Accordingly, this article distinguishes and analyses three 
qualitatively distinct phases: (1) the first phase of fiscal consolidation and public sector 
reforms in 2004–2008; (2) the IMF bailout program in 2008–2010; and (3) the post-
2010 public sector reforms and fiscal programs. 
Both the EDP and the IMF bailout program have inherent conditionality 
features (more implicitly in the first case and absolutely explicitly in the second). 
These circumstances provided a wide window of opportunity for the EU and the IMF 
to influence domestic public policy reforms. Persistent direct and explicit coercive 
policy transfer interplayed with the domestic context exemplified by the dynamics of 
socio-economic factors and the specificities of the political and the administrative 
system. How then did coercive policy transfer mechanisms work, and how did the 
actual public sector reforms unfold amidst the dynamically changing environment 
                                                          
31 Originally, this was defined by the Maastricht Treaty as below 3% of GDP. In the aftermath 
of the 2009 financial crisis, the Stability and Growth Pact was amended with a more rigorously set 
public debt criteria. Accordingly, EU member states need to adjust their structural budgetary positions 
at a rate of 0.5% of GDP per year as a benchmark and reduce their government debt level above 60% 
of GDP to diminish at a satisfactory pace (i.e. to be reduced by 1/20 annually on average over three 
years). 
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characterized by deep economic and social crises and major repositioning of domestic 
political actors in Hungary during the 2004–2013 period?  
This study aims to (1) uncover the connections between fiscal consolidation 
and public sector reform to map their processes and their substantive content, (2) 
analyse the instrumental role of domestic factors of elite decision making on the reform 
process and reform content, (3) identify EU and IMF influence on public sector 
reforms, and (4) interpret the interaction of the two (i.e. external influence and 
domestic decision making) in light of the literature on policy transfer and on public 
sector reform. The research question (RQ) posed in this article is: How applicable are 
existing policy change theories for interpreting the empirical puzzle embodied in the 
Hungarian case?  
The article proceeds as follows. First, the terminology is defined, the 
methodology is presented and the theoretical frame is outlined, with the underlying 
objective of exploring the suggestions that policy change theory might have for our 
case and how the emerging stream of public sector reform literature might be helpful 
in understanding the empirical puzzle. In the subsequent sections, the article recounts 
and discusses the three qualitatively different periods of the 10 years under 
investigation in chronological order. In these sections, the relationship between fiscal 
consolidation and public sector reform is investigated, as well as the role of domestic 
elite decision making and EU and IMF influence in the whole process. In the 
Discussion section, the reform trajectory suggested by the policy change literature and 
the actual developments exhibited by our case are compared in order to answer the 
research question (How applicable are existing policy change theories for interpreting 
the empirical puzzle embodied in the Hungarian case?). Ultimately, the study aims to 
amend and refine the emerging public administration applied-research agendas on EU 
influence on public sector reform, especially those of Ongaro (2014), Ongaro and Mele 
(2014), and Kickert and Randma-Liiv (2017).  
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2.2. Theories and Method 
This section first provides this study’s interpretations of the terms used 
referring to external (EU and IMF) influence on domestic policymaking in the field of 
fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms, and the theoretical framework of the 
study is then introduced. Fiscal consolidation is understood here as government 
policies aiming to cut the public deficit and debt accumulation (OECD, 2001). Public 
sector reforms are ‘deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector 
organisations with the objective of getting them (in some sense) to work better’ (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2011: 25; Ongaro, 2008). However, reform may not necessarily result 
in modernization or general improvement. This study puts the emphasis on the original 
meaning of the expression: i.e. re-form the previously existing arrangements and give 
them a new structure, form, or process, driven by specific considerations and political 
actors’ interests. Here, public sector reforms are understood in line with the concept 
as used by authors like Barzelay (2001) and Ongaro (2009), i.e. government-wide in 
scope and cross-cutting all public services. Thus, the focus here is on broad-scope 
public sector reforms; specific sectoral reforms are not encompassed in the 
investigation, mainly for reasons of space.  
Policy change lies at the centre of our investigation. Public sector reforms 
inherently entail a process of change. We are interested in circumstances under which 
the need for policy change gets articulated and the sources of the newly set policy 
directions and content in a given jurisdiction. We are also looking at the evolution of 
the policy change process and aim to identify the factors facilitating (or, conversely, 
hindering) change. Therefore, the emerging scholarly literature centred on explaining 
the policy change process appears a particularly suitable theoretical frame of our 
investigations. This public administration-based literature finds its roots in the seminal 
book Public Management Reform by Pollitt and Bouckaert, first published in 2004. 
Their initial findings were most recently further enriched by literature on state 
responses to the crisis (Kickert 2011; Kickert and Randma-Liiv 2017; Ongaro 2014).  
The public sector policy change literature identifies various factors that 
facilitate policy change. These include: (1) the window of opportunity provided most 
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notably by a crisis situation ‘since it delegitimizes long-standing policies underpinning 
the status quo’ (Kickert and Randma-Liiv, 2017: 91); (2) external pressures, including 
pressures emanating from supranational institutions (Christensen and Laegreid, 2017); 
and (3) the form of political executive that affects – among other things – reform 
ownership (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). In our case, Hungary’s deep economic crisis 
embodies the window of opportunity particularly in the second part of the period under 
investigation (2008–2013); in the first part (2004–2008), the crisis was less evident. 
Accordingly, the window of opportunity theory would suggest that public sector 
reforms were more successful in the second part. External pressure, on the other hand, 
existed throughout the whole period under investigation, albeit its strength varied 
across the periods (it peaked during the IMF program). We find the Pollitt and 
Bouckaert model instructive for our case because top-down reforms driven by elite 
decision making – influenced by ideas and pressures from elsewhere – constitute the 
core of the process. In the model, elite decision making is circumscribed by economic 
and socio-demographic factors, political and intellectual factors, and administrative 
factors; and the form of the political executive influences the degree of leverage to 
launch reform and the stability and the ownership of the reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2011). We are interested in the evolution of domestic reform ownership and its impact 
on the outcomes of public sector reforms. Therefore, we utilize the elite decision-
making model for the evaluation of public sector reforms in our case study. According 
to the model, a political weak government theoretically results in low levels of reform 
ownership and eventually hinders durable public sector reforms (valid for the 2004–
2010 period in Hungary), whereas a politically strong government (2010–2013) results 
in resilient reforms.  
As our case is characterized by external influence on policy change, we are 
interested in the content and the techniques of the inherent policy transfer processes. 
Policy transfer therefore is the second theoretical frame used. The theory suggests that 
public sector reforms could emerge as a result of the presence of external pressure in 
the entire period. Moreover, the reform content is supposed to be tailored by, or at least 
aligned to, the agenda of the external agents.  
External influence heralded both the pre-2004 and post-2004 periods. The 
adoption of the acquis communautaire, the general Europeanization trend ahead of EU 
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membership (not within the scope of the current study), the conditionality features of 
the EC’s EDP, and more pronouncedly the IMF bailout program (characterizing the 
2004–2013 period in Hungary) inherently entail some forms of policy transfer. It is 
therefore reasonable to investigate the applicability of policy transfer theory in our 
case.  
The notion of policy transfer refers to the process whereby actors borrow 
policies, administrative arrangements, and institutions developed in one setting to 
make them work within another setting (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Policy transfer 
can refer to policy goals; structure and content; administrative techniques (i.e. policy 
instruments); institutions; ideology; ideas or concepts (Robertson and Waltman, 
1992). In our case, this would translate into the most commonly agreed, accepted, and 
shared institutions, structures, and mechanisms of modern liberal democracies’ public 
sector arrangements in the Western world. Policy transfer can happen voluntarily or 
coercively (Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Heclo, 1974; Rose, 1991).  
When conditionality is involved in the relationship between two actors, then 
there is inherently a certain degree of coerciveness. Policy transfer occurs on a 
continuum between ‘purely voluntary’ policy transfer and ‘purely coercive’ policy 
transfer. Most cases fall along the continuum rather than at one pole (extreme). 
Hungary, however, fell quite squarely into the coercion case, exemplified by the EDP 
(i.e. a window of opportunity for the EC to exert more direct influence than otherwise 
on public sector reforms) and the IMF bailout program (i.e. involving straightforward 
conditionality in the form of policy prescriptions).  
Policy transfer theories therefore suggest that the Hungarian public sector 
reform trajectory in the 2004–2013 period should have resulted in an extended format 
of the pervious Europeanization drive, including decentralization and voluntary 
collaboration of stakeholders; demand-driven and responsive government; 
performance evaluation; customer orientation; local capacity building; territorial 
development strategies; novel budgeting techniques; various public–private 
partnerships, and so on – i.e. the public sector recommendations of the EC and the 
IMF.  
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Policy transfer can happen alongside qualitatively different mechanisms, such 
as copying, emulation, hybridization, synthesis, and inspiration (Rose, 1991). 
Emulation refers to a case where not every detail is copied. Hybridization and 
synthesis are about combining elements of programs found in two or more cases to 
develop a suitable policy for the actual problem. Hybridization and synthesis take into 
consideration the domestic policy legacy, and they prioritize expert decision making. 
They work better under tranquil circumstances in general.  
Crises times (2008–2013) provide a less appropriate environment for such a 
policy transfer trajectory, whereas the apparent lack of crises theoretically would have 
facilitated it in the first phase (2004–2008) under investigation. Inspiration happens 
when familiar problems in an unfamiliar setting can inspire fresh thinking about the 
necessary solutions (Rose, 1991). Such a policy change trajectory is viable when 
external pressure is limited.  
The success of policy transfer depends on the actual qualities of the process. 
Generally, it is helpful if the domestic policy legacy and institutional/cultural setting 
is taken into consideration (hybridization, synthesis) and/or if the domestic agents 
internalize the policy change process (inspiration). The qualitative features (i.e. levels) 
of the policy transfer process are scrutinized in the analysis. We adopt policy transfer 
as our theoretical framework, coupled with the Pollitt and Bouckaert model of public 
management reform processes, with amendments from recent public sector reform 
studies (Ongaro, 2014; Kickert, 2011).  
The study applies the process-tracing method for within-case analysis in order 
to establish causal relations (Bennett and George, 2005; Beach and Pedersen, 2013). 
Three sources of data are used: (1) relevant media sources; (2) publicly available 
official reports issued by the national and supranational institutions (e.g. national 
reform and convergence programs, country-specific recommendations, IMF 
documents); (3) interviews with representatives of ministries, the central bank, the 
fiscal council as well as the IMF and the EC – both on expert level and on decision-
maker level. Altogether, 10 persons were interviewed in the 2015–2017 period (see 
Appendix 1. List of interviews). The interviewees were selected with the intention to 
get a broad account of the case both horizontally (public sector representatives, central 
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bank and fiscal council representatives, EC and IMF representatives) and vertically 
(junior employees, executives, high level decision makers, experts and political 
appointees). A peculiarity of the interviews was that in most cases the interviewed 
persons changed their positions throughout the time period under investigation (2004–
2013), and therefore they could report relevant information from multiple 
viewpoints.32 
2.3. Empirical research  
2.3.1. The first phase of reforms (2004–2008) 
The year 2004 was a busy one: Hungary joined the EU in May, EDP was 
launched in early summer, the government parties (the socialist MSZP and the liberal 
SZDSZ) lost the European Parliament elections33 in June, and the ensuing internal 
coalition crisis resulted in a change of prime minister34 in August. The incoming Prime 
Minister Gyurcsány busied himself restoring the popularity of the government party, 
as the next (national) parliamentary elections were scheduled for within 18 months. 
The Hungarian government had no intention of implementing unpopular fiscal 
austerity measures.35 
                                                          
32 For example, a junior ministry expert in the early 2000s could advance and become a high 
level official eight years later; a central bank economist could become an expert at DGEcFin or at the 
IMF. To preserve anonymity, only the most relevant position of the interviewees is indicated here.  
33 The government parties (MSZP and SZDSZ together) won 11 EP seats out of the total 24 – 
the then opposition Fidesz won 12 EP seats. 
34 Prime Minister Medgyessy resigned in August 2004 – Gyurcsány (former Minister of Youth 
Affairs and Sports) became prime minister in September 2004. Early elections were not held; the 
coalition government continued. 
35 Interview with former high level decision maker at the Ministry of National Economy, 12 
September 2016 (Budapest, Hungary).   
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In order to formally comply with the EDP, the Ministry of Finance prepared a 
national program in autumn 2004 – without consulting fellow ministries, the central 
bank, or economic think-tanks.36 The fiscal consolidation program and structural 
reform proposals were aligned with the EU recommendations – although they lacked 
any detailed action plans, and they were not implemented.37 The EC preferred not to 
interfere in internal political developments (such as parliamentary elections); this 
explains the absence of strong pressure on the Hungarian government to start fiscal 
consolidation before the elections.  
This changed after the elections however, and fiscal consolidation had to 
commence. The prime minister won the 2006 election, but the government coalition 
remained fragile: it had a narrow parliamentary majority, and the prime minister’s 
political profile was damaged.38 The lack of a strong political coalition weakened 
political leaders’ capacity to implement comprehensive reforms.  
All decisions were made eventually by the prime minister.39 Ministry of 
Finance staff provided technical assistance, i.e. calculating the financial impact of the 
measures.40 Political consent was secured by party-politicking through behind the 
scenes deals among the coalition parties. Various interest groups were only minimally 
involved in policy formulation. Previously well-functioning and influential corporatist 
institutions, most importantly the National Interest Reconciliation Council (a tripartite 
                                                          
36 Interview with former official at the Ministry of Finance, 23 August 2016 (Budapest, 
Hungary).   
37 Interview with analyst at the European Commission Directorate-General for Communication, 
Representation in Hungary, 24 February 2017 (Budapest, Hungary); Interview with former high level 
political representative of Hungary in the European Commission, 20 September 2016 (Szentendre, 
Hungary). 
38 A secret political speech by the prime minister was made public in which he acknowledged 
that he had lied to voters before the elections. This provoked violent street demonstrations lasting for 
several months. 
39 Interview with former official at the Ministry of Finance, 23 August 2016 (Budapest, 
Hungary). 
40 Interview with former official at the Ministry of Finance, 23 August 2016 (Budapest, 
Hungary).  
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council dealing with labour market and general economic policy issues involving the 
government, the trade unions, and the various employer groups), were side-lined 
(Sárközy, 2012; Hajnal, 2013).  
In order to enhance the efficiency of the austerity program’s implementation, 
a centralization process took place within the state bureaucracy. On the institutional 
level, the number of ministries and central executive agencies was cut (merged or 
subordinated to their parent ministry), and agencies’ autonomy was curtailed. Within 
the government structure, the position of the administrative state secretary was 
eliminated (typically a bureaucrat responsible for professional administration as 
opposed to the political state secretary who was typically a politician). At the same 
time, new coordinating institutions were created in order to improve the management 
of key policy areas (e.g. National Development Agency responsible for EU funds, 
Committee on State Reform responsible for the implementation of the fiscal package).  
The prime minister became the chairman of the most critical cabinet 
committees. The prescribed roles and functions of the ministers were transformed: 
whereas previously the minister represented the ministry and the corresponding policy 
area in the cabinet with a high level of autonomy, now the minister represented the 
cabinet at the top of the ministry and subordinated to the prime minister (Sárközy, 
2012). The prime minister–minister relation became that of a principal–agent type. 
Strengthening political control and containing organizational resistance facilitated the 
implementation of the fiscal austerity measures (Hajnal and Kovács, 2015).  
Public sector reforms – aimed at improving spending efficiency – were also 
included in the program. Elite political decision makers’ attitude to public sector 
reforms was dominated by the inertia of the Europeanization drive pursued in pre-EU 
accession times. These reforms aimed to: exploit economies of scale through voluntary 
collaboration between local governments; invest in local capacity building (with 
training programs for civil servants and effective monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms for government performance); foster territorial development strategies; 
adopt performance-oriented budgeting practices; introduce a private insurance system-
based healthcare system. These reform ideas did not take into consideration domestic 
policy legacies, lacked sufficient political ownership, and resulted mostly in virtually 
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no action at all or quasi (symbolic) action. Implemented reforms (i.e. performance 
management system in public administration; co-payment in healthcare and education) 
faced professional and institutional resistance, political blocking, and popular 
discontent, and therefore they were ultimately withdrawn.41 Centralization (decision 
making, public sector arrangements, implementation, and so forth) was a means to 
overcome domestic political resistance. 
Instead of lasting public sector reforms, the actual outcome of the government 
efforts was a cut in public administration funding at all levels. The emphasis was put 
on fiscal consolidation (i.e. cutting budget deficit), focusing on the revenue side (i.e. 
increasing tax rates over all and introducing new taxes42). Other measures that were 
not directly linked to short-term fiscal consolidation needs (such as the public sector 
performance management system, or healthcare reform) were eventually withdrawn 
(Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1. General public sector reforms and fiscal consolidation measures in 
the 2004–2008 period  
General public sector reforms Fiscal consolidation measures 
Political control strengthened in central public 
administration 
Public sector layoffs – wage freeze 
Number of ministries cut (from 22 to 18) 
Income tax hikes, new sector taxes (energy, 
banking) 
New coordinating bodies to steer implementation Social security contribution hike 
Public sector performance management system 
(withdrawn) 
Co-payment in healthcare and higher 
education (withdrawn) 
Source: Ministry documents, author 
In this period, there was a lack of urgency on the part of domestic elite decision 
makers (i.e. no perceived crisis). There was external pressure (especially in the 2006–
2008 period), although the interaction between the EU and the national government 
                                                          
41 Interviews with National Bank of Hungary experts, 20 October 2015; 24 May 2016; 4 July 
2016 (Budapest, Hungary); Interview with former representative of the Fiscal Council, 18 December 
2015 (Budapest, Hungary).  
42 The government increased personal and corporate income taxes and social security 
contributions and introduced a sector tax on the energy and banking sectors.    
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was high level political; the content of the fiscal consolidation was not up for 
discussion.43 Internal political support for the government was weak; there was a lack 
of reform ownership (Table 2.2).  
Table 2.2. Domestic factors and EU influence on reforms in the 2004–2008 
period 
Domestic factors EU influence on reforms 
Weak government – weak reform ownership Strong pressure to cut public budget deficit 
No crisis perception Interaction on high political level 
No action (2004–2006) – Quasi reforms (2006–
2008) 
No direct influence on reform content 
Source: Author 
The main ingredients facilitating reforms stipulated by theories (i.e. window of 
opportunity, sufficient reform ownership, and coercive policy transfer) were weak or 
missing. Existing scholarly literature explaining policy change therefore is helpful for 
interpreting public sector reform developments (i.e. no actions, failed reforms) in this 
time period.  
2.3.2. The second phase: the IMF bailout (2008–2010) 
The IMF bailout program took place in a period of major economic crisis and 
was characterized by strict conditionality. Amidst the emerging global financial crisis 
in autumn 2008, a complete freeze on the government primary bond market 
necessitated a call for financial assistance in order to avoid the country defaulting on 
its debt servicing. In late October 2008, the government signed a stand-by arrangement 
(SBA) with the IMF, supplemented by a loan contract signed with the EU and another 
                                                          
43 Interview with former high level political representative of Hungary in the European 
Commission, 20 September 2016 (Szentendre, Hungary); Interview with DGEcFin expert, 13 July 
2016 (Brussels, Belgium). 
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one with the World Bank.44 The EU was involved in the bailout program under the 
terms of the EU Treaty. According to article 119, before a non-Euro-area member state 
seeks financial assistance from an outside source, it has to consult with the EC and the 
Economic and Financial Committee. Hungary’s IMF bailout package was such a case 
– actually the first case in the history of the EU.  
The IMF arrived for the very first preliminary negotiations with a detailed set 
of policy prescriptions about what to do and how to do it.45 The IMF required the 
Hungarian government to deliver additional fiscal adjustment, focusing mainly on 
expenditure-side measures.46 The SBA included detailed policy prescriptions with (1) 
quantitative targets in the form of policy measures with numerical objectives and (2) 
qualitative targets in the form of public sector reforms. The implementation of both 
the quantitative and the qualitative policy targets was strictly monitored. The program 
had firm conditionality features involving several quantitative performance criteria 
(i.e. indicative macro and fiscal targets, structural performance criteria, and so on). 
The Hungarian government had to report monthly; the IMF–EU missions conducted 
quarterly monitoring. Each mission started with an expert level consultation (on the 
macro trends), followed by scrutiny of the fiscal trajectory with the policymakers, and 
ended with the chief negotiators bargaining on the next fiscal measures. A successful 
round of quarterly screening was necessary before the loan window would be opened 
(i.e. access to the next loan tranche).  
Whereas formally the program was a joint product of the IMF–EU and the 
Hungarian government, in reality the IMF delegation prepared a list of policy measures 
that served as a menu, and the Hungarian government had the choice of which ones to 
select. More precisely, the Hungarian government had to implement most of them, but 
                                                          
44 The size of the SBA loan was EUR 12.5bn, the EU loan was EUR 6bn, the World Bank loan 
was EUR 1bn. 
45 Interview with analyst at the European Commission Directorate-General for Communication, 
Representation in Hungary, 24 February 2017 (Budapest, Hungary); Interview with former official at 
the Ministry of Finance, 23 August 2016 (Budapest, Hungary).  
46 Interview with DG EcFin expert, 13 July 2016 (Brussels, Belgium); Interview with analyst at 
the European Commission Directorate-General for Communication, Representation in Hungary, 24 
February 2017 (Budapest, Hungary). 
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it had a small amount of freedom to reject some. The focus was on the cumulative 
financial impact of the selected policy measures.47  
Under the IMF bailout program (2008–2010), the perceived task of the central 
government was crisis management, with the underlying objective of implementing 
the agreed (i.e. prescribed) fiscal consolidation measures and the public sector reforms. 
Prime Minister Gyurcsány resigned in March 2009, and the incoming caretaker 
government was headed by Bajnai, a former manager, until the next elections 
(scheduled for one year later).  
Early elections were not called. Bajnai’s government had several members 
from outside politics (businessmen, experts), and the operating processes started to 
resemble business-like mechanisms, at least at the top echelons of central state 
administration. It would be an exaggeration to label it as an NPM approach, but its 
operational mechanisms (efficiency-driven management approach, corporate 
governance-style leadership patterns) resembled NPM.48 Nevertheless, the caretaker 
government acted as the agent of the IMF and the EC, without a high level of domestic 
support or political legitimacy.   
The IMF-prescribed fiscal consolidation program contained (1) short-term 
efficiency-enhancing measures with prompt expenditure cuts, (2) long-term structural 
reforms, and (3) correction of the Hungarian tax system. Hungary adopted a fiscal 
responsibility law and established a fiscal council49 (with three members and a fairly 
large secretariat staff) to oversee compliance with the fiscal rules authoritatively.  
The pension system was reformed (including a change in the indexation 
methodology, an increase in the retirement age, axing the thirteenth month pension; 
revisiting and controlling disabled pension schemes), although the changes to the 
                                                          
47  Interview with analyst at the European Commission Directorate-General for Communication, 
Representation in Hungary, 24 February 2017 (Budapest, Hungary); Interview with former official at 
the Ministry of Finance, 23 August 2016 (Budapest, Hungary).   
48 Interview with former official at the Ministry of Finance, 23 August 2016 (Budapest, 
Hungary). 
49 Both instigated by DGEcFin.  
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pension system (i.e. raising the retirement age from 62 to 65) were planned to take 
effect gradually between 2016 and 2024. Further measures including the reform of 
central and local level state administration, healthcare, and education did not fit into 
the short-term timeframe.  
Strict discipline was introduced on the management of budgets, with general 
expenditure cuts across the public sector in order to advance fiscal consolidation. 
Public sector real gross wages were reduced. Housing and farm subsidies were cut. 
Social transfers were cut and transformed (e.g. withdrawal of high wage earners’ 
family tax allowances, community work in exchange for social benefits). On the 
revenue side, the program prescribed tax cuts (social security contributions, personal 
and corporate income taxes) with a broadening of the tax base and tax increases 
(consumption taxes). The underlying objective of the IMF-prescribed measures was to 
support the sustainability of the fiscal position by elevating the economy’s growth 
potential through institutional changes in the longer term – fiscal consolidation 
measures were subordinated to this aim (Table 2.3.).  
Table 2.3. General public sector reforms and fiscal consolidation measures in 
the 2008–2010 period  
General public sector reforms Fiscal consolidation measures 
Number of ministries cut (from 18 to 15) 
Public sector layoffs – general public sector 
expenditure cuts 
Fiscal responsibility law (fiscal council) Tax base widening 
Pension system reform VAT hike 
Source: Ministry documents, author 
Under the SBA, the IMF had largely taken over economic policymaking from 
the national government. Domestic decision-making authority was severely curtailed. 
The emergency situation paralysed the domestic political elite and reduced domestic 
resistance, that is, it opened the window of opportunity for public sector reforms. The 
policy measures were prescribed by the IMF and the EC (i.e. coercive policy transfer) 
and therefore fully aligned to the policy agenda of the external agents. Reforms 
targeted structures and institutions. The content of the reforms was derived from NPM 
doctrines and resulted in a reinforced Europeanization drive. Reform ownership was 
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high – as the opposite would have delivered the catastrophic scenario of a potential 
country default (Table 2.4.). The empirical evidence is in accordance with the 
stipulations of policy change theories.   
Table 2.4. Domestic factors and EU/IMF influence on reforms in the 2008–2010 
period 
Domestic factors  EU and IMF influence on reforms 
Strong reform ownership Strong conditionality of the bailout program 
Major financial crisis Reform measures prescribed by IMF 
NPM-like operational mechanisms  
EU focus on fiscal target; IMF focus on 
sustainability 
Source: Author 
2.3.3. The post-IMF program (2010–2013) 
The post-IMF program period brought about radical changes in the direction 
of reforms. Opposition party Fidesz campaigned with anti-austerity rhetoric and tax-
cut promises ahead of the 2010 parliamentary elections. Eventually, Fidesz won a two-
thirds parliamentary majority. The new government led by Prime Minister Orbán faced 
the challenge of pleasing voters (i.e. deliver tax cuts, refrain from further austerity 
measures), while also continuing with fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms 
according to the IMF program and the EDP. First, the government introduced a 
banking tax – without any consultation with the IMF or the EC.50 This was a violation 
of the program. Several other policy measures followed that contravened EU rules 
(e.g. allowing home distilling of the fruit brandy pálinka, curbing the independence of 
the central bank and the fiscal council). Given the confrontational stance of Prime 
Minister Orbán, the relationship between the new government and the IMF/EC soured 
rapidly. Experts (both on the national side and the IMF/EC missions) worked 
                                                          
50 After the government change, it turned out that the public deficit was running above plan; 
therefore, the measure was implemented in order to fix the fiscal problem quickly.  
65 
 
diligently, however, in order to keep the program running.51 Finally, the IMF and the 
EC decided to terminate the bailout program prematurely in summer 2010.52 The EDP 
was still in place though, and therefore fiscal consolidation had to continue. The details 
of the national program and its fiscal impact were actively discussed with DGEcFin at 
expert level.53 
The centralization drive – a main political initiative of the Orbán government 
– was fully accomplished. The parliamentary supermajority allowed a quick and 
fundamental redesign of the whole political system, including that of central and local 
state administration. The previous ministry structure was abandoned, and eight 
integrated super-ministries were created (previously 13 ministries). The personal 
competencies of the prime minister were strengthened as he took charge of all senior 
appointments in the central administration (Sárközy, 2012). Central control increased 
not only over central government, but also over county and local governments (i.e. the 
concentration of discretionary decision power, the establishment of regional 
government offices, the changing of the regulatory framework). Decision-making 
powers shifted within the central government: public service officers and executives 
lost their previous roles in the decision-making process; all important decisions were 
taken at state secretary level (Hajnal, 2014). Central political control was the key 
feature of civil servants’ new recruitment and promotion system. Appointments even 
to middle and lower level management positions required the approval of the state 
secretary. The county level offices of central executive agencies were integrated into 
the newly created County Government Offices. Political appointees were put in charge 
of these entities, and they operated under government control. Several important 
                                                          
51 Interview with former employee of the IMF Resident Representative Office, 14 June 2016 
(Budapest, Hungary); Interview with former official at the Ministry of Finance, 23 August 2016 
(Budapest, Hungary); Interview with former high level decision maker at the Ministry of National 
Economy, 12 September 2016 (Budapest, Hungary); Interview with DG EcFin expert, 13 July 2016 
(Brussels, Belgium).  
52 The officially set end date for the programme was October 2010.  
53 Interview with former high level decision maker at the Ministry of National Economy, 12 
September 2016 (Budapest, Hungary). 
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functions and institutions were transferred from elected county level governments to 
the politically appointed leaders of County Government Offices. 
Similar changes occurred at municipality level. District Government Offices 
were established, subordinated to the County Government Offices. Culture, education, 
and healthcare competencies and duties together with their financing were removed 
from the municipalities (whose budget shrank to one quarter of the original).54  
The National Interest Reconciliation Council and other consultative, tripartite 
arrangements aimed at collective bargaining, as well as sectoral level consultative 
forums, were either abolished or replaced by new institutions with limited authority. 
The corporatist nature of the Hungarian civil service was largely curtailed. As far as 
the general public sector reforms were concerned, some earlier ‘conventional’ or 
‘mainstream’ reforms continued (social welfare system, pension system, tax regime 
reforms started under the IMF bailout program). The Orbán government’s public 
sector reforms also targeted the simplification of administrative procedures: move 
towards e-government, implement one-stop-shops.  
Because of the EDP, additional fiscal consolidation measures were needed. As 
most of the ‘low hanging fruit’ had already been harvested, there was a tendency to 
look for out-of-the-box (also referred as ‘unorthodox’ or ‘unconventional’) policy 
measures.55 The government axed the obligatory pension funds and nationalized their 
assets, introduced sector taxes on selected industries (bank, retail, energy, and 
telecoms), and withdrew the fiscal council funding (resulting in the abolition of the 
secretariat, and the economists were laid off), replaced its members, and cut its 
authority. The tax system was further modified by increasing the VAT rate (to 27%, 
the highest in the EU) and by introducing various consumption and turnover-related 
taxes (unhealthy food tax, financial transactions levy, telephone usage tax, 
advertisement tax, and so forth). On the other hand, income taxes (both personal and 
                                                          
54 Interview with former official at the Ministry of Finance, 23 August 2016 (Budapest, 
Hungary). 
55 Interview with former official at the Ministry of Finance, 23 August 2016 (Budapest, 
Hungary); Interview with former high level decision maker at the Ministry of National Economy, 12 
September 2016 (Budapest, Hungary).   
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corporate) were cut. Further measures included additional expenditure cuts (cutting 
pharmaceutical subsidies, curbing ministry spending, a wage cut in the public sector, 
and so on). Social transfers were cut, and strict conditionality criteria were attached to 
them. Early pension privileges (for soldiers, fire-fighters, and so on) were cut, and 
disability pension schemes were further scrutinized (Table 2.5). In this period, public 
sector reforms were designed in order to strengthen the elite political decision makers. 
Fiscal consolidation measures (mainly focusing on unorthodox policies) ran parallel 
without being directly linked to the general public sector reform stream.  
Table 2.5. General public sector reforms and fiscal consolidation measures in 
the post-2010 period  
General public sector reforms Fiscal consolidation measures 
Political control in central, mezo and local 
level public administration  
Public sector layoffs – wage cuts 
Number of ministries cut (from 15 to 8)  General public sector expenditure cuts 
Decrease role of independent consultative 
bodies and curtail authority of independent 
institutions  
VAT, social security contribution hike, new sector 
taxes 
E-governance, one-stop-shops Centralization of healthcare and education funding  
Source: Ministry documents, author 
In the post-IMF program period (2010–2013), the Orbán government aimed to 
reduce external influence as much as possible. Freedom of policy choice became a 
prime objective. The IMF bailout program and its strict conditionality were quickly 
dispatched, but the EDP remained in place. The underlying government goal was to 
exit the EDP as soon as possible in order to further limit external influence. The 
government had very strong political support: a single-party government with a 
parliamentary supermajority and a continuously high popular approval rate.56 This 
provided a domestic political window of opportunity for public sector reforms in the 
form of strong reform ownership and capable managers (i.e. not constrained by 
                                                          
56 No opposition parties could challenge Fidesz’s position as the most favoured political party – 
Source: Medián, Ipsos, Tárki, Századvég polls. 
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internal political forces, such a coalition partner or strong opposition). Table 2.6. lists 
the domestic factors and EU/IMF influence on reforms in the 2010–2013 period.  
Table 2.6. Domestic factors and EU/IMF influence on reforms in the 2010–2013 
period 
Domestic factors  EU and IMF influence on reforms 
Strong government – strong reform ownership Strong pressure to cut budget deficit (EDP) 
Financial and economic crisis EU policy recommendations 
Centralization of political power No direct influence – expert level consultation  
Source: Author 
Major public sector reforms took place in the post-2010 period in Hungary. 
Existing policy change theories are applicable for the case as long as the indispensable 
ingredients of such developments were present in the period (window of opportunity, 
strong reform ownership, external pressure). The reform contents were largely running 
contrary to the agenda of external agents though.     
2.4. Discussion 
Hungary’s three phases of public sector reforms and fiscal consolidation 
represent qualitatively different episodes regarding the economic environment, the key 
players’ political support, their ambitions, and the role of the EU and the IMF. Theory 
stipulates that policy change is facilitated by a window of opportunity (provided by a 
crisis situation), external pressures (including pressures emanating from supranational 
institutions), and the form of the political executive (a weak political executive results 
in a low level of reform ownership and eventually hinders durable public sector 
reforms, whereas a politically strong government results in resilient reforms). An 
excessive public budget deficit is by definition the raison d’être of the EDP (EU 
influence); therefore, in the Hungarian case, the underlying ambition of successive 
governments was to reduce it. Accordingly, this article focuses on that fiscal 
consolidation (i.e. government policies aiming to cut the public deficit and debt 
accumulation) (OECD, 2001). In this quest, quantitatively (i.e. regarding the size of 
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the overall fiscal consolidation impact) the revenue-side measures (i.e. increasing tax 
rates, widening the tax base, introducing new types of taxes) played a big role, 
whereas, comparatively, expenditure-side measures (i.e. public sector reforms) played 
a smaller role.  
Public sector reforms are understood in this study as changes to the structures 
and processes of public sector organizations, i.e. re-form previously existing 
arrangements by the attributes of a new structure, form, or process, driven by specific 
considerations and political actors’ interests (Barzelay, 2001; Ongaro, 2009). The 
previous sections gave an account of these measures by analysing the instrumental role 
of domestic factors of elite decision making, by mapping the processes and the 
substantive content of the reforms, and by identifying EU and IMF influence on public 
sector reforms.  
The attributes of the 2004–2008 period were: weak political reform ownership 
(strong domestic resistance, conflicts among stakeholders, strong bargaining power of 
interest groups, poor government capacity to act); imported public sector reform plans 
(copy and paste EC blueprints); external pressure on high political level (policy details 
were out of its scope); and no visible economic crisis. Practically none of the factors 
stipulated by policy change theories were available that would have supported public 
sector reforms. In reality during this time period, most public sector reforms existed 
as rhetoric and at the level of formal decisions, and their actual transformative 
implementation exhibited a particularly poor track record. This finding is in line with 
the scholarly literature.  
In the second phase (IMF bailout 2008–2010), the deep financial crisis and the 
risk of country default eliminated domestic resistance and opened the window of 
opportunity for reforms. The autonomy of domestic elite decision makers was 
curtailed, and fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms were prescribed by the 
IMF. However, they were adjusted to the domestic circumstances (hybridization, 
synthesis) by the policy experts. Public sector reforms were not aimed at short-term 
budget deficit-cutting targets; rather, they were designed to modernize domestic 
structures, arrangements, and processes – alongside the IMF’s NPM doctrines – in 
order to support the long-term sustainability of the public finances.  
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In the post-2010 period (after the IMF bailout program), external pressure 
continued in the form of the EDP (until 2013). The underlying objective of elite 
decision makers was to reduce external influence (i.e. to achieve the termination of the 
EDP). Reform ownership was strong, and it was backed by the parliamentary 
supermajority. Additional fiscal consolidation measures consisted mainly of revenue-
side actions in the tax system amidst the continuation of a major economic crisis. 
Policy transfer was executed by motivated domestic elite decision makers through 
policy inspiration. At the same time, several previously implemented reforms were re-
formulated (i.e. fiscal council, public work scheme, pension reform), which this study 
considers as a politically driven policy synthesis. The qualities of the various factors 
facilitating public sector reforms (such as window of opportunity, level of external 
pressure, domestic reform ownership, and dominant policy transfer quality) and the 
existence of public sector reforms exhibited by the Hungarian case are in accordance 
with theory (Table 2.7). 
Table 2.7. The characteristics of public sector reforms in Hungary  
  2004–2008 2008–2010 2010–2013 
Window of opportunity  
(in the form of financial/economic 
crisis) 
No Yes Yes 
External pressure  
(in the form of coercive policy 
transfer) 
Moderate Strong  Moderate 
Reform ownership  
(of domestic elite decision makers) 
Weak 
Strong (under 
conditionality)  
Strong 
Dominant policy transfer quality Copying 
Hybridization 
and synthesis (by 
experts) 
 
Inspiration and 
synthesis (by 
elected 
politicians) 
Sustained public sector reforms No No/Yes Yes 
Source: Author 
Nevertheless, policy transfer theory also suggests that, because of sustained 
external influence, Hungarian public sector reform qualities in the 2004–2013 period 
should have aligned to the external agents’ policy agenda. This should have resulted 
in – among other things – decentralization, voluntary collaboration of stakeholders, 
demand-driven and responsive government, performance evaluation, and local 
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capacity building. Although in the 2004–2008 and in the 2008–2010 period the 
direction of the public sector reforms aligned to such a trajectory, this was reversed in 
the post-2010 period, when the main political objective was the power grab that 
resulted in centralization across the various public sector levels (Table 2.8).  
Table 2.8. Does the Hungarian case support policy transfer theories? 
  2004–2008 2008–2010 2010–2013 
Formal criteria (existence of reforms) Yes Yes Yes 
Substantive criteria (content of reforms) Yes Yes No 
Source: Author 
How then are existing policy change theories useful for interpreting the 
empirical puzzle embodied by the country’s derailment from its previous 
Europeanization drive concerning public sector reforms? The empirical puzzle 
presented by the case shows that the term ‘reform’ denotes changes that do not 
necessarily represent modernization, general improvement, or technically optimal 
arrangements.  
Indeed, the analysis corroborates the thesis that the success of a policy transfer 
is a function of the actual qualitative features of the policy transfer process and echoes 
mainstream texts on public management reforms, especially those that postulate that 
the nature of the executive government affects reform perceptions of desirability and 
feasibility, reform content, the implementation process, and the extent of reform 
achieved.  Moreover, the empirical puzzle provides evidence that the theory must 
adopt a more granular approach in order to fully seize the various policy reform 
trajectories. Both the complexity of the real-life situation (i.e. socio-economic factors, 
domestic policy legacy, previous reform trajectories, actual qualities of external 
influence) and the cultural and political attributes and motivations of domestic elite 
decision makers need to be taken into consideration. 
Accordingly, in the Hungarian case: the deviation from the public reforms 
prescribed by EU policy models and values in the post-2010 period is well explained 
by the particular socio-economic, political, and administrative factors and the form of 
the political executive. These features are embodied in the emerging stream of public 
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administration applied-research agendas on EU influence on public sector reform 
(Ongaro, 2014; Kickert and Randma-Liiv, 2017).  
This article argues that it is worthwhile to amend and refine policy transfer 
theories with the findings of this study, i.e. public sector reform content is aligned to 
the dominant elite decision makers’ agenda. The main finding of this study is that the 
Hungarian case gives evidence of how EU-influenced public sector reforms could 
eventually produce outcomes with consequences that are the exact opposite of what 
was intended.      
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CHAPTER 3. 
THE POLITICS OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND 
REFORM UNDER EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS IN 
THE EUROPEAN PERIPHERY: COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF HUNGARY AND LATVIA 
3.1.Introduction 
One decade has passed since the onset of the global financial crisis, during 
which different European Union (EU) member states have had different experiences. 
Some, such as the Baltic States, experienced a severe contraction, but just a couple of 
years later returned to relatively strong growth (Bohle 2017). Other countries, such as 
some member states in Central Eastern and Southern Europe, have experienced a 
weaker recovery (e.g. Hungary) or went through an almost decade-long recession and 
only now are returning to growth (e.g. Greece). Some countries have retained relative 
political stability despite severe fiscal consolidation and economic hardship (e.g. 
Latvia57 and Estonia), whereas other countries under similar conditions have gone 
through a remarkable political transformation (e.g. Hungary or Greece).  
                                                          
57 Although the Godmanis government resigned in early 2009, it resigned not due to mass 
protests, but largely due to the internal disagreement on the implementation of the austerity measures 
agreed upon with the international institutions. In 2011, as a result of a referendum, the parliament 
was dismissed, however, it was largely the result of political manoeuvring by the President Zatlers, 
exploiting the general dissatisfaction with political institutions to his own political advantage (his 
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The interest of the paper is the politics of consolidation and the influence of the 
European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on fiscal 
consolidation and public sector reforms: fiscal consolidation outcome is understood 
here, as the dependent variable. The available pool of cases are EU member states 
subject to conditionalities imposed by the international institutions following the 
financial and economic crisis in the form of European Commission’s Excessive Deficit 
Procedure and IMF’s Stand-by Agreement.  We purposively sampled the cases, which 
share some independent variables, but differ significantly in terms of outcomes (i.e. 
most similar system design applied).   
We narrowed our selection down to two comparable cases: Hungary and 
Latvia. Both Hungary and Latvia were severely hit by the financial crisis and were 
among the first countries to seek financial assistance from the EU and the IMF (Lütz 
and Kranke 2014). Hungary and Latvia share many similarities, especially in regard 
to their initial conditions in the run-up to the crisis: both were new EU member states; 
both were part of the Communist bloc before the regime change; both were outside of 
the Eurozone in advance of the crisis; both are small and open economies; private 
sector and especially mortgage lending in both countries was predominantly in foreign 
currencies; and both countries represent relatively little-known cases beyond the 
regular media coverage. Nevertheless, the two countries exhibited rather different 
crisis management trajectories. Whereas Latvia overcame the immediate economic 
challenges relatively quickly and joined the Eurozone in 2014, Hungary stepped out 
of the IMF program prematurely and subsequently had a lengthy, fragmented, and 
cumbersome fiscal consolidation, lasting altogether for eight years. The current paper 
aims to address the following research questions:  
How did the international institutions affect fiscal consolidation and reforms? 
Why were the outcomes of the crisis so different despite the seemingly similar 
initial conditions?  
                                                          
newly formed party came in second in the extraordinary elections in autumn 2011 (for an overview 
see Auers, 2011)). 
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This article, which utilizes the most similar system design and adopts a two-
country comparative case study methodology, is comprised of exploratory and 
explanatory research. Comparative analysis of these two cases contributes to the 
debate on fiscal consolidation, public sector reforms, and EU post-crisis governance 
as follows. First, it allows us to understand the effect of initial conditions on the 
patterns of fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms. Second, it allows us to 
explain how domestic political environments and dominant cleavage structures affect 
local political decision making, focusing on fiscal consolidation measures. Finally, the 
combination of factors allows us to explain the diverging crisis management patterns 
and eventual outcomes.  
In order to establish causal relations (Bennett 2004; George and Bennett 2005) 
in our within-case analysis, three data Sources were consulted. First, we conducted 
extensive desk research, analysing publicly available official reports issued by the 
national institutions (e.g. National Reform Programs and Convergence Programs). We 
also analysed Country-Specific Recommendations issued by the European 
Commission (EC) as part of the European Semester policy coordination framework, 
EC staff working documents, and World Bank and IMF reports. Second, we conducted 
semi-structured interviews with representatives of ministries and public agencies, 
former and current members of parliament, and fiscal council representatives58.  
Third, in order to incorporate the broader public debate into the picture, we consulted 
relevant media sources.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, the theoretical framework is presented, 
second the paper provides background information on both countries, focusing on the 
political context and socioeconomic developments before the bailout. Then the paper 
                                                          
58 Latvia: Interviews were conducted between 2013 and 2016 with representatives of the Bank 
of Latvia, Ministry of Finance, Finance and Capital Markets Commission, State Employment Agency, 
State Social Insurance Agency. Some of these were conducted as part of the project, Understanding 
policy change: Financial and fiscal bureaucracy in the Baltic Sea Region, supported by the 
Norwegian–Estonian Research Cooperation Programme. Hungary: Interviews were conducted 
between 2015 and 2017 with representatives of National Bank of Hungary, the Fiscal Council, the 
IMF Resident Representative Office, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of National Economy, European 
Commission. 
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analyses fiscal consolidation in the two countries, including its sequence and content, 
the influence of the external agents, the relation between the EU and the IMF, and the 
conditionalities of the bailout programs; and the domestic responses to the austerity 
measures are looked at and compared. The last section is devoted to an assessment of 
the reasons for, and outcomes of, the different trajectories. 
3.2. Theoretical framework 
There is an abundant literature dealing with the topic of public sector policy 
change. The research interest of this article is narrowed to a special type of policy 
change: fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms amidst the circumstances of an 
economic crisis and initiated and supervised by external agents (i.e. international 
organizations) in a form of coercive policy transfer. Policy change literature identifies 
various factors those facilitate policy change including (1) the window of opportunity 
provided most notably by a crisis situation ‘since it delegitimizes long-standing 
policies underpinning the status quo’ (Kickert and Randma-Liiv, 2017: 91); (2) 
external pressures, including pressures emanating from supranational institutions 
(Christensen and Laegreid, 2017); and (3) the form of political executive that affects 
– among other things – reform ownership (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). First we look 
at the findings of existing policy change literature of these three conditions vis-à-vis 
fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms. Then immediately we interrelate the 
attributes found in our selected cases (Hungary and Latvia) with those stipulated by 
scholarly literature.   
 
The window of opportunity: A critical juncture (Capoccia and Kelemen 
2007) or a window of exceptional opportunity called conjuncture (Wilsford 1994) are 
identified as an independent variable facilitating policy change. Such a critical 
juncture/conjuncture is provided by the constellation of economic crisis. Political 
economy scholars even claims that the hypothesis that crises lead to fiscal 
consolidation and public sector reforms is part of the “conventional wisdom” 
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(Tommasi and Velasco, 1996). However, public sector policy change scholars (Kickert 
et al., 2015) argue that the depth and immediacy of the crisis would influence the 
selection of specific measures (e.g. hiring freezes, lay-offs, or program-specific cuts) 
and the approach to cutback management (e.g. cheese-slicing or targeted cuts). 
Deep economic crisis of our two cases embody well the window of opportunity. 
The critical conjuncture in both cases allowed the political executives to implement 
those changes both in terms of fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms those 
were blocked in normal times as we will exhibit later in the paper. 
External pressure: In our understanding, it is practical to derive from the 
definition stipulated by the seminal article of Dolowitz and Marsh that external 
influence eventually is the transfer process of policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions, and ideas from one entity to another (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). While 
literature distinguishes between coercive and voluntary transfer, in this article we deal 
with latter. Coercive policy transfer – also termed as facilitated unilateralism or 
hierarchical policy transfer - occurs via the exercise of transnational or supranational 
authority; when a state is obliged to adopt policy as a condition of financial assistance 
(Bulmer and Padgett 2014). Some scholars argue that the importance of foreign 
pressure is overstated and in reality it has only a weak effect (Alesina 2006, Mahon 
2004). Others claim that in IMF-supported programs’ conditionalities are critical to 
fiscal consolidation, but the eventual success of a program rests on the individual 
governments those are responsible for policy selections, design and implementation 
(Crivelli and Gupta, 2014). Public sector policy change scholars argue that countries 
facing external pressure in a form of conditionality related to financial assistance (i.e. 
external lending by the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank), are forced to implement swift and radical policy change (Christensen and 
Laegreid, 2017; Randma-Liiv and Kickert, 2018). Bulmer and Padgett (2014) offers a 
resolution of these apparently disharmonious views that quality of the coercive policy 
transfer and its eventual outcome depends on variables such as the degree of authority 
accrued by supranational institutions and the density of rules and the availability of 
sanctions/incentives.  The very same rules of the IMF Stand-by Agreement were 
applied to Hungary and Latvia. The individual country targets set by the EU, and the 
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monitoring procedures of the external crisis management were also displaying largely 
similar attributes.  
The form of political executive: Political economy scholars find that fiscal 
consolidation and broad reforms are more likely to occur when new governments take 
office (i.e. when elections are a long time away); when governments are politically 
strong (strong mandate, strong state, narrow coalition, strong leadership); and when 
the executive branch faces fewer institutional constraints (Reich, 1995; Alesina, 2006). 
The form of the political system influences also the decision-making patterns: one-
party governments in majoritarian systems are able to implement quick and resolute 
fiscal cutbacks, while coalition governments in consensual democracies will engage 
in protracted negotiations (Kickert et al., 2015). The historical context, such as the 
strength of the welfare state, civil society organisations and public-sector unions, as 
well as the nature of civil service regulations also considered to be factors shaping the 
process and content of fiscal consolidation. Thus, in a country with strong public-
sector unions, regulations limiting the possibility of severe pay cuts and lay-offs in the 
public sector, decisive implementation of cutbacks will be difficult. In a country with 
a historically strong welfare state, the government will likely face opposition in a form 
of protests whenever targeted program-specific cuts will be implemented. (Christensen 
and Laegreid, 2017; Randma-Liiv and Kickert, 2018). Concerning policy transfer 
capabilities of the under the circumstances of coercive policy transfer, Bulmer and 
Padgett (2014) distinguishes between bargaining/muddling through and problem 
solving type of attitudes of the political executives whereas the muddling through 
approach would lead to weaker forms of policy transfer while problem solving attitude 
results stronger policy transfer outcomes.  
As far as the sequence of fiscal consolidation, and the pattern of the decisions 
are concerned the cutback management literature gives additional cues (for a thorough 
overview see Raudla et al., 2015) suggesting that the fiscal cuts are implemented 
through several stages, especially during protracted fiscal crises. First, there is the 
stage of denial, followed by several rounds of across-the-board cuts, cutting deeper the 
more politicians realised the severity of the crisis. Only in case of protracted and severe 
fiscal crises did the authorities resort to targeted cuts, which also affected public 
service delivery and social transfers (Hood and Wright, 1981; Levine, 1979, 1985; 
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Kickert and Randma-Liiv, 2015; Pollitt, 2010). Therefore, we can expect that in case 
of rapidly deteriorating public finances (e.g. bank bailout), the government will be 
forced to make unpopular decisions early on in the crisis. In addition, the composition 
of cutback measures will be affected by the depth and the duration of the crisis: When 
fiscal situation deteriorates over a longer period of time, the more complex and 
strategic would the cutback measures become; if the crisis is deep from the start, the 
more drastic and resolute cutbacks without the necessary evaluation would be 
implemented in the beginning (Randma-Liiv and Kickert, 2018).  
Our two cases under investigation in this article experienced both the deep 
economic crisis and the inducement for public sector reforms and fiscal consolidation 
coming from external agents in a form of coercive policy transfer. However, the 
sequence and the eventual outcome of the fiscal consolidation process differed 
significantly in the two countries. We find the Pollitt and Bouckaert model instructive 
for our analysis because top-down reforms driven by elite decision making – 
influenced by ideas and pressures from elsewhere – constitute the core of the process. 
In the model, elite decision making is circumscribed by economic and socio-
demographic factors, political and intellectual factors, and administrative factors; and 
the form of the political executive influences the degree of leverage to launch reform 
and the stability and the ownership of the reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). We 
are interested in the evolution of domestic reform ownership and its impact on the 
outcomes of public sector reforms. Therefore, we utilize the elite decision-making 
model for the evaluation of public sector reforms in our case study. According to the 
model, a political weak government theoretically results in low levels of reform 
ownership and eventually hinders durable public sector reforms. 
The dependent variable of the article is the outcome of fiscal consolidation and 
public sector reforms under external constraints. We operationalize the independent 
variables derived from the exhibited scholarly literature alongside the qualities of the 
execute decision makers; and the socio-economic context (detailed in Table 3.1.). 
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Table 3.1. Independent variables for the politics of fiscal consolidation and 
reform under external constraints - comparative study of Hungary and Latvia 
 
High likelihood of policy 
change 
Low likelihood of policy 
change 
political support strong mandate weak mandate 
institutional constraint  insignificant significant 
objective problem-solution muddle through 
reform ownership strong weak 
magnitude of the crisis small large 
Source: Authors 
3.3. Background conditions and developments leading to the 
crisis 
3.3.1. Political environment 
Hungary and Latvia are on the Eastern periphery of the EU. Both countries 
joined the EU in May 2004. Both countries are small in terms of their geographical 
size and population; both are underdeveloped with living standards at around 2/3 of 
the EU average (exhibited in Table 3.2.).   
Table 3.2. General information on Hungary and Latvia 
 Hungary Latvia 
Country surface (square km) 93,030 64,589 
Total population in 2016 (million) 9.83 1.97 
GDP per capita in PPS in 2015 (EU28=100) 68.2 64.4 
Source: Eurostat 
Hungary, a country with 10 million citizens, is a unitary state with unicameral 
parliament and a majoritarian political system. In the bipolar post-World War II period 
Hungary became part of the Soviet-bloc as a quasi-independent satellite-state with a 
communist dictatorship installed. One-party system was established and civil 
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(especially political) rights of the citizens were severely restrained. The transformation 
of the political system started in the late 1980’s. This process was facilitated by 
peaceful negotiations (often referred to as the “round-table” talks) between the ruling 
communist elite and the newly formed various democratic grassroots movements. First 
democratic elections were held in 1990.  
The Hungarian government administration is composed of three plus one 
layers: central-level, county-level and local-level governments with the additional 
regional-level one (between national and county level). The system of Hungary’s 
public administration roots back to the centralized and hierarchical traditions of the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy times (Nunberg, 2000) which had close relationship with 
the German administrative tradition and its Weberian culture. In the post- World War 
II period, the centralization of public administration was made far-reaching with an 
all-encompassing political influence of the communist party.  
Based on historical and cultural heritage the Hungarian population widely 
shared the sense of belonging to Europe and therefore there was a concealed desire for 
Europeanization throughout the decades of the communism as opposed the political, 
economic, and cultural orientation towards the Soviet Union. Therefore, the drive of 
“returning to Europe” was indeed framing domestic discourse, beliefs and 
expectations. This resulted in the adoption of a new institutional design in governance. 
Nevertheless, apart from the formal changes, no fundamental changes were taking 
place as far as the essential features of the formal rules, attitudes, norms and public 
values were concerned – i.e. the Hungarian case exhibits no real transformation, but 
rather  absorption. The explicit goal of Hungarians was a quick political integration 
with the “West” based on the country’s fast advancing track-record on legal 
convergence. It was a disappointment therefore that the EU was inclined to provide 
only a slow-track accession process and opted for a strategy of allowing the East 
Central European countries to acquire EU membership together in one block only in 
May 2004. 
Latvia, with a population of just under 2 million people, is a unitary state with 
a unicameral parliament, and a proportional representation system. Latvia along with 
its neighbours – Estonia and Lithuania – was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940, 
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which opened these countries to large scale migration, the repercussions of which still 
affect the political realm, especially in Latvia (Auers, 2015). Similar to Hungary, civil 
liberties were severely constrained also in Latvia during the Soviet times. Eventually, 
in the late 1980s, the national movements across the Baltic states, including Latvia 
seized the new opportunities provided by the policies of ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestroika’ 
introduced by Gorbachev to delegitimise the Soviet annexation and initiated protest 
movements, which, in turn led to political sovereignty and later also full independence. 
The protest movements across the Baltic states culminated in the 1989, in the form of 
the ‘Baltic Way’ – a chain of humans holding hands across the three Baltic states. The 
initial transition towards independence was not entirely peaceful, as forces loyal to the 
Soviet Union tried to threaten the independent movement in Latvia with military force 
that culminated in the January 1991 Barricades in Riga. Although initially there were 
two pro-independence factions – the radical nationalists that formed Citizens’ 
Committees, and the moderate and inclusive Popular Front – eventually the Popular 
Front also shifted to the right, alienating its Russian-speaking members. Thus the 
independence project was also a project focused on re-building a mono-national state 
of the interwar period.(Auers, 2015; Hiden and Salmon, 2014) This set the direction 
for development of the political system in Latvia. 
The government administration in Latvia is now organised on two levels: 
central government and local government. Public administrations had to be re-built 
from scratch after re-gaining the independence, and were based on the best practice 
borrowed from a variety of Western democracies, creating a system that combined 
some principles of Weberian public administration with a significant influence of New 
Public Management. Already by 1995, following the first banking crisis, politicians 
lost interest in development  of effective public administration structures, slowing the 
pace of reforms, and leaving Latvia well behind other East Central European states in 
terms of effectiveness of public administrations (Meyer-Sahling, 2009; Reinholde, 
2004). 
The political party structure of Hungary was from the inception of the new 
democratic regime a highly polarised one with the democratic grassroots movements 
on the one side (nationalist, liberal, conservative, social-democratic in various 
mixtures), and ex-communists on the other. The polarisation of the Hungarian political 
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scenery is a sticky phenomenon even though the very division line moved time-to-
time (new democratic parties vs. ex-communists; political left and right; populist and 
mainstream parties). Nevertheless, throughout the 1990’s the main strategic goals 
(modernization of the economy with foreign capital import; pro-Western orientation 
in foreign policy with the ultimate aim of NATO and EU membership) were 
commonly shared by all major political parties. In the 1990-2010 period Hungary had 
coalition governments. These coalitions proved to be relatively stable where coalition 
agreements played a major role in reconciling political conflicts of government parties. 
This has changed with the single party Fidesz-government from 2010 on.  
Latvian political party system has been characterised by unceasing change 
since the early 1990s, with new parties entering the political arena every election cycle. 
One of the peculiarities having a significant effect on the functioning of the political 
system is the substantial Russophone minority. Latvia adopted a rather restrictive 
citizenship law in 1994. The European Commission argued that Russian-speaking 
minorities should be granted greater access to professions and democratic participation 
(European Commission, 1997), therefore the law was somewhat liberalised in 1998, 
still maintaining though the requirement for examination in Latvian language, history. 
This effectively created a significant minority not able to effectively participate in 
democratic processes neither on the central nor on the local government level. 
However, as growing numbers of Russian-speaking population in Latvia gained 
citizenship, the political landscape started to change. 
Party politics have been very volatile throughout the first two decades of 
independence, with volatility somewhat diminishing with the changes in the electoral 
campaign laws. Still, every election is marked by creation of at least one start-up party. 
However, despite the frequent changes in fortune of political parties, there has been 
remarkable ideological and policy continuity – in part explained by lack of legitimate 
alternative from the left of the political spectrum, which would be acceptable to both 
Latvians and Russophones, as well as the widely shared common goals of becoming 
part of the wider Europe by joining first the EU and NATO, later the Eurozone and the 
OECD (Auers, 2015). 
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Volatility in the political sphere was reflected not only in the frequent change 
of political parties, but also in the number of governments – twenty governments with 
14 prime ministers. The longest serving prime minister – Valdis Dombrovski -, 
presided over governments during the times of economic uncertainty, instability, 
severe austerity, and general social distress (Woolfson and Sommers, 2016). In the 
years following the economic crisis, there has been some shift in the political 
preferences of the electorate, which could be observed in the election results. First, the 
Concord party, which has been historically linked to the Russophone electorate, which 
has been growing in numbers as more of the non-citizens passed naturalisation, has 
won both two subsequent local government elections in Riga – the major municipality. 
Concord also gathered substantial support in the national elections, claiming 29 seats 
in 2010 elections (from 17 seats in 2006), then claiming 31 seats and effectively 
winning the extraordinary elections after the dissolution of the parliament initiated by 
the President Valdis Zatlers, and then once again outpacing the opponents in 2014 with 
24 seats. Despite the three subsequent successful elections, Concord – the only left-
leaning party – remained in opposition in the Parliament, which since re-gaining 
independence in 1991 and until 2016 has remained dominated by a coalition of centre-
right and nationalist parties. The right wing nationalist party National Alliance gained 
8 seats in 2010, 14 seats in 2011, and 17 seats in 2014 parliamentary elections, thus 
substantially strengthening its voice in the coalition. 
In contrast to Hungary, Latvia had only a short experience as an independent 
state during the interwar years, until the annexation by the Soviet Union (1918-1940). 
As part of the Soviet Union, Latvia was deeply integrated in the latter’s governance 
and economic structures. Therefore, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Latvia 
had to develop its administrative structures from scratch. Simultaneously, Latvia 
attempted to reject the Soviet legacies while effectively re-building a modern version 
of the pre-war independent Latvia, largely based on nationalist ideology and 
unrestrained capitalism (Hiden and Salmon 1994).   
The initial economic policy choices vis-à-vis the transformation of the 
economy comprised in both countries radical privatization and liberalization of trade 
and financial flows. Hungary arrived to the regime change with high (over 70% in 
GDP percentage) public debt, while Latvia with virtually no public debt. Latvia opted 
85 
 
for a fixed exchange rate and a concomitantly tight monetary and fiscal policies, as 
well as a limited welfare state (Auers 2015; Bohle and Jacoby 2017). Hungarian 
governments carried on with loose fiscal policy (i.e. extending the welfare state served 
the goal of mitigating the social problems caused by regime change economic shocks). 
Hungary also experienced recurrent waves of currency devaluations.  
Both states are unitary states with strong central government responsible for 
policy making across a variety of policy domains and limited decentralisation. The 
electoral systems in the countries are different: In Hungary the electoral system is 
mixed-member majoritarian, while Latvia has a proportional electoral system 
(Scheppele, 2014; Sárközy 2012).  
Polarization is a characteristic feature of Hungary’s political party structure: 
the division line was initially between ex-communists and democratic parties; than 
political left and political right, followed by the mainstream vs. populist divide 
(Körössényi 1999). In Latvia the division line is drawn between centre-right and 
outright right-wing nationalist parties with a strong preference for neoliberal policies 
(forming the various government coalitions) versus left-wing parties largely focussing 
on the Russian-speaking minority as their core electorate (prohibited to join or form a 
coalition government) (Auers, 2015). Table 3.3. presents a synopsis of the political 
background in Hungary and Latvia. 
Both countries’ governments shared a similar pro-European stance, however 
the position towards joining the Eurozone was much clearer in Latvia, while in 
Hungary the commitment to join the Eurozone was only formal in the pre-201059 and 
it was officially abandoned after (Kovács, 2016). As opposed the Hungarian trajectory 
the Latvian government (lead by Dombrovskis) while also tasked with resolving the 
crisis maintained the commitment to single currency as the only possible exit strategy 
despite the calls for currency devaluation. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that 
Latvia gave up its own monetary policy by pegging its national currency first to the 
currency basket and then to the Euro, while Hungary retained control over monetary 
                                                          
59 Eurozone entry target dates were delayed several times, while the country drifted further away 
meeting the Maastricht criteria. 
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policy, which allowed for some additional policy tools (e.g. exchange rate 
adjustments) when dealing with the crisis (see e.g. Josifidis et al., 2013). 
Table 3.3. Political background in Hungary and in Latvia 
 
Hungary Latvia 
Regime change Peaceful negotiations between 
democratic movements and the 
Communist elite 
Some confrontation with 
pro-Soviet forces and 
economic sanctions 
Political objectives Political consensus on 
democratization and Western 
orientation 
Consolidation of pro-
independence movement 
around the national state 
Elections First free elections in 1990 First free elections in 1993 
State building Continuity of the nation state / 
amending the constitution 
Rejection of Soviet 
legacies / modern state 
building 
Economic policy Neo-liberal elements mixed 
with social market economy 
Radical neo-liberal 
economic policy 
Party structure  Polarized – left vs. right / 
coalition governments until 
2010 
Main cleavage around 
nationality – language / 
centre-right in power since 
independence 
Europeanization Driven by personal freedom 
and economic prosperity 
External security, 
economic prosperity, and 
being part of Europe 
Source: Authors 
3.3.2. Socioeconomic developments before the crisis 
Following accession to the EU, both Hungary and Latvia set out on spectacular 
convergence trajectories with strong economic growth (Graph 3.1.) and improving 
socioeconomic conditions, but coupled with the building up of macroeconomic 
imbalances, growing external indebtedness (Graph 3.2.) and increasing foreign 
currency exposure of domestic borrowers (Blanchard, Griffiths, and Gruss 2013; 
Bohle 2017).  
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Graph 3.1. Annual change of real GDP in Hungary and Latvia (2000-2013) 
Source: Eurostat 
Graph 3.2. External debt in GDP percentage in Hungary and Latvia (2000-
2014) 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Hungary consistently had a loose fiscal policy, high public debt, high inflation, 
and a relatively low unemployment rate. At the same time, Latvia maintained a 
relatively more prudent stance towards macroeconomic policies, keeping a relatively 
low public debt and deficit, although at the cost of a relatively high unemployment 
rate (see Tables 3.4. and 3.5.). In Hungary, political priority was social stability 
financed by expensive welfare programs (i.e. the continuation of the Goulash-
Communism60) whereas in Latvia the priority was stabilizing state sovereignty by 
radical policies rejecting the previous Soviet regime. 
Table 3.4. Economic indicators in the pre-crisis period* 
  Hungary Latvia 
Economic growth rate** Medium (around 4% in the 
pre-crisis years) 
Very high (8–12% in the pre-
crisis years) 
Unemployment rate Low (6% on average in 2000–
2007) 
High (11% on average in 
2000–2007) 
Public budget deficit High (7–9% of GDP in the 
pre-crisis years) 
Very low (below 1% of GDP 
in the pre-crisis years) 
Public debt High (67% of GDP in 2007) Very low (8.4% of GDP in 
2007) 
Gross foreign debt High and increasing (almost 
100% of GDP in 2007) 
High and rapidly increasing  
(over 120% of GDP in 2007) 
Inflation High (6.4% on average in 
2000–2007) 
Moderate (3.5% on average in 
2000–2007, but reaching 15% 
in 2008) 
Currency regime Floating   Currency peg (fixed rate) 
Source: Authors; * Data Source for all indicators is Eurostat processed by the authors; ** Economic 
growth rate is understood here as real GDP change year-on-year 
                                                          
60 The term is applied for Hungary’s softer policy stance adopted after the 1956 revolution to 
stabilize Communists in power, i.e. a deviation away from soviet-type communism providing higher 
living standards and more personal freedom to citizens compared to peer countries. 
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3.4. The pace and composition of fiscal consolidation: 
Hungary and Latvia compared 
Both Hungary and Latvia had to implement substantial fiscal consolidation 
measures. However, the two countries’ experiences with consolidation efforts were 
quite different.  
To start with: the main reasons of the fiscal consolidation (i.e. “the original 
sin”) were different. In Hungary it was generally loose fiscal policy (‘fiscal 
alcoholism’) and large accumulated public debt in Hungary, while in case of Latvia it 
was the vulnerability of financial sector. In Hungary loose fiscal policy carried out by 
the subsequent governments lead to the problem of aggravating public debt. Excessive 
deficit was an issue already when Hungary joined the EU in 2004, and the EC’s 
excessive deficit procedure was launched just month after EU membership was gained. 
In Latvia, the fiscal stance was fairly prudent (a must under the fixed currency regime), 
and it was the 2008 global financial crisis that revealed the vulnerabilities of the 
country’s banking system (i.e. high proportion of foreign currency lending, and 
excessive risk taking of the second largest bank in Latvia – Parex).  According to a 
number of interviewees, in addition to a liberal regulatory regime, lack of experience 
with capital inflows of such magnitude proved to be the main challenge for 
policymakers. When the liquidity crunch reached Latvia, Parex – relying on foreign 
short-term lending to refinance its debt, most of which was also carrying a currency 
risk – was not able to refinance its debt obligations and was taken over by the Latvian 
Government (Griffiths 2013; Sommers 2014). 
The timing and the sequence of the fiscal consolidation also display markedly 
different trajectories. In Latvia it was front-loaded and focussed, in Hungary it was 
segmented, reluctant and cumbersome (nearly a decade-long procedure with the 
involvement of 3 consecutive governments). In Latvia, the EC and IMF assisted fiscal 
consolidation, the process was frontloaded, and it brought about quick results (i.e. one 
cycle). The government effectively utilized the ‘living beyond one’s means’ rhetoric, 
constructing fiscal austerity in terms of ‘virtuous pain after the immoral party’ (Blyth 
2013, 13). This helped to mitigate or soften the public reaction to austerity. Besides, 
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also in contrast to the situation in Hungary, the Latvian welfare state was never 
particularly strong, requiring people to be self-reliant rather than rely on the state to 
provide social support. After the fall of the Godmanis government, in March 2009, a 
new government led by Valdis Dombrovskis – a broad coalition including five centre-
right and right-wing parties – began its work. Dombrovskis government had an explicit 
mandate from the international institutions to implement consolidation measures 
proposed earlier.  Fiscal consolidation measures (amounting to 9.5% of GDP) were 
implemented over three years, and the fiscal consolidation effort was largely 
frontloaded – most of the expenditure cuts were made within two years of the crisis. 
In Hungary, fiscal consolidation span over 3 governments and 8 years. The first 
episode (2006–2008) cutback measures were frontloaded, domestically designed, and 
focused on the revenue side. The aim of the government was to protect welfare 
spending budget and to muddle through until the next elections. While a large budget 
deficit cut was achieved (9.3% of GDP in 2006 vs. 3.6% in 2008), global financial 
crisis resulted in the need for an IMF bail-out in late 2008 (Staehr 2010). A temporary 
care-taking government took over (2009-2010) with the primary mandate to deliver 
the IMF program. The 2010 election resulted in a political landslide - the incoming 
government (with 2/3 parliamentary supermajority) rejected fiscal austerity and 
promised voters to end austerity. This resulted in an early termination of the IMF 
program in the summer of 2010 (interviews with former representatives of the IMF 
Resident Representative Office, the Ministry of National Economy, the EC 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs conducted between June and 
September 2016). Eventually, with the deployment of auxiliary fiscal measures 
(including several unorthodox ones61), fiscal consolidation ended in 2013.  
 
 
                                                          
61 Sector taxes and various new taxes (i.e. on financial transaction); flat personal income tax; 
social transfers changed to extensive public works schemes; full abolishment of the three-pillar 
pension system (i.e. obligatory pension funds axed) etc. 
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Table 3.5. The sequence of fiscal consolidation 
 
Hungary Latvia 
Trigger Loose fiscal policy continued after 
joining the EU 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) 
launched in 2004 
IMF bailout in 2008 
Economic boom in the post-accession 
years led to a more lax fiscal policy; 
however, the final trigger was the bank 
bailout in late 2008, which required 
international assistance 
Timeframe Started after the 2006 elections; ended 
in 2013 (EDP lifted)   
Started in late 2008; ended in 2013 with 
accession to the Eurozone 
The sequence  1.Non-compliance (2004–2006) 
2.Gyurcsány government fiscal 
austerity (2006–2008) 
3.IMF bailout (2008–2010) 
4.Orbán government unorthodox 
measures (2010–2013) 
1.Global financial crisis and bank 
bailout (late 2008) 
2.Austerity measures under 
Dombrovskis government (2009–2013) 
followed by additional measures in 
2014 to comply with the fiscal 
discipline law. 
3.Joining the Eurozone (2014)  
Source: Authors 
On the revenue side, the Hungarian fiscal consolidation started with a massive 
increase in the tax burden in 2006. Then, in accordance with the IMF program, the 
weight of income taxes was reduced (corporate income tax was cut, a flat and low 
personal income tax was introduced), the tax base was expanded, consumption and 
transaction-type taxes were increased, and sector taxes were introduced. In the Latvian 
case, the IMF argued for a more progressive tax regime, putting greater emphasis on 
taxing property and not income or consumption.  
However, the Latvian government implemented a broad range of revenue-
enhancing measures. First, VAT was increased from 18 to 22 per cent, followed by an 
increase in a range of excise taxes, the introduction of a luxury car tax, a real estate 
tax, and a capital gains tax. These somewhat progressive taxes were counterbalanced 
by regressive changes to the special VAT rates on certain types of goods and services 
(e.g. medicines). 
 On the expenditure side, in Hungary both cheese-slicing and targeted policy 
reforms took place including public sector wage freeze and public sector lay-offs in 
recurrent waves. In Latvia fiscal consolidation was also implemented through a broad 
mix of measures, including across-the-board cuts and more targeted measures. The 
former included cuts to public sector wages, wage and hiring freezes, and a reduction 
of staff numbers in the public sector. The latter included more severe cuts in specific 
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sectors, such as healthcare (by some 20 per cent) and education (by some 45 per cent). 
National defence experienced, perhaps, the deepest cuts. More than 60 per cent of 
government agencies were either closed or merged, with functions either integrated 
into other agencies (often with no or very limited additional funding to carry out these 
functions), or delegated to NGOs, or abandoned entirely. Public sector wages were cut 
by up to 30 per cent, with additional cuts to non-wage benefits as well as substantial 
public sector employment cuts (see also Savi and Cepilovs 2017).  
Public administration reforms in Latvia focused on the transparency of wage 
setting via the introduction of a unified wage scale for the public sector; transparent 
hiring practices based on competencies; performance evaluation; and performance 
pay. The crisis also opened the possibility of reviewing public services, with the aim 
of identifying non-core activities that could potentially be outsourced or privatized 
(see e.g. Eversheds Bitans 2011) (see Table 3.6.). Reforms proposed by the IMF 
technical assistance staff as well as the World Bank (whose technical assistance was 
focused on specific areas of welfare, education, and healthcare) related mostly to the 
consolidation of the education and healthcare systems. In Hungary the centralization 
of decision making, execution, and monitoring was the characteristic phenomenon of 
the public sector reforms.  Local governments’ autonomy and authority were severely 
curtailed by the central government. In addition, non-governmental stakeholders’ 
involvement in policymaking was effectively abandoned (Hajnal and Kovács 2015). 
This direction was opposite to the previous Europeanization drive, and went against 
the guidelines of the external agents. 
Concerning public finance management, substantial institutional reform took 
place in both cases: the Minister of Finance’s power to veto budget requests from line 
ministries was enhanced in the two countries. In Latvia, the Ministry of Finance 
created a fiscal policy department mainly tasked with implementing the EU 
requirements – signalling a very strong domestic commitment to the success of fiscal 
consolidation with the objective of European Monetary Union (EMU) membership. In 
Hungary, there was no such objective; the political elite’s objective was to decrease 
external influence in domestic policy-making. 
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Fiscal discipline law was also adopted in both cases. Fiscal councils were 
created, following the requirement of the Stability and Growth Pact. In Latvia 
however, the idea of a fiscal council had initially been proposed by some members of 
parliament (i.e. domestic ownership), whereas in Hungary the fiscal council was 
essentially a pre-requisite of the IMF loan tranches (i.e. no domestic ownership). In 
the post-2010 period, the Hungarian government cut the fiscal council’s funding, and 
implemented a fundamental re-design of it.  
 Content-wise, despite the many similarities of commonly shared 
mainstream crisis management receipts (cutting expenditures, raising taxes) the most 
visible divide comes on the side of public sector reform measures (transparency drive 
in Latvia vs. centralization drive in Hungary)  
Table 3.6. The sequence and content of fiscal consolidation 
 
Hungary Latvia 
Timeframe 8 years  5 years  
Size of fiscal 
consolidation 
8% of GDP 9.5% of GDP 
Sequence 3 cycles: orthodox measures in 2006–
2008; IMF program 2008–2010; 
unorthodox measures 2010–2013 
1 cycle: IMF/EC program, 
frontloaded 
Expenditure 
side 
Across-the-board cuts, public sector 
wage cuts and layoffs, social transfer 
cuts, pension cuts  
Across-the-board public sector cuts, 
30% public sector wage cut, public 
sector layoffs, complemented by some 
targeted cuts, such as reduction of 
capital investment and spending on 
defence, healthcare and science and 
education for example.  
Public sector 
reforms 
Centralization of state administration; 
pension system reform (thirteenth 
month pension cut, indexation 
changed, elimination of the obligatory 
pension funds) 
Transparency of public sector 
employment (wages, hiring, etc.), 
public finance management, school 
and hospital system reform 
Tax reforms Consumption and turnover taxes 
increased, income taxes cut, property 
tax not introduced 
Property, excise, and consumption 
taxes increased, income taxes cut, and 
new taxes introduced 
(Source: Authors; based on the official documents (i.e. IMF staff reports; EC surveillance reports; 
Government reports; Country Convergence Programs and National Reform Programs); Interviews). 
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3.5. The role of external actors in domestic policymaking 
During the bailout program, the different international institutions involved in 
the program complemented each other’s expertise in both Hungary and Latvia (see 
Table 3.7.). The EC’s lack of the necessary expertise to deal with such an acute crisis 
meant that IMF participation was required as it has led a number of crisis management 
programs all over the world. The IMF was first and foremost interested in a fiscal 
consolidation that would allow the repayment of the loans granted to the two countries, 
whereas the EC was interested in fiscal consolidation combined with structural reforms 
sustainable in the long term. The World Bank added to the mix, providing its expertise 
in reforming social security and pension systems, education, and healthcare. The 
IMF’s monthly two-week-long missions not only evaluated the proposed fiscal 
consolidation measures, but also provided an analysis of the economy and offered 
advice on the development of local modelling and analytical capabilities, including 
building a model on fiscal effects of EU structural funds in the Ministry of Finance.  
In the case of Hungary, the fiscal consolidation saga contained a pre- and post-
IMF bailout periods as well. In these episodes the involvement and influence of 
external agents differed markedly from the IMF bailout. In the pre-IMF bail-out period 
(2006-2008), the role of the EC was to kick-start the fiscal consolidation. The content 
of the program was the sole responsibility of the national government. In the post-IMF 
bail-out period (2010-2013), the national government worked closely with the 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DGECFIN) at expert level 
in designing policies (interview with former high-level decision maker at the Ministry 
of National Economy in 2016). This change resulted from the EU’s strengthened 
macroeconomic prudential framework developed in response to the crisis.  
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Table 3.7. Role of external agents 
 
Hungary Latvia 
Program design 2006–2008: No direct 
involvement (no meaningful 
consultations) 
IMF bailout program – direct 
involvement 
2008–2010: IMF program – direct 
involvement  
2010–2013: No direct 
involvement (consultations at 
expert level) 
Public sector reforms 2006–2008: Recommended Prescribed 
2008–2010: Prescribed 
2010–2013: Recommended 
Consequence of non-
compliance 
2006–2008: Loss of EU structural 
funds – politically negotiable 
Loss of access to external agents’ 
loans – risking insolvency 
2008–2010: Loss of access to 
external agents’ loans – risking 
insolvency 
2010–2013: Loss of EU structural 
funds – politically non-negotiable 
Domestic ownership / 
Objective 
Limited / Muddle through, 
dispense with external agents' 
influence in domestic 
policymaking (i.e. independence) 
Strong / Achieve European 
Monetary Union membership 
(independence, i.e. deepen ties with 
EU, detachment from Russia) 
(Source: Authors).  
3.6. The conditionalities of the bailout program 
The Stand-By-Arrangement included policy prescriptions with (1) quantitative 
targets in the form of policy measures attached to numerical objectives and (2) 
qualitative targets in the form of public sector reforms. The implementation of both 
the quantitative and the qualitative policy targets was strictly monitored. The program 
had firm conditionality features involving several quantitative performance criteria, 
continuous performance criteria, inflation consultation clause, indicative targets, 
structural performance criteria, and structural benchmarks – these were thoroughly 
scrutinized by quarterly monitoring. Only a successful round of quarterly screening 
opened the loan window (i.e. access to the next loan tranche). 
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The IMF was interested in sustainability and achieving good fiscal metrics, and 
paid attention to a large number of indicators. Moreover, it was aware of the negative 
repercussions of additional fiscal tightening. Negotiations between the Hungarian 
delegation and the IMF–EU mission centred on how the specific measures of fiscal 
consolidation would impact the budget numerically, to what extent they could be 
implemented, and what revenue increases and expenditure cuts they would therefore 
eventually generate – the IMF, the EU, and the Ministry of Finance had strong and 
often conflicting views on that. 
The IMF–EU delegation paid quarterly visits. Each mission lasted around 10 
days. In the first couple of days, the IMF–EU delegation consulted at expert level with 
the central bank and with the Ministry of Finance staff on the macro outlook. The aim 
was to agree common terms regarding the evaluation of the economic situation and the 
macro outlook. Then the talks moved on to the fiscal trajectory – policymakers were 
already involved at this stage. The last item on the agenda was to agree on the 
necessary additional fiscal measures at chief negotiator level (in Hungary, this was 
typically the Finance Minister). A large amount of politicking was involved in this 
bargaining process: the IMF–EU side typically demanded too many fiscal measures, 
an exaggeratedly tight fiscal stance, whereas the Hungarian side demanded just the 
opposite (as confirmed by negotiators on both sides: interviews with National Bank of 
Hungary experts, former employees of the IMF Resident Representative Office, and 
DGEcFin experts in 2015–2016). The overall influence of external actors on fiscal 
consolidation in Latvia was similar to that in Hungary.  
The main objectives of the program were set in the initial Letter of Intent 
submitted by the government of Latvia to the IMF in December 2008, and the 
subsequent Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Latvia and the EC 
in early 2009. The main requirement of the IMF and the EC was that the government’s 
fiscal consolidation strategy should be built around spending cuts and not revenue 
increases, as the former were deemed more sustainable, given the persisting shadow 
economy as well as the generally uncertain economic environment. Emphasis was also 
placed on structural reforms aimed at improving the performance of the public sector 
and the economy more generally, with a particular focus on reforms in education, 
healthcare, pensions, and labour market flexibilization (World Bank 2010).  
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In December 2008, the lenders had already imposed a requirement to set aside 
10 per cent of budget appropriations in a contingency reserve in order to put additional 
pressure on line ministries. The IMF set the tone of the program early on, as it expected 
the loan to be repaid in a matter of a couple years, but also because of its experience 
in orchestrating bailouts and technical assistance in countries in financial distress 
around the world.  
The institutions broadly followed a ‘show me what you’ve got approach’, 
although with some exceptions. Given that the IMF and the EC representatives had the 
final say over whether the budget package would be approved or not, the government 
often had to re-draft the list of proposed consolidation measures, often over several 
iterations until agreement was reached. Furthermore, the IMF was running a macro-
model of the Latvian economy in parallel with the Ministry of Finance, and it was the 
IMF model that was used as reference to evaluate the fiscal effect of certain proposals. 
In terms of influence at different stages of the bailout, the IMF was very active during 
the very initial stage, given their experience in country bailouts as well as lack of 
capacity on the side of the EC, but also given their interest in the loan being repaid in 
due course (interview with a former senior civil servant from the Ministry of Finance 
of the Republic of Latvia).  
In contrast to the Latvian government’s pursuit of fiscal consolidation and 
generally market-oriented policies at all costs, the EC along with the IMF and the 
World Bank took on an unusual role of social policy advocates, often expressing 
concerns about the economic hardship experienced by the most vulnerable and calling 
for stronger social policy measures (Eihmanis, 2018). 
3.7. Discussion 
The role of external agents in program design, policy prescriptions, 
conditionalities, and monitoring were similar during the bailout program period in both 
cases, however the outcome of fiscal consolidation and public sector reform turned out 
to be remarkable different. Latvia became the poster child of successful IMF 
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stabilization and fostered the Europeanization drive with the eventual adoption of the 
euro in 2014. In contrast, Hungary made a U-turn vis-à-vis the earlier path of 
Europeanization and moved towards the centralization of the public sector.  
The sequence of the two fiscal consolidation cases differed too. In Latvia, fiscal 
consolidation was relatively fast (over five years, with the bulk of consolidation 
undertaken in the first three years), whereas in Hungary it was very lengthy (eight 
years). These developments occurred despite some underlying similarities of the two 
countries’ conditions (i.e. new EU member states; historic experience with 
Communism; small and open economies; private sector lending in foreign currencies 
etc.).The different trajectories therefore need to be explained by some other factors. 
We utilized a relatively long list of independent variables those identified by policy 
change literature as determinants of the quality of change. In this section we discuss 
the EU and the IMF influence on domestic fiscal consolidation and analyse whether 
and how the independent variables led to the observed outcomes.  
The magnitude economic problems were not the same. In Latvia, the problem 
was stemming from the inadequate regulation of the financial sector, the rapidly 
growing external debt in foreign currency and the costs of the state bail-out of the 
country’s second largest bank. The Hungarian case proved to much more complex. 
Hungary had high public debt versus very low public debt in Latvia. Hungary ran a 
consistently loose fiscal policy, whereas Latvia maintained a more conservative fiscal 
stance (as required to support its fixed exchange rate). Consequently crisis 
management through fiscal consolidation and public sector reform as a far bigger 
challenge in Hungary than in Latvia – in accordance with the Pollitt and Bouckaert 
(2011) model of elite decision making. 
Political support 
 In Hungary, the enduring hardships of the fiscal consolidation coupled with 
the economic difficulties of the crisis caused ‘reform fatigue’ and the insurgence of 
anti-austerity sentiment in society after the first three or four years of reforms (Ágh 
2011). This provided the political opportunity for anti-austerity political rhetoric and 
the rise of political populism, which concluded in Fidesz’ landslide victory in 2010. 
At the same time, in Latvia, tolerance of austerity developed through decades of 
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hardship during the Soviet era and in the early years of independence, leading to what 
Bohle (2016) aptly named austerity nationalism, which entails a sense of pride for not 
being like the ‘profligate and lazy’ South of Europe, and being able to suffer through 
harsh austerity and restore economic competitiveness.  
An exemplary exposition of such austerity nationalism is a book co-authored 
by the former Prime Minister Dombrovskis, who was responsible for implementing 
the austerity package (Åslund and Dombrovskis 2011). The successive governments 
led by Dombrovskis enjoyed strong mandate to effectively resolve the crisis by 
governing by external constraint (Woll and Jacquot 2010). In the same time, the elite 
political decision-makers were selectively instrumentalizing EU and IMF 
conditionalities and recommendations in order to effectively shift the blame for 
particularly unpopular decisions. The weak political support of fiscal cutback 
measures is identified as one explanatory variable hindering reform in Hungary, while 
austerity nationalism assisted Latvia’s government in the fast advancement with the 
reform measures. We found evidence that the form of political executive indeed 
infuenced reform ownership (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). 
Institutional constraint: Latvia had traditionally followed radically neo-
liberal economic policies, whereas Hungary resorted to a more social-democratic 
approach with its history of a relatively developed welfare state. For many Hungarians, 
the regime change did not bring about the expected rise in living standards. In 
Hungary, the pre-regime change period was evaluated as an era of economic prosperity 
and social security, especially when compared to the economic hardship after the 
regime change (i.e. unemployment, growing inequality). The subsequent governments 
after the regime change utilized amendments of the welfare system (i.e. rents provided 
for various social groups) to keep social stability. The maintenance of the relatively 
high level of social spending was one of the reasons of the country’s large fiscal deficit. 
Cutting these privileges was considered politically difficult and undesired, that in turn 
obstacle fiscal cutbacks. At the same time, in Latvia, given the historical circumstances 
(i.e. rebuilding the nation state as a focal point during the first decade that allowed 
neoliberal policies to be pursued with a disregard for social welfare), a strong welfare 
state did not develop. Hence, the implementation of policies that undermined the 
institutional constraint embodied by the welfare state was not outside the spectrum of 
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‘normal’. Fiscal consolidation could run in a more uninhibited manner and despite the 
harsh austerity measures, mainstream centre-right parties remained in power.  This 
finding is consistent with the stipulation of the various streams of policy change theory 
(Alesina, 2006; Reich, 1995; Christensen and Laegreid, 2017; Randma-Liiv and 
Kickert, 2018). 
Reforms objective: For Latvia, in the pursuit of the fiscal consolidation and 
public sector reforms, the main aim – and an effective exit strategy – was joining the 
Eurozone (Kattel and Raudla 2013). The Dombrovskis government relied on a strong 
mandate from the electorate of the centre-right parties and supported by the 
international lenders to continue the course of European integration by joining the 
EMU, removing the remaining currency risks. This was particularly important for 
businesses and households, as well as for the Nordic banks, given that most of the 
private sector loans at the time of the crisis were denominated in Euro, hence carrying 
significant balance sheet effects in the event of devaluation. Moreover, the centre-right 
parties kept playing the anti-Russophone card in order to retain their core electorate 
(Auers 2015; Auers and Kasekamp 2013). Therefore, conflicts around economic issues 
were consistently displaced by ethnic or nationalist conflicts (Bohle 2017; Ost 2006; 
Sommers 2014). Altogether, Latvia’s governments displayed strong reform 
ownership. For the executive decision maker this made the case for problem-solving 
attitude, that indeed, resulted in stronger form of policy transfer outcomes – as 
stipulated by Bulmer and Padgett (2014).  
In Hungary, the political centre-left was deemed to have started fiscal 
consolidation, first without the direct involvement of external agents (2006–2008), 
then in cooperation with them (IMF bailout 2008–2010). Not only did reform fatigue 
develop during these years (moreover, ‘reform’ had become a swear word and a taboo 
expression in political communication by the late 2000’s), but also a pronouncedly 
anti-austerity sentiment grew amongst voters. Fiscal consolidation and public sector 
reforms meant additional hardship for the population, mainly because they entailed tax 
hikes, social transfer cuts, and public sector layoffs. The opposition centre-right Fidesz 
utilized the anti-austerity sentiment to move into populist terrain. This strategy was 
successful and resulted in the 2010 election victory. However, the anti-austerity 
rhetoric ran counter to the mainstream IMF bailout program. This concluded in the 
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premature termination of the IMF program and necessitated alternative ways to 
conclude the fiscal consolidation process (i.e. unorthodox solutions).  
The underlying objective of the successive Hungarian governments was the 
preservation of social stability. Their reform mandate was generally weak – which 
resulted in weak reform ownership and a bargaining/muddling through attitude. This 
approach led to weaker forms of policy transfer (Bulmer and Padgett, 2014), and in 
turn was one explanation for the protracted nature of the fiscal consolidation process. 
To sum up, we have identified major structural differences (Table 3.8.) that are 
considered to provide sufficient explanation for the very different fiscal consolidation 
trajectories in Hungary and Latvia. The two cases share some similarities at first 
glance, but deeper examination provides a substantially different macroeconomic 
picture, political endowments, and a consequently contrasting reform ownership.   
How then are existing policy change theories useful for interpreting the 
qualitatively different trajectories of Hungary and Latvia vis-à-vis public sector 
reforms and fiscal consolidation?  Indeed, the analysis corroborates the thesis that the 
success of a policy transfer is a function of the actual qualitative features of the policy 
transfer process and echoes mainstream texts on public management reforms, 
especially those that postulate that the nature of the executive government affects 
reform perceptions of desirability and feasibility, reform content, the implementation 
process, and the extent of reform achieved. The particular socio-economic, political, 
and administrative factors and the form of the political executive are all relevant in 
explain the outcomes. These features are embodied in the emerging stream of public 
administration applied-research agendas on EU influence on public sector reform 
(Ongaro, 2014; Kickert and Randma-Liiv, 2017).  
This article argues that it is worthwhile to amend and refine policy transfer 
theories with the findings of this study: socio-economic structures and key political 
decision makers’ reform ownership is crucial in the explanation of the different 
trajectories Hungary and Latvia displayed during their fiscal consolidation and reform 
under external constraints. 
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Table 3.8. Differences explained 
 
Variables supporting policy change 
 
Variables inhibiting policy change 
political 
support 
strong mandate (Latvia) weak mandate (Hungary) 
institutional 
constraint  
insignificant (Latvia) significant (Hungary) 
objective problem-solution (Latvia) muddle through (Hungary) 
reform 
ownership 
strong (Latvia) weak (Hungary) 
magnitude of 
the crisis 
small (Latvia) large (Hungary) 
(Source: Authors).  
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CHAPTER 4.  
FACTORS FACILITATING LARGE SCALE POLICY 
CHANGE - HUNGARIAN TAX REFORM 2009-2018 
4.1. Introduction 
Change is one of the most commonly used term in our everyday life. Public 
policy change refers to shifts in existing structures deriving from a change in attitude 
or in principle (Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Cerna 2013). The realm of public policies 
is in a perpetual flow of change as elite decision makers adjust them according to their 
perceived interests shaped by socioeconomic trends, electoral preferences, 
technological developments, etc. Nevertheless, the advancement of public policy 
change often comes unevenly, concerning its speed and concerning its scope. In such 
instances periods characterized by relative stability of public policies are followed by 
periods of major changes62.  
Public policy making has an imperative financial dimension: financial 
resources are raised by the government and then they are allocated to various activities 
delivered “A state’s means of raising and deploying financial resources tell us more 
than could any other single factor about its existing (and immediately potential) 
capacities…” (Skocpol, 1985:17). 
                                                          
62 The paper uses the notions of “policy reform” and ”large-scale policy change” inter-
changeable, as no clear difference is provided in their definitions by the relevant literature (Cerna, 
2013). 
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The revenue side is predominantly made up by tax revenues – typically well 
above 90% of public sector revenues are coming from taxes in modern states. Taxes 
account for 30-50% of GDP in modern states63 (Graph 4.1.)- the average tax-to-GDP 
ratio was 40.2% in the EU in 201764. Taxes directly affect the daily lives of individual 
citizens while also provide "the sinews of state”65.  Taxation gives the government 
access to private economic resources; the formulation of the tax system is the choice 
of the government on how to raise money: what taxes to levy, on whom to put the tax 
burden and on what size. The tax system influences the behaviour of the economic 
agents (both individuals and corporations) and alters the distribution of wealth among 
different groups. “How a society employs taxation reveals much about the relation 
between its citizens” (Hettich and Winer, 1999:1).  
                                                          
63 OECD countries’ average tax burden was 30-34% of GDP in the past four decades (i.e. 1978-
2017), whereas Scandinavian countries’ had 43.3%; Non-EU members OECD countries’ average was 
25.9% (OECD Database https://data.oecd.org/tax/tax-revenue.htm#indicator-chart) 
64 The highest was in France (48.4%), the lowest in Ireland (23.5%) – in Hungary the ratio was 
slightly below average (38.4%) – Eurostat database 
65 The original sentence of Marcus Tullius Cicero was "Endless money forms the sinews of 
war." This sentence was adjusted by modern scholars to “Taxes are the sinews of State” (see Hettich 
and Winer, 1999)  
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Graph 4.1. Total tax revenue in GDP percentage (OECD average) 1965-2017 
Source: OECD 
Graph 4.2. The lowest and the highest total tax revenue in GDP percentage 
amongst OECD countries 1965-2017 
Source: OECD 
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After a long time period characterized by relative tax regime stability, a major 
revamp of the tax system had taken place starting from 2009 in Hungary66. The essence 
of this policy change was a dramatic shift of the tax burden from labour and capital 
income to consumption. While tax policy changes in the same period happened in other 
European Union (EU) and OECD67 member states as well, Hungary clearly stands out 
with regards to the direction and magnitude of the changes implemented. Why is it so? 
What factors can explain such an abrupt and fundamental change of the Hungarian tax 
policy? Interestingly, as I will argue later, the topic provides an unanswered riddle, yet 
little academic discourse has emerged around it68. The intention is to make this to 
happen with the current study. 
This paper focuses on the large-scale policy changes, and aims to uncover the 
combination of  factors facilitating such trajectories. As such, the research is embedded 
into the terrain of policy change theories. Public sector- and tax policy change 
literature constitutes the conceptual framework of the study.  
The broad aim of the paper is to deliver a weak test of existing theories of 
policy change applied for a large scale policy change scenario. The underlying 
explanatory powers of the particular policy change theories are examined in the special 
case of large scale policy change under the circumstances of external constraints. The 
paper intends to carry out an analysis whether the stipulations of the theories are 
supported by the case or not.  Therefore the paper intends to contribute to the emerging 
stream of public administration applied research agendas on public sector reform by 
making visible and understandable the main contexts and the interacting processes 
those shaping public policymaking with the use of the findings of the case study those 
potentially add and enrich the existing theories. Such an insight could improve our 
                                                          
66 See “A quiet tax revolution in Hungary?” (Pesuth, 2015). 
67 OECD stands for Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – grouping 
together 36 industrialized countries. 
68 Apart from some MNB working papers, there are references to it in various regular OECD 
and European Commission publications. 
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understanding of the factors hindering and the factors facilitating public policy change 
to happen.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, the analytical framework of study, the 
relevant policy change theories are presented (Section 2). Afterwards, the research 
design is set, the methodology is presented, the research question and hypothesis are 
elaborated (Section 3.). Then the variables offered by policy change theories are 
operationalized (Section 4.) and the case study’s empirical body of work is presented 
(Section 5.). Finally, the paper concludes with evaluating the role of independent 
variables in explaining the causal mechanisms of policy change (Section 6.).   
4.2. Policy change theories – literature review 
The topic of large scale tax policy change is located at the intersections of 
policy studies, political economy, political science, public administration studies and 
tax theory writings. Policy change refers both to incremental refinements in existing 
structures and the introduction of new and innovative policies replacing existing ones. 
Accordingly, it posits a change in attitude or in principle of the decision-makers 
(Hogwood and Peters, 1983; Polsby, 1984; Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Cerna, 2013). 
The term “policy reform” generally refers to a major change that goes beyond day-to-
day policy management, potentially involving structural changes (Alesina et al, 2006), 
a “deliberate attempt (…) to change the system as a whole” (Fullan, 2009).  
Reform is inherently political as it represents a selection of values, a particular 
view of society and is has distributional consequences vis-à-vis the allocation of 
benefits and costs (Reich, 1995). However, it is not easy to accomplish policy reforms. 
Large-scale change is considered as “not the norm” by scholars, (Wilsford, 1994:251), 
even “difficult, if not impossible” (Birkland, 2005:41). Why policies change and when, 
is indeed a tricky question and a “rather poorly understood phenomena” (Rodrik, 
1996). Many policies - even dysfunctional ones – are going through long periods of 
stability before they change. 
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 How can change eventually come at all? What are the circumstances those 
allow and what are the factors those facilitate policy change to happen? The axiom 
that “policy change can and does happen under the proper conditions” (Birkland, 2005: 
41) gives little practical help in answering the question. A better understanding on 
these “proper conditions” is offered by the policy theories elaborated by scholars in 
the past decades. In the following section the paper gives a brief overview of the 
various policy theories with a special focus on their policy change explanations.  
Public policy theories are centred around to uncover the ways how the policy 
agenda is constituted and to find those factors – or rather the interaction of multiple 
factors - from where the change of those policies emerge. In their quest, scholars 
looked at the role of new ideas and arguments in the above processes. Policy change 
does not come easily, though. The theory of path dependency (Wilsford, 1994; Pierson, 
2000; Mahoney, 2000) departs from the postulate that “history matters, and it matters 
a great deal” (Wilsford, 1994: 279). According to the theory, the policy process within 
an existing institutional framework is dominated by the decentralized interaction of 
policy actors. That can lead to the lengthy survival of certain - even suboptimal - policy 
outcomes. As such, public policies and formal institutions are difficult to change by 
design: decisions made in the past encourage policy continuity. Because institutions 
are sticky and actors protect existing models, it is difficult to change policies (Pierson, 
2000; Greener 2002). Still, under certain conditions, a big change that departs from 
the historical path can be possible. The theory of path dependency helps to explain 
why policy continuity is more likely than policy change, but it also reveals that “critical 
junctures” facilitate policy change to occur (Cerna, 2013).  
The interplay of individual agents, ideas, institutions and external factors (i.e. 
multiple streams) is looked at by Kingdon in his seminal book “Agendas, Alternatives, 
and Public Policies” (Kingdon, 1984). The multiple streams (MS) approach was a 
major step in understanding policy formation. Policy formation is seen by Kingdon, as 
the joint combination of the streams of problems, policies and politics. The particular 
circumstances where they congregate and result in policy change decisions is labelled 
by Kingdon as the policy window. Kingdon argues for continual change and adaptation 
of public policies as opposed to the stability of decision-making in policy 
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communities. Other scholars enriched the window of opportunity theory, such as 
Wilsford and Capoccia. “By developing the interplay of structure with conjuncture, 
the occasional accomplishment of big change can be systematically understood.” 
(Wilsford, 1994: 253). To introduce a major change policy makers have to wait for a 
critical juncture (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007) or a window of exceptional 
opportunity called conjuncture (Wilsford 1994).  
A critical juncture (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) or a window of exceptional 
opportunity called conjuncture (Wilsford 1994) is identified by the literature as an 
independent variable facilitating policy change. The window of opportunity is 
provided most notably by a crisis situation ‘since it delegitimizes long-standing 
policies underpinning the status quo’ (Kickert and Randma-Liiv, 2017: 91).  Economic 
crises by nature deliver welfare losses. A deep economic crisis may deliver policy 
reforms because the perceived political costs of not reforming (i.e. policy continuity 
scenario) is larger than the costs of the reform scenario (Drazen and Grilli, 1990). The 
hypothesis that crises lead to fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms has become 
part of the “conventional wisdom” (Tommasi and Velasco, 1996). Accordingly, both 
the path dependency (PD) and the multiple streams (MS) approach identify the 
window of exceptional opportunity manifested by an economic crises as an 
independent variable that facilitate policy change.  
In a typical policy sector, there are long periods of stability followed by major 
(fast - and sometimes dramatic) policy changes. Therefore scholarly attention need to 
be focused on both change and stability. Baumgartner and Jones are particularly 
interested in the rapidity of the change between longer periods of equilibrium. Hence 
the idea that stable periods of policy making are punctuated by policy activism. 
Punctuated equilibrium (PE) theory describes the pattern of cyclical changes of policy. 
According to the theory, once an idea gets attention, it will expand rapidly and become 
unstoppable (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). 
Punctuated equilibrium is the process of interaction of beliefs and values concerning 
particular policy (termed policy images) with the existing set of political institutions 
or venues of policy action. (Christensen, Aaron and Clark 2003, Christensen et al. 
2006). Punctuated equilibrium model connects together in a dynamic framework the 
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various elements to decision-making. Institutions are important as they encircle a set 
of political participants into the policy process (while exclude others). Ideas, are vital 
as they are the rudimentary building blocks of the various policy agendas.  According 
to the punctuated equilibrium theory, policy-makers’ perceptions and the institutional 
framework determine the way policy problems are defined. 
Changes in the main aspects of a policy usually result from shifts in external 
factors such as macro-economic conditions or the rise of a new systemic governing 
coalition, i.e. the “Advocacy Coalition Framework” (ACF) (Sabatier 1988, Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Similar to PET, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith also put the role 
of ideas in the centre in theorizing over policy change. They synthesized many insights 
from earlier accounts of public policy in the formulation of public policies framework. 
According to their findings, the advocacy coalition is an alliance of bodies holding the 
same ideas and interests. Moreover, according to the ACF, changes in economy and 
society feed into public opinion - this in turn affects the policy positions of political 
parties and interest groups and henceforward, the ideas and preferences of policy 
makers.  
Policy change can be understood through the examination of political 
subsystems (advocacy coalitions) those seek to influence governmental decisions. The 
theory recognizes that there are various competing sets of core ideas about causation 
and value in public policy. Coalitions form around these core idea sets because certain 
interests are linked to them. The members of advocacy coalitions are coming from a 
variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers 
etc.) and they shape the particular belief system - a set of basic values, causal 
assumptions and problem perceptions (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1991). Policy options are therefore the function of the position of the particular 
advocacy coalition vis-à-vis the elite political decision makers: shifts in the 
government have an impact on the advocacy coalition.  
The role of beliefs in shaping policy ideas is a key concept for both the 
advocacy coalition framework (ACF) and the punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), 
both takes into account the theoretical relevance of discursive factors in policy change. 
Additionally, the ACF approach claims that there is a tendency for policy actors to 
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exaggerate both the power and maliciousness of their policy opponents – this is 
referred to as the devil shift (Sabatier et al., 1987). At the same time PET argues that 
reframing plays a key role in changing the policy image (Baumgartner, 2013; Princen, 
2013). 
The form of political executive (i.e. advocacy coalition) affects – among other 
things – reform ownership (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Top-down reforms driven by 
elite decision making – influenced by ideas and pressures from elsewhere – constitute 
the core of the reform process. Shifts in the locus of authority is a critical component 
of the policy change process (Hall, 1993). A public sector reform is more likely to 
happen if one political group (or advocacy coalition) becomes a dominant player 
(Alesina, 2006). This political group is understood as being mainly domestic – 
however in some cases external players (mainly supranational institutions) play also 
an important role.  
Though the academic field of political economy (PE) may lie somewhat offside 
the scholarly tradition of public administration studies, still for the policy change topic 
it is considered highly relevant. Political economy researchers find that fiscal 
consolidation and broad reforms are more likely to occur when new governments take 
office (i.e. when elections are a long time away); when governments are politically 
strong (strong mandate, strong state, narrow coalition, strong leadership); and when 
the executive branch faces fewer institutional constraints (Reich, 1995; Alesina, 2006). 
Large scale policy shifts are more likely to occur immediately after an election, 
presumably when the new government enjoys a mandate and when new elections are 
a long time away (Alesina, 2006). The form of the political system influences also the 
decision-making patterns: one-party governments in majoritarian systems are able to 
implement quick and resolute fiscal cutbacks, while coalition governments in 
consensual democracies will engage in protracted negotiations (Kickert, Randma-Liiv 
and Savi, 2015). Broad reforms are possible when there is sufficient political will and 
when changes are designed and implemented by capable planners and managers with 
strong vision. The larger the number of institutional constraints on the executive, the 
more delayed and less successful policy reforms become (Hamann and Prati, 2002).  
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How ideas can be transmitted from one place to another is the topic of the 
policy learning stream of thought, that terms “policy-oriented learning” or “diffusion” 
as a major determinant of policy innovation and change (Cairney, 2015). Policy 
learning emphasises the importance of policy diffusion and policy transfer in the policy 
change processes (Rose, 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1994). Policy diffusion is a 
process in which policy innovations spread from one government to another (Shipan 
and Volden 2008). In its most generic form, policy diffusion is defined as one 
government’s policy choices being influenced by the choices of other governments. In 
other words, the “knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative 
arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place” (Dolowitz and Marsh 
1996: 344). Policy makers rely on examples and insights from those who have already 
experimented with concerning policies (Shipan and Volden 2008; Shipan and Volden, 
2012). Policy diffusion and its role in public policy formation can take various forms 
(i.e. political leaming, government leaming, policy-oriented leaming, lesson drawing 
and social leaming). These concepts are used to describe the process by which 
programs and policies developed in one country are emulated by, and diffused to others 
(Rose, 1991; Cerna, 2013).  
This can take the form of a transfer process of policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions, and ideas from one entity to another (Dolowitz and Marsh, 
1996). It can come in a voluntary or in a coercive way, where coercion is the use of 
force, threats, or incentives by one government to affect the policy decisions of 
another. Coercive policy transfer is also termed as facilitated unilateralism or 
hierarchical policy transfer. This occurs via the transnational or supranational authority 
when a state is obliged to adopt policy as a condition of financial assistance (Bulmer 
and Padgett 2014). Nevertheless, the perceived influence of the external pressure on 
domestic policy making varies.  
Some scholars argue that foreign pressure in reality has only a weak or 
moderate effect on domestic policy making (Alesina 2006, Mahon 2004). Some argue 
that IMF-supported programs’ conditionalities are critical to fiscal consolidation, 
however the eventual success of a program rests on individual governments that are 
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responsible for policy choices, design and implementation (Crivelli and Gupta, 2014). 
Other scholars stipulate that external pressure in a form of conditionality related to 
financial assistance (i.e. IMF bail-out program) is the final source of forced 
implementation of swift and radical policy change (Christensen and Laegreid, 2017; 
Randma-Liiv and Kickert, 2018). While quantitative revenue conditionality is a 
regular phenomenon of IMF programs, this can also be related to tax policy or tax 
administration reform (Crivelli and Gupta, 2014).  
The quality of the coercive policy transfer and its outcome depend on variables 
such as the degree of authority accrued by supranational institutions and the density of 
rules and the availability of sanctions/incentives (Bulmer and Padgett, 2014). 
Concerning policy transfer capabilities of governments under the circumstances of 
coercive policy transfer, Bulmer and Padgett (2014) distinguish muddling through and 
problem solving type of attitudes of the political executives whereas the muddling 
through approach leads to weaker forms of policy transfer while problem solving 
attitude results in stronger policy transfer outcomes.  
Isomorphism models argue that policy diffusion occurs between states when 
one is adopting a new policy from others that are similar (i.e. peers), as these states 
provide the best information about the usefulness of the given policy and also about 
the potential implications of adopting it (Brooks, 2005). A certain degree of regional 
diffusion is therefore a consequence of the above mechanisms, as neighbouring 
countries tend to be similar in a variety of ways. But states share similarities with states 
that are not geographically. In their seminal paper, (1983): “The Iron Cage Revisited: 
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields” 
DiMaggio and Powell claim that the concept that captures the process of organizations 
getting more similar (i.e. homogenization) is isomorphism. They conclude that 
isomorphism has two types (competitive and institutional) and they identify three 
mechanism of institutional isomorphic change (coercive, mimetic and normative). 
Policy diffusion can be based on a wide range of political, demographic and budgetary 
similarities across states. (Volden, 2006) or channels of cultural commonality and 
historic connection among nations (Weyland, 2004). , p. 256). A special type of 
isomorphism is constituted by the process of Europeanization (Radaelli 2000 and 
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Radaelli 2003). Pressures for changing public policies could also emanate from 
supranational institutions in the form of coercive policy diffusion (Christensen and 
Laegreid, 2017). 
The above theories provided justifications of policy change versus policy 
stability. They are interested in the role of existing routines and interests in periods of 
change, they analyse the influence of ideas, institutions and interests. They offer 
explanations of the complex interactions between these multiple factors by looking at 
the range of causal inferences. Theorizing also delivers simplifications over the key 
aspects of the complex policies. As an outcome, public policy scholars introduced 
novel concepts to represent these influences, such as the policy window, punctuated 
equilibrium, policy diffusion, advocacy coalition, etc.. Table 4.1. summarizes the main 
findings of the various policy change theories. Both path dependency and multiple 
streams theory identifies the window of opportunity (labelled as critical juncture, 
conjuncture policy window) often coming in a sudden change of the socio-economic 
setting. This become manifest most typically in the form of an economic crisis, and 
this is considered as an independent variable that facilitates policy change to happen.  
The political factors shaping policies come along with the conceptualisation of 
ACF and PET in the form of underlying beliefs of policy preferences, frames and 
reframing of policies - as well as with PE scholars (through the reform ownership of 
elite decision makers). Ideas and perceptions of the elite decision makers play a crucial 
role in these theories. Policy change may come when the policy ideas turn around, 
most likely through the change within the composition (i.e. a government change) and 
the quality (i.e. strong mandate and leadership, narrow coalition, fewer institutional 
constraints etc.) of the decision making authority. These factors facilitating policy 
change are synthetized by the paper as domestic cleavage structures – the term is 
encompassing the most relevant concepts offered by PET, ACF and PE.  
Nevertheless, alongside the domestic cleavage structures, PE recognizes 
another relevant change with regards to the decision making body, that is the shift in 
the locus of authority (that results in changing policy formulation by influencing policy 
ideas, and often exerting pressures to change). External influence is therefore 
recognized as a factor facilitating policy change. The scholars of the policy learning 
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stream of thoughts had the same findings. According to the conceptualization of the 
policy learning stream, external influence plays a key role in policy learning. It can 
take the form of a voluntary and coercive form. Voluntary policy learning comes with 
policy diffusion and isomorphism. External pressure emanates from the coercive 
policy transfer processes. External influence in the form of coercive policy transfer is 
typically delivered in form of policy conditionality. This can be manifest in IMF bail-
out cases.   
The above approach presented by the theories is going to be applied by the 
paper with regards to the analysis of the Hungarian tax reform. This categorization 
echoes Mahon’s findings whereby he suggested that in reforming the tax system in 
Latin America, there were three areas of focus — economic crises, international 
influence, and domestic politics (Mahon, 2004). 
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Table 4.1. Policy change theories: key concepts and 
independent variables facilitating policy change  
  
  
Path 
dependency 
Multiple 
streams 
PET ACF PE Policy learning 
Key concepts 
facilitating 
policy 
formulation 
decentralized 
interaction of 
policy actors 
interplay of 
individual 
agents, ideas, 
institutions 
and external 
factors 
process of 
interaction of 
beliefs and 
values 
the advocacy 
coalition  
form of 
political 
executive 
policy diffusion 
policy transfer 
isomorphism 
policy 
continuity 
and 
institutional 
stickiness 
the joint 
combination 
of the streams 
of problems, 
policies and 
politics 
institutions 
ideas 
perceptions 
 
ideas 
interests 
belief system 
reform 
ownership 
capable 
managers 
political leaming 
government 
leaming 
policy-oriented 
leaming 
lesson drawing 
social leaming 
Key concepts 
facilitating 
policy 
change 
critical 
junctures 
policy 
window 
reframing changes in 
public 
opinion affect 
policy 
positions  
shift in the 
locus of 
authority 
(ideas, 
pressures) 
coercive or 
voluntary policy 
transfer 
 
sudden 
change in the 
socio-
economic 
environment 
change in the 
macro 
conditions 
new elite 
decision 
makers 
shifts in the 
government 
(devil shift) 
new 
governments 
strong 
mandate 
narrow 
coalition 
strong 
leadership 
fewer 
institutional 
constraints 
policy 
conditionality 
Independent 
variables 
facilitating 
policy 
change 
economic crisis domestic cleavage structures external 
influence 
Source: Author   
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4.3. Research question, research design and case selection  
The paper is interested in identifying the combination of factors facilitating 
large-scale policy changes. The dependent variable of the article is the outcome of tax 
policy change in Hungary in 2009-2018. The research question (RQ) of the paper is 
the following one:  
What combination of independent factors facilitated the Hungarian tax reform 
in the 2009-2018 period?  
Derived from the exhibited scholarly literature and utilizing Mahon’s 
propositions (Mahon, 2004) the following factors are operationalized as independent 
explanatory variables:  
1. Domestic cleavage structures which define reform ownership 
through the political capabilities of elite decision makers and the 
belief system of the advocacy coalitions.   
2. The window of opportunity in the form of economic crisis as it 
delegitimizes previous long-serving policies and undermines the 
status quo. 
3. External influence that makes policy learning, policy diffusion and 
policy transfer happen either in voluntary or in coercive form.  
The hypothesis of the paper is (H) the following one: The co-existence of all the three 
factors stipulated by policy change theories, i.e. domestic cleavage structures allowing 
high level of reform ownership, the window of opportunity in the form of economic 
crises and the influence of international agents in the form of policy transfer facilitated 
the Hungarian tax reform in the 2009-2018 period.  
The research focuses on the Hungarian tax reform that took place in the past 
decade (from 2009 until 2018).  In order to achieve better contextualization of the 
topic, the study looks at the previous history of tax policy changes in Hungary (i.e. the 
2004-2008 period), and examines the tax policy developments in other (mainly EU 
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and OECD) countries as well. The time period under investigation is segmented into 
four episodes of the four consecutive governments. Governments are considered to 
have the democratic mandate to deliver their political programs therefore they are 
considered by the paper as the units of the analysis.  
A large scale tax policy change occurred in the given time period (2009-2018) 
and in the given place (Hungary)69 – these changes were unprecedented in an 
international comparison, therefore it is an extreme case. At the same time, 
macroeconomic conditions, the intensity of external influence, the political orientation 
and the political support of domestic elite decision makers were qualitatively different 
throughout the observed time-period. There is one auxiliary reason of the case 
selection and this is the familiarity of case: i.e. as an economist, I have analysed the 
developments of the Hungarian economy and contacted the various members of the 
prevailing advocacy coalitions from a macroeconomic point of view by profession70.  
The analytical work is based on macroeconomic datasets (Eurostat; OECD, 
Worldbank; KSH, MNB, Hungarian Government), official government documents, 
official and working papers of international organizations (IMF, OECD, European 
Commission), advocacy coalition policy papers, and other documents as well as semi-
structured interviews with members of various advocacy coalitions71. Case studies are 
considered to be a powerful method for locating causal mechanism and explaining 
single outcomes (Coppedge, 2007; Gerring 2007). Accordingly, the research is 
designed as an embedded case study purporting within-case analysis. 
                                                          
69 The share of income tax in total tax revenues dropped from 26% to 18% while the share of  
taxes on goods and services increased from 37% to 44% - OECD database: 
https://stats.oecd.org/OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx 
70 I am the Head of Research of Raiffeisen Bank Hungary from 1997 on – the primary coverage 
of the macroeconomic developments, including public finances is my job. 
71 Interviews were conducted between 2015 and 2017 with representatives of National Bank of 
Hungary, the Fiscal Council, the IMF Resident Representative Office, Ministry of Finance, Ministry 
of National Economy, European Commission. 
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It is not the purpose of this study though to evaluate the effects of the changes 
of tax system on the economy and on the society. Tax policy is looked at by taking the 
big picture: the tax revenue changes of the main tax types are in focus, a more refined 
analysis is not carried out. Taxes imposed at the local level are not in the scope of the 
study.   
In the next section the paper further elaborates the three factors identified by 
policy change theories from the perspective of their impact on tax reform with the 
underlying ambitions to find out how they interplay in the causal mechanisms of tax 
policy change.  
4.4. Contextualization of the independent variables facilitating 
tax policy change  
4.4.1. Domestic cleavage structure  
“Taxation is deeply redistributive, therefore profoundly political. National tax 
structures reflect both national preferences and histories” (Wyplosz, 2015:15). Tax 
policy design and its implementation are outcomes of the political process, i.e. the 
choices on taxation made by public decision makers are always influenced by political 
considerations (Woolley, 1984; Hettich and Winer, 1999). These choices are 
influenced by the given institutional context and the various advocacy coalitions, 
however political factors have a more explicit role as elected politicians typically use 
the tax system (i.e. tax bases, rate structures, exemptions and provisions as a set of 
related policy instruments) to favour particular interest groups in order to increase their 
chances of re-election (Hettich and Winer, 1999; Brys, 2011).  
Perceptions and ideas of the elite decision makers on tax policy design is 
shaped by their belief system according to the PET and ACF. Advocacy coalitions on 
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the political left are typically in favour of generally high redistribution ratio (measured 
in total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP) and also in relatively high and progressive 
income taxes. On the other hand, advocacy coalitions on the political right argue for 
lower general tax burden, and particularly for lower income tax. Nevertheless, there is 
rather a continuum with regards to the ideal tax policies rather than polarized views 
whereby the general perception of the voters (i.e. the given society) about fairness 
plays an essential role.  
Politicians have an incentive to implement tax reforms that benefit large 
numbers of voters, especially “swing voters”72 (Profeta, 2003). Tax reform is shaped 
by efficiency, by questions of horizontal and vertical equity (fairness), by tax evasion 
considerations and by revenue potential (Brys, 2011). The various political cleavage 
structures have other important influences on tax reforms: governments new in office, 
strong leadership, partisan dominance favours tax reform (Mahon, 2004; Bird, 2004; 
Brys, 2011).  
In order to formulate the opinion for a need of a tax reform, first, ideas on the 
necessary tax design have to be reframed by the elite decision makers. Alongside the 
stipulations of the policy change theories (PET, ACF, PE) it can come by the change 
of the public opinion that feeds into policy perceptions of the elite decision makers and 
allows the reframing of the tax policy, or the change of the dominant advocacy 
coalitions through the arrival of a new government (that preferably enjoys strong 
mandate, a narrow coalition, and fewer institutional constraints) or the change of the 
locus of authority through the emergence of external pressure via policy conditionality.  
Tax reform often takes place when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) makes it a 
performance condition for its loans. (Mahon, 2004). Governments sometimes face a 
situation where burden shifting across groups is perceived politically unviable. In these 
cases the reliance of national governments on international constraints, such as those 
                                                          
72 “Swing voters” are likely to change their votes in response to a reform that is beneficial for 
them (Profeta, 2003). 
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coming from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the European Commission are 
helpful in implementing tax reforms (Brys, 2011). 
The empirical section will scrutinize the above qualities of the domestic 
cleavage structures of the consecutive governments (i.e. the units of analysis) from the 
viewpoint of whether they were supportive or unsupportive for facilitating large scale 
policy change.  These will include the level of reform ownership of the elite decision 
makers, the belief system of the dominant advocacy coalitions (ideal policy design 
versus existing policies – i.e. the role of ideas, and the existence of the devil shift), and 
the investigation on the actual locus of authority (internal versus external).   
4.4.2. The Window of Opportunity in the form of economic crisis  
According to the path dependency theory, policy continuity is the norm, 
because decentralized interaction of policy actors argue for institutional stickiness. 
Multiple streams theory emphasises the interplay of individual agents, ideas, 
institutions and external factors and identifies the policy process as the joint 
combination of the streams of problems, policies and politics. Policy change therefore 
allowed if the problems, policies and policies twist to such an extent that existing 
policy solutions become obsolete in the perception of the policy makers. Such a 
situation (conjuncture, window of opportunity, policy window) comes when there is a 
major shift in the socio-economic environment: i.e. an economic crises.   
The political economy obstacles to reform are easier to overcome during a 
crisis situation as they undermine the power of vested interests and convinces policy 
makers that fundamental tax reforms are necessary. As such crisis facilitates to create 
a sense of urgency, to overcome the coalition of political opposition and administrative 
inertia that normally blocks significant change and therefore to open a “window of 
opportunity” for fundamental tax reform that otherwise would not come (Bird, 1992; 
Olofsgard, 2003; Brys, 2011; Brys, Matthews and Owen, 2011).  
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There are various types of economic crises, such as inflation, exchange rates, 
debt, banking, real estate, real economy etc. These crises seldom come alone, there are 
typical interlinkages between some of them (i.e. inflation and exchange rate crisis or 
real estate and banking crisis usually come together etc.). Financial crisis is constituted 
by a situation when there are perceived public sector problems on financing the 
payment obligations. At its most extreme case it is a sovereign debt crisis that involves 
either outright default on debt-refinancing, the restructuring of debt (Reinhardt and 
Rogoff 2011) or requiring the assistance of an international lender of last resort to 
mitigate debt-refinancing difficulties. Tax policy changes are often driven by adverse 
macroeconomic conditions, with the purpose to mitigate the impact of the financial 
crisis: i.e. crisis increases the pressure to raise more tax revenue in order to restore 
public finances.  
In order to contextualize the independent factor facilitating policy change in 
the form of an economic crisis, the severity and the magnitude of the 2008-2009 
financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign-debt crisis is briefly introduced here. The 
economic impact of the crisis is represented by Appendix 2 (GDP change over the 
previous year in EU member-states between 2004-2014). The crisis brought about a 
massive decrease of the employment rate and increased the poverty rate in most 
European Union member-states (see Appendix 11. Employment in EU memberstates, 
2007-2014 and Appendix 12. People at risk of poverty or social exclusion in EU 
memberstates, 2007-2014).73  
Several countries – including a number of EU member states - got into severe 
financial distress as a consequence of the financial and economic crises (see Appendix 
5. IMF program countries in 2009 by program types). The 2009 financial crises was 
followed by the sovereign debt crisis in the European Union manifest in a steep 
                                                          
73 In the 2010-2012 period the people at risk of poverty or social exclusion increased by 
almost 10 million in the EU. The most severe deterioration of the social conditions were registered in 
Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, and Hungary countries most affected by the financial crises. The EU lost 
nearly 1.5 million jobs in 2010 alone.   
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increase of public budget deficit and public debt in several member states (see 
Appendix 3. Public budget balance in EU member-states between 2004-2014 in GDP 
percentage and Appendix 4. General Government Debt in EU member-states between 
2004-2014 in GDP percentage). Due to its dramatic social costs it turned around both 
national and international politics and stemmed new mechanisms in the governance 
within the European Union (Alesina, 2012; Blöchliger at al 2012, De Grauwe, 2013, 
Sutherland et al 2012; Ongaro 2014). Clearly the 2008-2009 economic crisis can be 
well considered as an appropriate window of opportunity for policy change.  
The empirical research will shed light on how the presence versus the lack of 
the window of opportunity manifested in the form of an economic crises influenced 
the consecutive Hungarian governments’ willingness to reform tax policy.  
4.4.3. External influence: tax theories and policy recommendations 
The rudimentary building block of the policy learning stream of thought is that 
ideation for a policy change emanates from external sources through the process of the 
adaptation - in one way or in other – the policy practices already applied in another 
jurisdiction. Policy diffusion can take various forms ranging from policy emulations, 
isomorphism to coercive policy transfer.  
In order to contextualize how international influence facilitate tax policy 
change, this section first presents the theoretical foundations of taxation. Then a 
synopsis of policy recommendations stemming from the theories is offered followed 
by an overview of how policy recommendations changed taxation practices over the 
recent decades especially in OECD and EU member states. Then other sources of 
international influence are identified and explained.  
Three major normative taxation theories emerged influencing policy decisions 
in recent decades: (1) equitable taxation, the prevalent theory in the 1950s and 1960s; 
(2) the theory of optimal taxation developed in the 1970’s , and (3) the revival and 
reformulation of the fiscal exchange (Hettich and Winer, 1999). These theories provide 
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guidelines on the preferred tax design and the importance of the individual elements 
within the tax system as a whole. The theory of equitable taxation is rooted in classical 
liberalism (emphasizing individual liberty as the primary value, together with equality 
as next in importance). The theory advocates the minimization of political interference 
in the life of economic agents and therefore calls for institutions and policies designed 
accordingly. At the same time, due to its equality principle, the theory also claims that 
the tax system has to have the function to create greater equality through redistribution. 
Taxation is therefore imposed in accordance with the ability to pay – so the main focus 
is on horizontal equity (i.e. same rate for same comprehensive income). The theory 
assumes broad and single base. It also implies equal treatment of income from any 
source, including capital. Equitable taxation has exercised an impact on tax reform and 
design in the Anglo-Saxon countries (mainly in the 1965-1985 period)74.  
Optimal tax theory argues that as the efficiency costs of taxation are potentially 
large75, it is worthwhile to focus attention on how to minimize them (Slemrod, 1989). 
Optimal taxation theory assumes competitive markets in a general equilibrium 
whereby justice in taxation requires each taxpayer to suffer an equal sacrifice. Equity 
and efficiency goals are integrated into a single welfare function (Mirrlees, 1971; 
Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971). According to the theory a key goal for tax design is to 
reduce the deadweight loss of the system as a whole as far as possible76.  Optimal 
taxation theory argues for single and inelastic tax base and calls for broad personal 
consumption tax. At the same time it advocates shifting the emphasis away from 
                                                          
74 I.e. Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (1966) that proposed extensive revisions in 
the tax system of Canada; U.S. Department of the Treasury's Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (1977) 
and Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and Economic Growth (1984). The latter report led to the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
75 Modern welfare economics interprets sacrifice as loss of utility that need to be minimized in 
the aggregate level. Taxation is viewed as contributing to the loss of utility, and the theory defines 
sacrifice as a reduction of social welfare. 
76 The size of the deadweight loss is related to the elasticities of demand and supply for the item 
subject to being taxed (i.e. the extent to which demand and supply respond to changes in price). The 
more elastic is the demand for a product with respect to its price, the more a given tax increase will 
reduce demand for it. High elasticities equal to higher deadweight losses (Mirrlees, 2010). 
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capital taxation (Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan, 2009). Optimal taxation theory has 
influenced policy blueprint from the 1990’s onwards (i.e. income tax with a broadly 
defined base; a renewed emphasis on consumption and expenditure taxation; lower tax 
rates on the returns from capital assets).  
The fiscal exchange approach to taxation derives from the central problem of 
how to design institutions of government responsive to the electorate and at the same 
time ensure that electoral processes do not lead to exploitation by organized interest 
groups (Buchanan, 1976). Its central question is to what extent the government’s 
power to tax should be limited and how? The theory recommends narrow multiple and 
elastic tax base and reduced emphasis on taxation of capital, non-regressive tax 
structure with rules limiting tax discrimination. Table 4.2. summarizes the major 
theoretical considerations and policy recommendations of the three theories. 
Although, policymakers have been selective in adopting theories’ 
recommendations, overall, tax policy moved in directions suggested along several 
aspects (Slemrod, 1989; Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan, 2009). 
Based on tax theory suggestions, academic literature developed a ranking of 
taxes according to their negative consequences on economic growth, which was 
internalized by international and supranational institutions (i.e. the OECD, the IMF 
and the European Commission). Accordingly, in terms of reducing GDP potential of a 
given country recurrent taxes on immovable property are considered as being the least 
distortive tax instrument, followed by consumption taxes, taxes on labour and capital 
income (Prammer, 2011; Mirrlees, 2010; OECD, 2010; Csomós-P.Kiss, 2014; Garnier 
et al, 2014, Mathe, Nicodeme and Rua, 2015; Szoboszlai et al, 2018). It is assumed 
that switching from ‘origin-based’ taxes (income tax) to ‘destination-based’ taxes 
(consumption tax) could improve competitiveness (LeBlanc, Matthews and Mellbye, 
2013). This ranking has been influential for recommending to shift tax burden away 
from labour. Originating from tax theories’ policy prescription a common intellectual 
framework has developed claiming that the combination of broad tax bases and low 
rates are the best way to collect revenues while ensuring that taxes distort business and 
household decisions as little as possible (Brys, Matthews and Owen, 2011; Mathe, 
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Nicodeme and Rua, 2015). Fiscal devaluations – cuts in labour taxes financed by 
increases in VAT – are a particular form of tax shifts (Puglisi, 2014).  
The European Commission has been recommending Member States to reduce 
taxes on labour and increase revenues from other tax bases (i.e. consumption taxes) 
since the early 1990’s  (Mathe, Nicodeme, and Rua; 2015). The role of international 
organisations is important, both in coercive policy transfer (i.e. IMF conditionalities) 
and in voluntary policy learning as they play an important role in creating a forum 
where countries can share information and views about tax issues (Brys, 2011). 
Table 4.2. Tax theories - theoretical considerations and policy prescriptions 
  Equitable Taxation Optimal taxation Fiscal Exchange 
Theoretical 
considerations 
  
  
greater equality through 
redistribution 
competitive markets in 
general equilibrium 
limit tax discrimination 
minimal interference 
through taxes 
taxation is a reduction of 
aggregate welfare (i.e. 
deadweight loss) 
responsiveness to the 
electorate 
ability to pay 
(horizontal equity)  
deadweight loss need to 
be minimized 
  
Tax policy 
prescriptions 
  
  
  
broad and single base single inelastic base 
narrow multiple elastic 
base 
  broad consumption tax   
equal treatment of 
income  
lower tax on capital lower tax on capital 
  
hump-shaped rate 
structure 
non-regressive tax 
structure  
Source: Author 
      
The generally witnessed trend toward reduced taxation of capital income, tax 
systems with flatter tax rates and the growing importance of value-added taxes are 
consistent with theory prescriptions. In OECD countries, top marginal rates have 
declined, marginal income tax structures have flattened, and commodity taxes have 
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become more uniform (Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan, 2009)77.  Out of the 36 OECD 
countries, 33 experienced massive decrease of the personal income tax (measures in 
percentage of overall tax revenues – see also Appendix 8. Personal income tax 
percentage share of total tax revenue in OECD countries and Appendix 9. Personal 
income tax percentage share of total tax revenue OECD average and Hungary) and 
Appendix 8.). Altogether there were 57 periods of sizeable decrease of the personal 
income in total revenue, out of which 46 periods when the share of personal income in 
total tax revenue fell by more than 3%78.   
These tax cuts were accompanied by broadening the tax base: “fairness” 
arguments reinforced economic efficiency arguments for broadening tax bases by 
phasing out tax breaks favouring particular groups. (Brys, Matthews and Owen, 2011; 
Slemrod, 1989)79. The individual jurisdictions’ tax structures moved toward flatter 
rates and the marginal tax rate on high earners fell in most countries (in the OECD 
countries, but also outside over the past three decades (Hines and Summers, 2009) 
Globalization80 is considered to be also a factor of international influence 
facilitating tax policy change as it enhances “tax optimization” behaviour i.e. 
multinational corporations use internal prices to locate profits where taxation is lowest, 
therefore it generates tax competition (Brys, Matthews and Owen, 2011). 
Globalization also implies the increasing use of consumption taxes as the associated 
activities are relatively easy to localize (as opposed to incomes), which in turn reduces 
the potential for international tax avoidance. Smaller and more open economies rely 
                                                          
77 The top marginal income tax rate has fallen in nearly every OECD country over the past 
decades, in many cases quite substantially: i.e. the marginal tax rate on the highest income in the U.S. 
was reduced from 70 percent (in the early 1970’s) to below 30 percent (by late 1980’s). 
78 Source: OECD tax database - https://data.oecd.org/tax 
79 The principle is that the tax base should be broad and marginal tax rates should be moderate 
formed the basis of the 1986 reform of the US income tax reform (Williamson 1990). 
80 I.e. the liberalization and integration of markets that made capital internationally mobile and 
increased cross-border ownership of business. 
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less on personal and corporate income taxes, and more on expenditure and trade taxes 
than other governments do (Hines and Summers, 2009). 
The paper will examine in the following section (4.5.) the strength of external 
influence coming in the form of ideation, policy recommendations, coercive external 
pressure, economic rationality (i.e. the challenge of globalization) on the consecutive 
Hungarian governments, with the purpose to uncover the relation of this independent 
variable (i.e. external influence) on the dependent variable (i.e. large scale tax policy 
change).  
4.5. Empirical body of work 
4.5.1. Case selection rationale 
In the following section the paper analyses the previously identified three 
factors’ role in the causal mechanism of tax policy change both in a general setting 
and in a particular context provided by the case under investigation.  
The main elements in all tax systems are tax bases, rate structures, and special 
provisions such as exemptions, credits, and deductions. Tax regimes are complex 
systems, with typically 50-80 different types of taxes employed, often with different 
tax rates and numerous exemptions applied to various economic agents or economic 
activities. In any tax system, these elements are all determined jointly. One needs to 
examine the process by which tax structure is determined in order to understand 
taxation. “Tax systems can be viewed as the outcome of optimizing political and 
economic behaviour in a competitive political system” (Hettich and Winer, 1999:59). 
Tax revenues constitute the large majority of governments’ income – it is an essential 
question how tax burden is distributed: i.e. what actors on what type of activities pay 
how much taxes. From the perspective of the current study, this is the most 
rudimentary characteristic of any given tax system. 
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When one aims to evaluate the changes in the tax policy, there are several 
possible ways to measure them. One way would be to examine the particular tax rates 
imposed, exemptions applied, and the changes along these dimensions. Nevertheless, 
such an approach would prove to be rather insufficient in grabbing the underlying issue 
of how tax burden is distributed in the society. Another approach would be to measure 
the various types of tax revenues in nominal terms, or discounting the impact of 
inflation and economic growth, rather in relation to GDP. However, there still remains 
the noise of the sometimes drastic cyclical and/or structural changes of the economy 
and fiscal consolidation needs. Therefore, the most reliable measure of a given tax 
system is the share of the various economic actors and activities within the pool of 
total tax revenue. This is the chosen measurement technique of this study where the 
big picture is in the focus.  
The big picture has the following segmentation81: (1) taxes on income, profits 
and capital gains; (2) social security contributions; (3) taxes on payroll and workforce; 
(4) taxes on property; (5) taxes on goods and services. Tax policy changes are 
examined by the paper on the dimension of the changes in the share of the overall tax 
revenues of the above categories. What would be the criteria of a significant tax policy 
change? There is no agreed definition for this question, therefore there is a need to 
develop it here. 
 The assumption is that a significant tax policy shift occurs when the burden 
share within the total tax revenue mix of at least two types of taxes (i.e. out of the large 
tax categories) changes by more than 5 percentage points. While the criteria of the 5 
percentage point change can be labelled as arbitrary, and one can argue that a smaller 
(i.e. 2-3 percentage point) change should also be classified as a significant tax policy 
change, the counterargument is that such fluctuations may be produced by abrupt 
changes in the macroeconomic environment as well without intentional policy 
measures, therefore by lifting the criteria threshold to meaningfully higher levels as 
proposed, such caveats could be avoided. A 5 percentage point change of a major 
element within the tax structure on the other hand is a measure that reflects a significant 
                                                          
81 This classification of taxes is used by the Worldbank, the IMF, and the OECD. 
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reconsideration of the tax policy concerning the weights of certain taxable activities 
and actors. 
The argument for the other criteria, i.e. that tax changes should comprise at 
least two types of taxes is based on the intention to avoid cases of more incremental 
tax policy changes and grab the cases of deliberate policy reforms. Nevertheless, tax 
policy reforms normally take considerable amount of time to deliver intended 
outcomes. Starting from the point in time, when the idea of a tax reform is born in 
advocacy coalitions, typically it takes years to get the results, as ideas need to go 
through fiscal feasibility studies and legislative procedures before implementation, 
time is needed to get the tax-payers ready to accustom to the new requirements, and 
finally the revenues to come alongside the expected structure.  
It is advisable to examine multiyear periods’ tax revenues before and after tax 
reforms versus those of single years, as that would give a more balanced picture 
preferably cleared from one-off effects producing undesired biases in the time series. 
Therefore, the following research will analyse 3-year averages in order to conclude 
whether a significant tax reform occurred.  
A major tax reform therefore was identified in any case when 5% percentage 
point change happened of at least two major tax elements with regards to their share 
in the overall tax revenues in examining three-year period averages. Having analysed 
the Eurostat and OECD databases, eventually there are two such cases detected: 
Hungary and Lithuania (see Table 4.3.). Nevertheless, in Lithuania the overall tax 
burden shift is less fundamental as it can be considered as a rebalancing of the different 
types of tax on labor, whereas the Hungarian case exemplifies a major policy 
turnaround with the weight of the tax burden moved from income to consumption (see 
Table 4.4. and also Appendix 10. Hungary’s tax revenues structure by tax types’ 
share of total tax revenue, 1991-2017). Therefore, Hungary arguably constitutes the 
case of a significant tax policy change. 
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Table 4.3. The change of share of the tax types in total tax revenue (in %) 
2006-2008 average versus 2012-2014 average  
  consumption tax  income tax property tax social security tax 
Hungary 6,3  -7,2  1,2  -0,8 
Lithuania 2,7 -12,5 0,1 9,7 
Source: OECD Database / Author 
     
Table 4.4. The changes in Hungary’s tax revenue structure (3-year averages) 
  2006-2008 2009-2011 2012-2014 2015-2017 
Taxes on income, profits and 
capital gains 25,1% 20,7% 17,9% 18,6% 
Social security contributions  33,4% 32,6% 32,6% 33,1% 
Taxes on payroll and 
workforce 0,8% 1,1% 1,4% 1,7% 
Taxes on property 2,1% 2,8% 3,3% 3,0% 
Taxes on goods and services 37,6% 42,0% 43,9% 42,9% 
Other taxes 0,9% 0,8% 0,8% 0,7% 
Source: OECD Database / Author 
   
4.5.2. Case research  
The analysis covers the three consecutive governments’ tax policy changes (i.e. 
Bajnai 2009-2010; Orbán 2010-2014; Orbán 2014-2018), however, it also gives an 
account of the previous time period (2004-2008) in order to better contextualize the 
case.  
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Hungary joined the EU in May 2004 and almost immediately the EU’s 
Excessive Deficit Procedure82 was launched (in early summer 2004). The Hungarian 
government needed to submit a detailed plan how it planned to reduce the deficit. 
Internal conflicts within the government resulted in a change of the prime minister83 
in August 2004. The incoming Prime Minister Gyurcsány was eyeing to the 2006 
parliamentary elections, therefore the government refrained from employing 
unpopular fiscal consolidation measures. However, in order to formally comply with 
the EDP, the Ministry of Finance prepared a national program in autumn 2004 – 
without consulting fellow ministries, the central bank, or economic think-tanks84. 
While fiscal consolidation program and structural reform proposals were aligned with 
the EU recommendations – implementation was fully missing85. This changed after 
the 2006 elections. The lack of a strong political coalition weakened the political 
leaders’ capacity to implement comprehensive reforms though. Political consent was 
secured by party-politicking through behind-the-scenes deals among the coalition 
parties. Interest groups were only minimally involved in policy formulation and 
eventually all decisions were made by the prime minister.86 Corporatist institutions, 
such as the National Interest Reconciliation Council87, were side-lined (Sárközy, 2012; 
Hajnal, 2012). Fiscal consolidation focused on the revenue side. The government 
                                                          
82 The EDP is an action initiated by the European Commission (EC) against those member states 
whose public budget deficit runs above 3% of GDP (the rule was changed in the aftermath of the 
severe 2009 crisis).   
83 Prime Minister Medgyessy resigned in August 2004 – Gyurcsány (former Minister of Youth 
Affairs and Sports) became prime minister in September 2004. Early elections were not held; the 
coalition government continued. 
84 Interview with former official at the Ministry of Finance, 23 August 2016 (Budapest, 
Hungary).   
85 Interview with analyst at the European Commission Directorate-General for Communication, 
Representation in Hungary, 24 February 2017 (Budapest, Hungary); Interview with former high level 
political representative of Hungary in the European Commission, 20 September 2016 (Szentendre, 
Hungary). 
86 Interview with former official at the Ministry of Finance, 23 August 2016 (Budapest, 
Hungary). 
87 A tripartite council dealing with labour market and general economic policy issues involving 
the government, the trade unions, and the various employer groups. 
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increased personal and corporate income taxes, social security contributions and 
introduced a sector tax on the energy and banking sectors.  
The domestic cleavage structures were unhelpful in achieving a meaningful tax 
reform as the political support of the government was weak (no dominant player 
emerged) and the government was not considering international recommendations on 
how to create a more growth enhancing tax regime, but was rather focussing on 
keeping its voter base relatively immune against tax increases88. Reform ownership 
(i.e. tax reforms recommended by the international institutions) was weak.  
 In this time period (2004-2008) the window of opportunity in the form of 
economic crisis was absent. Global and European economic conditions were 
favourable. The Hungarian economy had an average annual GDP growth rate of 4.4% 
(versus 2.4% in the Euro-area – see also Appendix 2.) in 2004-2006, The revenue-
side-centred-measures resulted in punishingly high taxes intimidating investment and 
employment while they also led to flourishing tax avoidance practices; economic 
growth practically disappeared in 2007-2008 (average annual GDP growth was 0.7% 
in Hungary versus 1.8% in the Euro-area and 6% in the East Central European89 
region).   
Despite the EDP, international influence on domestic policy making was weak. 
According to the EU rules of those times, in case of such an incident, the member state 
under the EDP was obliged to submit corrective programs in order to eliminate the 
excessive deficit. The usual method was that the European Commission (EC), more 
specifically the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DGEcFin) 
gave an opinion on the member state’s fiscal consolidation program. The content of 
the program was solely the responsibility of the member state’s government. DGEcFin 
                                                          
88 Interviews with high ranked government officials and background conversations with top 
level political decision makers (undisclosed). 
89 East Central European region is understood here as the ex-Communist countries without ex-
Sovietunion 
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also had the task to audit the development of the program, but the programs content 
and its implementation was fully the responsibility of the member state (Török, 2019).  
As the global financial crisis escalated in autumn 2008, due to the weak 
financial position of Hungary90, there came a complete freeze on the government’s 
primary bond market. Elite political decision makers called for financial assistance in 
order to avoid the country defaulting on its debt servicing. In late October 2008, the 
government signed a stand-by arrangement (SBA) with the IMF, supplemented by a 
loan contract signed with the EU and another one with the World Bank91. The EU was 
involved in the bailout program under the terms of the EU Treaty92. The IMF’s SBA 
included detailed policy prescriptions with quantitative targets in the form of policy 
measures with numerical objectives and qualitative targets in the form of public sector 
reforms. The implementation of both the quantitative and the qualitative policy targets 
was strictly monitored – i.e. the program had firm conditionality criteria. Under the 
IMF bailout program (2008–2010), the perceived task of the central government was 
crisis management, with the underlying objective of implementing the agreed (i.e. 
prescribed) fiscal consolidation measures and the public sector reforms.  
Prime Minister Gyurcsány resigned in March 2009, and the incoming caretaker 
government was headed by Bajnai, until the next elections (scheduled for one year 
later). Bajnai’s caretaker government acted as the agent of the IMF and the EC, without 
a high level of domestic support or political legitimacy (Török, 2019).  The IMF-
prescribed fiscal consolidation program contained the correction of the Hungarian tax 
system among others (i.e. short-term efficiency-enhancing measures with prompt 
expenditure cuts and long-term structural reforms). The program prescribed tax cuts 
(social security contributions, personal and corporate income taxes) with a broadening 
of the tax base and tax increases (consumption taxes). Domestic decision-making 
authority was severely curtailed. The emergency situation paralysed the domestic 
                                                          
90 I.e. Hungary had excessively high level of short maturity external debt. 
91 The size of the SBA loan was EUR 12.5bn, the EU loan was EUR 6bn, the World Bank loan 
was EUR 1bn. 
92 According to article 119, before a non-Euro-area member state seeks financial assistance from 
an outside source, it has to consult with the EC and the Economic and Financial Committee. 
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political elite and reduced domestic resistance, that is, it opened the window of 
opportunity for public sector reforms. The shift in the locus of authority (from 
domestic elite decision makers to the IMF) was present in the form of coercive policy 
transfer (i.e. the SBA conditionalities). New policy images were adopted. In this 
process domestic advocacy coalitions were also supporting the policy change: 
“Reformszövetség”93 was delivering policy proposals echoing the mainstream 
propositions in tax policy change (aligned to the taxation theories). It advocated flat 
rate tax system as lower marginal tax rate was expected to increase the labour supply, 
and therefore deliver the widening of the tax base. Lower tax rates were also expected 
to lower the propensity for tax avoiding behaviour (i.e. whitening the economy) and 
simplify the tax system (therefore reducing administrative costs). Eventually, a key 
member of Reformszövetség became the Finance Minister of the Bajnai government.  
The care-taker government had NPM-like managerial approach in delivering 
policy changes94. The sense of urgency also decreased the institutional constraints and 
resulted in a relatively high level of reform ownership.   
At the 2010 parliamentary elections, opposition Fidesz, campaigning with tax-
cut promises, won a two-thirds parliamentary super-majority. The new government led 
by Prime Minister Orbán faced the challenge of pleasing voters (i.e. deliver tax cuts, 
refrain from further austerity measures), while also continuing with fiscal 
consolidation and public sector reforms according to the IMF program?. Moreover, in 
the post-crisis period, the EC took more seriously its role in preventing macro 
                                                          
93 Reformszövetség (i.e. Reform-alliance) formally existing between November 2008 and April 
2009 was formed by various interest groups (employers’ associations, trade unions, business groups 
and scientists, economists). It proposed an economic program which was largely resembling the IMF 
prescribed measures focussing on macro-stability and competitiveness, public sector and tax reforms 
(Source: Reformszövetség). 
94 Interviews with former representative of the Fiscal Council, former employee of the IMF 
Resident Representative Office, former official at the Ministry of Finance, former high level decision 
maker at Ministry of National Economy.  
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instability and excessive deficits with the introduction of strengthened mechanism95. 
First, the government introduced a banking tax – without any consultation with the 
IMF or the EC96. This was a violation of the program. Given the confrontational stance 
of Prime Minister Orbán, the relationship between the new government and the 
IMF/EC soured rapidly. Finally, the IMF and the EC decided to terminate the bailout 
program prematurely in summer 201097. The EDP was still in place though, and 
therefore fiscal consolidation had to continue.  
The government introduced sector taxes on selected industries (bank, retail, 
energy, and telecoms). Otherwise, the Orbán government’s tax policy was consistent 
vis-à-vis the philosophy of putting the weight of taxation from income related taxes to 
consumption related ones (as a consequence, the normal VAT bracket was raised to 
27% in Hungary, the highest in the EU and in the OECD) and broadened the tax base98 
– this strategy was advocated by the OECD and by the IMF. The tax system was further 
modified by introducing various consumption and turnover-related taxes (unhealthy 
food tax, financial transactions levy, telephone usage tax, advertisement tax, and so 
forth). The source of these ideas were typically other countries’ taxation practices99 in 
the form of voluntary policy learning. Income taxes (both personal and corporate) were 
cut100. In the post-IMF program period the Orbán government aimed to reduce 
coercive external influence as much as possible. The locus of authority shifted again, 
this time back to the domestic decision making elite. The National Interest 
Reconciliation Council and other consultative, tripartite arrangements aimed at 
                                                          
95 Introduction of the European Semester, the Six pack and the Two pack, the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure and the strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact. 
96 After the government change, it turned out that the public deficit was running above plan; 
therefore, the measure was implemented in order to fix the fiscal problem quickly.  
97 The officially set end date for the program was October 2010.  
98 Several tax exemptions were abolished, including minimum wage earners’. 
99 The government made thorough analysis of the global taxation regimes and adopted several 
elements from various countries to the Hungarian circumstances – Interview with a former high level 
decision maker at Ministry of National Economy 
100 The personal income tax system was transformed from a progressive rate structure to flat tax, 
while SME’s corporate tax rate was cut. 
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collective bargaining, as well as sectoral level consultative forums, were either 
abolished or replaced by new institutions with limited authority (Hajnal, 2016).  
The government had very strong political support: a single-party government 
with a parliamentary supermajority and a continuously high popular approval rate. 
Strong reform ownership and capable managers were present (i.e. not constrained by 
internal political forces, such a coalition partner or strong opposition). The belief 
system of the elite political decision makers was resembling the mainstream tax policy 
theories rooted in the school of neo-liberal economic policy. The advocacy coalition 
of the Orbán government proclaimed similar ideas on tax policy as the previous 
Reformszövetség and as the recommendations of international institutions: broadening 
the tax base, reducing tax on income and a fundamental tax philosophy change 
(Cséfalvay and Matolcsy, 2009). However, while under the IMF SBA program, policy 
diffusion occurred among the circumstances of a coercive policy transfer and in the 
post-IMF program period policy learning was voluntary. The source of tax policy ideas 
was diverse: some were coming from the OECD, some from the European Union, and 
some from other sources. The window of opportunity in the form of economic crisis 
prevailed, although it was not as severe as in the previous period. Due to the European 
debt crisis in 2012 (followed by the 2008 financial and 2009 real economy crisis), the 
lack of available IMF credit line, Hungary’s financial position got under renewed 
pressure. Fiscal consolidation was also a necessity due to the ongoing EDP.  
The government was able to secure its re-election at the 2014 parliamentary 
elections with 2/3 majority once again, i.e. the locus of authority did not change. This 
period was qualitatively different from the previous four years, given the economic 
setting. Hungary was released from the EDP in 2013. Sustainable and relatively fast 
economic growth returned from 2013 onwards both in Hungary and in the Euro-area. 
The window of opportunity in the form of economic crises has disappeared. As far as 
the tax policy is concerned, this period brought about mixed results. The tax base was 
(minimally) narrowed as certain product groups (i.e. meat and milk) were reclassified 
from the normal 27% VAT bracket to lower ones. However, at the same time, both 
corporate and personal income taxes were further cut, and the cost of labour (the social 
security tax paid by the employer) has been decided to get reduced in a multiyear 
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program through cutting social security tax – it is still ongoing. Employers’ paid social 
security tax on gross wages was 27% in 2016, when a multiyear program was decided 
to cut it – in line with international institutions’ recommendation to cut tax burden on 
labour – and therefore to gain competitive advantage in globalization.  Social security 
tax on gross wages was lowered in 2017, 2018 and in 2019 (currently it is 17.5%) 
while further cuts are scheduled with the target of reaching 11.5% in 2022. The impact 
on tax revenues is rather neutral so far, given the fast wage an employment growth in 
2017-2018 so far. Therefore, eventually the 2014-2018 government period did not 
delivered a large-scale tax policy change.  
As it is exhibited in Table 4.5., the large policy shifts were the characteristics 
of the Bajnai and the Orbán I. governments (cutting tax burden on income and increase 
the tax burden on consumption – i.e. a policy shift defined as fiscal devaluation by the 
scholarly literature – see Puglisi, 2014).   
Table 4.5. The change of the tax types in total tax revenues* 
  Gyurcsány Bajnai Orbán I. Orbán II. 
Taxes on income, profits 
and capital gains 1,4% -2,9% -4,9% 0,3% 
Social security 
contributions (SSC) 0,7% -1,6% 1,5% -0,8% 
Taxes on payroll and 
workforce -0,1% 0,2% 0,3% 0,1% 
Taxes on property -0,2% 0,5% 0,6% 0,2% 
Taxes on goods and services -1,6% 3,9% 2,6% 0,1% 
Other taxes -0,2% 0,0% -0,1% 0,1% 
Source: OECD Database / Author; *measured in consecutive periods (before and after the tax 
changes) 
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4.6. Discussion 
The paper was looking for the answer to the question: What combination of 
independent factors facilitated the Hungarian tax reform in the 2009-2018 period?  
The paper is embedded in the various policy change theories and utilized the 
explanations theories provide for the phenomenon of policy change as opposed to 
policy continuity. Multiple streams and path dependency argue that while policy 
change (especially large scale reform) is not the norm, still, under extraordinary 
ciscrumstances labelled as policy windows, or window of opportunities, conjunctures 
do exist under which policy change finds it way through the interplay of individual 
agents, ideas, institutions and external factors (multiple streams) or through the 
decentralized interaction of policy actors (path dependency). Such extraordinary 
circumstances are provided by the 2008-2009 financial and economic crisis and the 
following 2011-2012 souvereign debt crisis in most EU memberstates. The magnitude 
of the crisis was particuclary significant in the case of Hungary. That affected both the 
society and the political actors to a large extent. The paper has found that in those cases 
(whereby the unit of analysis is a government’s tenure) when the independent 
explanatory variable of economic crisis was present (i.e. 2008-2010 and 2010-2014) 
large scale tax policy change happened as opposed to the cases (i.e. 2004-2008 and 
2014-2018) when both economic crisis and tax reform was missing.  
Punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) and advocacy coalition framework 
(ACF) suggest that ideas and the political executives’ belief systems play a key role in 
policy formulation. These can change either upon the arrival of new elite decision 
makers (in the form of a new government involving the devil shift, or by large 
modifications in the composition of the advocacy coalition) or upon elite decision 
makers’ reflection on dramatic shifts in the public opinon concerning the relevant 
policy field. Political economy (PE) scholars accentuate the importance of reform 
ownership of the political executive that is determinded by a set of various factors (i.e. 
strong mandate; narrow or no coalition; intstitutional contraints etc.). The above 
factors altogether are synthetized by the paper in the term of domestic cleavage 
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structure. According to the stipulations of PET, ACF and PE, high level of reform 
ownership and the devil shift can be considered as appropriate facilitating factors for 
policy reform. The empirical evidence echoes well the stipulations of the theories: 
domestic cleavage strucutres were supportive for tax policy reform in the case of both 
the 2008-2010 (i.e. changes in the advocacy coalition, shift in the belief system of the 
political executives), and 2010-20104 governments (strong mandate, one-party 
government etc.) while unsupportive in the case of the 2004-2008 and the 2014-2018 
governments. 
Policy learning theories find that external influence plays a key role in policy 
diffusion and in policy transfer processes. Policy transfer may be voluntary or 
coercive. Coercive policy transfer typically involves some form of conditionality. In 
the case of the 2004-2008 government, external influence was weak, through the mild 
(pre-crisis) form of policy recommendations derived from the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure. Large scale tax policy reform was not enacted by the government then. The 
2008-2010 period brought about a dramatic change with IMF policy conditionality. In 
this period, tax reform measures were taken by the government. While the 210-2014 
government started with the pre-mature stepping out from the IMF bail-out program, 
elevated level of external pressure was derived from the strict post-crisis form of the 
EDP. Major tax reform was enacted, largely influenced by mainstream (i.e. European 
Commission, IMF and particularly OECD) tax policy recommendations. As EDP was 
lifted in 2013, the 2014-2018 government did not face high level external influence 
any longer. No major tax reform was enacted by this period’s government.       
The hypothesis was that the co-existence of the three factors stipulated by 
policy change theories, i.e. domestic cleavage structures allowing high level of reform 
ownership, the window of opportunity in the form of economic crises and the influence 
of international agents in the form of policy transfer facilitated the reform of the 
Hungarian tax system in the 2009-2018 period. This hypothesis was proved - as Table 
4.6. exhibits. Eventually, the expenditure level is being determined simultaneously 
with the structure of taxation (Hettich and Winer, 1999).  
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Table 4.6. Unfolding the case - independent factors facilitating tax policy change 
Hungary 2004-2018 
  2004-2008 2008-2010 2010-2014 2014-2018 
  
economic 
crisis 
not present present present not present 
In
d
ep
e
n
d
e
n
t 
/ 
e
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
favourable 
economic and 
financial 
conditions 
major financial 
and real 
economy crisis 
protracted 
financial and 
real economy 
crisis 
favourable 
economic and 
financial 
conditions 
international 
influence 
weak strong strong weak 
in the form of 
pre-crisis EDP 
coercive policy 
transfer (IMF 
SBA) 
in the form 
voluntary 
policy learning 
and post-crisis 
EDP 
in the form of 
globalization 
reform 
ownership 
weak strong strong strong 
weak government 
thriving for 
political survival 
locus of authority 
shifted to IMF 
new single 
party 
government, 
strong mandate 
single party 
government, 
strong mandate 
  
advocacy 
coalition not 
supporting tax 
reform 
advocacy 
coalition 
supporting tax 
reform 
advocacy 
coalition 
supporting tax 
reform 
advocacy 
coalition 
supporting tax 
reform  
Dependent  tax policy 
change 
small large large small 
variable 
Source: Author 
 
Policy change is truly difficult to happen and only does when the “proper 
conditions” are available (Birkland). We argued to have a more refined knowledge on 
the factors facilitating policy change to happen. The finding of the paper is that the 
coexistence of all the various identified independent factors were necessary for major 
policy change or policy reform - that goes beyond day-to-day policy management and 
involves structural changes. It is that the theories of path dependency, punctuated 
equilibrium, policy learning and advocacy coalition framework have already 
developed individually the elements of the big puzzle of policy change. The paper 
proposes to bring on a common platform of the existing streams of thoughts to develop 
the framework for a policy reform theory. In order to facilitate such an enterprise, the 
paper suggests continuing to study the causal mechanism of large scale policy shifts 
in other cases.  
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CHAPTER 5.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Public policy change is the broad enquiry of the dissertation. The narrower 
research area under coverage is large scale policy change or policy reform of the 
central government. The underlying aim of the dissertation was to gain a better 
understanding on the factors those facilitate policy change. The research looked at the 
circumstances under which the need for policy change articulates; the sources of the 
newly set policy directions; and the evolution of the policy change process. 
As a macroeconomic analyst I learned that the content and the quality of 
economic policy making largely determines the overall performance of a country. 
Therefore, in my professional work I had paid a special attention on public policies 
affecting the macro-level beyond fiscal policy in general, such areas as tax policy, 
education policy, health care policy, industrial policy etc.  
The 2008-2009 financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign-debt crisis 
brought about distinctive break vis-à-vis the previously accepted modus operandi not 
only in the realm of the economy and financial markets, but it also generated 
meaningful repercussions in the field of (both national and international) politics and 
resulted in new mechanisms in the governance within the European Union (Alesina, 
2012; Blöchliger at al 2012, De Grauwe, 2013, Sutherland et al 2012; Ongaro 2014). 
Several countries – including a number of EU member states - got into severe financial 
distress as a consequence of the financial and economic crises due to their earlier 
accumulated imbalances provoked by policy malfunctioning. The previously designed 
governance structures of the EU proved to be inefficient to prevent and manage the 
crisis. The influence of external agents (understood here as the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General of Economic and Financial Affairs and the 
International Monetary Fund) on national policy design substantially increased. 
Problem-ridden member-states of the EU were requested to cut budget deficit and 
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reduce public debt. Hungary was a definitive basket case for such developments: the 
country witnessed external influence coming from the EU in the form of the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure, an IMF-bail-out, land-sliding political changes, deep economic 
crisis, and a series of fiscal consolidation and public sector reform attempts. The 
Hungarian case is considered here an apt choice to elucidate large scale policy change 
and national policy reform under external constraints.  
In 2015 an international research project was launched where I was invited to 
join. The research project - led by Professor Ongaro and Professor Kickert - aimed to 
investigate the politics of fiscal consolidation, the domestic government’s political 
decision-making about consolidation, and the influence EU (and IMF) on that. The 
research project was a follow-up of earlier research (COCOPS WP7) that focused on 
national governments’ political decision-making on fiscal consolidation and reform.  
The ultimate ambition of the research project was to analyse how the external agents 
affected public sector reforms in countries under conditions of fiscal crisis and 
consolidation. The research work developed in two streams. One with a relative focus 
on the effects of EU (and IMF) on public sector and administrative reforms and another 
with a relative focus on the influence of EU (and IMF) on consolidation. I participated 
in both streams and covered the Hungarian case. The ultimate contribution from my 
side to the research project was two articles published in renowned international 
journals. ‘Unintended outcomes effects of the European Union and the International 
Monetary Fund on Hungary's public sector and administrative reforms’ published in 
Public Policy and Administration, and  ‘The politics of fiscal consolidation and reform 
under external constraints in the European periphery: Comparative study of Hungary 
and Latvia’ published in Public Management Review co-authored be Aleksanders 
Cepilovs. 
 I continued to further study the combination of necessary factors facilitating 
large scale policy change / policy reform with the broad aim to test and potentially 
refine existing theories of policy change and to compare their explanatory power. I 
studied a specific policy area in Hungary with the the target to uncover the various 
stages of the change process;  the rationale behind the choices of national elite decision 
makers; the influence of external agents; and the interplay between the considerations 
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of fiscal consolidation need and policy reform. The article written on it ‘Factors 
Facilitating Large Scale Policy Change Hungarian Tax Reform 2009-2018’ is 
published in Political Science Online (2019 December).  
This portfolio dissertation compiles the three articles (Chapter 2., Chapter 3. 
and Chapter 4.) which constitute the main body of the text. The central theme of each 
of the articles is policy change under the circumstances of external constraints with the 
focus on the influence of external agents on national policy making. A special focus 
was put on the domestic fiscal consolidation, the fiscal measures affecting public 
sector reforms and the influence of external agents on the decisions on particular policy 
outcomes.  
All the three papers are embedded into the terrain of the various policy change 
theories. They equally share the ambition to test and refine existing theories of policy 
change and to contribute to the emerging stream of public administration applied 
research agendas on public sector reform by making visible and understandable the 
main contexts and the interacting processes shaping public policymaking.  
The time frame of all the three article is the financial crisis and the crisis 
management years (2008-2012), amended with the pre-, and post crisis years, broadly 
speaking the past 15 years (2004-2018). The selected case of the dissertation is 
Hungary – all three articles deal with the Hungarian developments. In the same time, 
other EU and OECD countries are also looked at for comparisons and Latvia is 
analysed more in-depth in Chapter 3.  
Public policy change refers to shifts in existing structures deriving from a 
change in attitude or in principle (Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Cerna 2013). The 
dissertation looked at large-scale policy change or policy reform, i.e. a major change 
that goes beyond day-to-day policy management, potentially involving structural 
changes (Alesina et al, 2006), the introduction of new and innovative policies replacing 
existing ones in order to change the system as a whole (Fullan, 2009: 102). Public 
sector reforms, government-wide in scope and cross-cutting all public services are 
understood as changes to the structures and processes of public sector organizations, 
i.e. re-form previously existing arrangements by the attributes of a new structure, form, 
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or process, driven by specific considerations and political actors’ interests (Barzelay, 
2001; Ongaro, 2009). The dissertation considers the terms ‘policy reform’ and ‘large 
scale policy shift’ interchangeable in line with other scholars (i.e. Cerna, 2013). The 
dissertation stipulates that policy change does not necessarily equal with 
improvements with regards to efficiency or quality of the public services or by any 
other considerations.  
There is abundant literature on the policy change topic. Nevertheless, policy 
change theory is fragmented as it is consisting of a number of streams – not a coherent, 
all-encompassing policy framework as such exist yet. The scholars identified the most 
important theories as (1) multiple streams; (2) path dependency; (3) punctuated 
equilibrium; (4) policy learning – policy diffusion; and (5) the interest group activity 
centred ‘Advocacy Coalition Framework’. While these approaches offer fairly uneven 
categories, regarding their scholarly ambitions and their actual scopes, each of them 
has the underlying goal to comprehend the very existence of policy change and to give 
plausible explanations to the question what factors drive policy change. Therefore the 
above literature constitutes the theoretical framework of the dissertation. 
As a major step in understanding policy formation, Kingdon looked at the 
interplay of individual agents, ideas, institutions and external factors (i.e. multiple 
streams). Policy formation is seen by Kingdon, as the joint combination of the streams 
of problems, policies and politics. The particular circumstances where they congregate 
and result in policy change decisions is labelled by Kingdon as the policy window. 
Kingdon argues for continual change and adaptation of public policies as opposed to 
the stability of decision-making in policy communities. 
The theory of path dependency claims that institutions are sticky, decisions 
made in the past encourage policy continuity and actors protect existing models, 
therefore public policies and formal institutions are difficult to change (Greener 2002; 
Wilsford, 1994; Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000). Still, under certain conditions – that 
is called conjuncture, critical juncture or more commonly, the window of opportunity 
- a big change that departs from the historical path can be possible (Wilsford 1994; 
Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). The window of opportunity - in the form of an 
economic crisis - delegitimizes previous arrangements and policies (Kickert and 
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Randma-Liiv, 2017), therefore it is considered by the literature as an independent 
variable facilitating policy change. When policy change comes, than the historical 
context – i.e. welfare state, civil society organisations, civil service regulations, 
unionization -  also considered to be factors shaping the process and content of policy 
change (Christensen and Laegreid, 2017; Randma-Liiv and Kickert, 2018).  
In a typical policy sector, there are long periods of stability followed by major 
(fast - and sometimes dramatic) policy changes. Therefore scholarly attention need to 
be focused on both change and stability. Punctuated equilibrium theory looks at the 
pattern of cyclical changes of policies when long periods of stability are followed by 
major policy changes. According to the theory, once an idea gets attention, it will 
expand rapidly and become unstoppable (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991; Baumgartner 
and Jones, 1993). Punctuated equilibrium is the process of interaction of beliefs and 
values concerning particular policy (termed policy images) with the existing set of 
political institutions or venues of policy action (Christensen, Aaron and Clark 2003, 
Christensen et al. 2006). According to the theory, policy-makers’ perceptions and the 
institutional framework determine the way policy problems are defined.  
Policy learning deals with the question how ideas can be transmitted from one 
place to another (Rose, 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1994; Shipan and Volden 2008). 
Policy transfer refers to the process whereby actors borrow policies, administrative 
arrangements, and institutions developed in one setting to make them work within 
another setting (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Policy transfer occurs on a continuum 
between ‘purely voluntary’ policy transfer and ‘purely coercive’ policy transfer 
(Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Heclo, 1974; Rose, 1991).  Coercive policy transfer – 
also termed as facilitated unilateralism or hierarchical policy transfer - occurs via the 
exercise of transnational or supranational authority; when a state is obliged to adopt 
policy as a condition of financial assistance (Bulmer and Padgett 2014).  
The quality of the coercive policy transfer and its eventual outcome depends 
on variables such as the degree of authority accrued by supranational institutions and 
the density of rules and the availability of sanctions on the one hand, and on the reform 
ownership of elite decision makers on the other hand. Reform ownership in turn rests 
upon ‘advocacy coalitions’. The change of the systemic governing coalition and the 
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surrounding political subsystems (i.e. the form of political executive) with new policy 
concepts, is another independent variable of policy change. Top-down reforms driven 
by elite decision making – influenced by ideas and pressures from elsewhere – 
constitute the core of the reform process. Accordingly, public sector reform is more 
likely to happen if one political group (or advocacy coalition) becomes a dominant 
player (Alesina, 2006).  
Policy change can be understood through the examination of political 
subsystems (advocacy coalitions) those seek to influence governmental decisions. The 
adcovacy coalition theory recognizes that there are various competing sets of core 
ideas about causation and value in public policy. Coalitions form around these core 
idea sets because certain interests are linked to them. The members of advocacy 
coalitions are coming from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest 
group leaders, researchers etc.) and they shape the particular belief system - a set of 
basic values, causal assumptions and problem perceptions (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith, 1991). Policy options are therefore the function of the position of 
the particular advocacy coalition vis-à-vis the elite political decision makers: shifts in 
the government have an impact on the advocacy coalition. The role of beliefs in 
shaping policy ideas is a key concept for both the advocacy coalition framework and 
the punctuated equilibrium theory - both takes into account the theoretical relevance 
of discursive factors in policy change.  
The dissertation uncovers the politics of fiscal consolidation under the 
circumstances of economic crises, studies the external inducement in making policy 
reform at the national level in the wider area of the public sector and in the narrower 
case of tax policy in Hungary. The dependent variable is ultimately the policy outcome 
of the policy change procedure. There are a series of independent variables identified 
stemming from the postulates of the various policy change theory literature, such as 
the influence of the EU and the IMF; economic crises; reform ownership of elite 
decision makers etc.  
In order to establish causal relations (Bennett 2004; George and Bennett 2005) 
four data sources were consulted during the empirical research. First, extensive desk 
research was conducted, analysing publicly available official reports issued by the 
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national institutions Second, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key 
policy makers. Third, relevant media sources were consulted. Fourth, statistical and 
financial market data were collected and analysed. The research chapters apply the 
process-tracing method for within-case analysis in order to establish causal relations 
(Bennett and George, 2005; Beach and Pedersen, 2013) incorporated into within-case 
analysis (Chapter 2. and Chapter 4.), and the most similar system design in a two-
country comparative case study methodology (Chapter 3.). The dependent variable is 
ultimately the policy outcome of the policy change procedure. The independent 
variables are: (1) Domestic cleavage structures which define reform ownership 
through the political capabilities of elite decision makers and the belief system of the 
advocacy coalitions. (2)  The window of opportunity in the form of economic crisis as 
it delegitimizes previous long-serving policies and undermines the status quo. (3) 
International influence that makes policy learning, policy diffusion and policy transfer 
happen either in voluntary or in coercive form.  
The articles asked the following questions: How applicable are existing policy 
change theories for interpreting the empirical puzzle embodied in the Hungarian case? 
How did the international institutions affect fiscal consolidation and reforms? Why 
were the outcomes of the crisis so different despite the seemingly similar initial 
conditions (Hungary vs. Latvia)? What combination of independent factors facilitated 
the Hungarian tax reform in the 2009-2018 period?  
The main findings of the dissertation chapters are the following: (1) Public 
sector reform content is aligned to the dominant elite decision makers’ agenda 
(Hungary: 2004-2013). (2) Socio-economic structures and key political decision 
makers’ reform ownership is crucial in the policy reform trajectories (Hungary; Latvia, 
2009-2013). (3) The coexistence of all the various identified independent by the policy 
change theories (that of path dependency, punctuated equilibrium, policy learning and 
advocacy coalition framework factors were necessary for major policy change or 
policy reform) were present and facilitated large scale tax policy change in Hungary.  
The dissertation proposes the refinement of existing policy change theories 
with the findings on the role of socioeconomic factors, key political decision makers’ 
reform ownership and their dominant political agenda. Moreover the dissertation 
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suggests that shcolars of the policy change area could put additional efforts and 
endeavour to synthetize existing policy change theories, in order to collect them onto 
a common platform and develop the framework for a ‘Grand Policy Reform Theory’. 
In order to facilitate such an enterprise, the paper suggests continuing to study the 
causal mechanism of large scale policy shifts expanded into a broader set of cases in 
order to gain more evidence and insight into the necessary factors facilitating large 
scale policy changes.  
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Appendix: 
Appendix 1. List of interviews 
 
(1) Interview with a member of parliament, 5 July 2016 (Riga, Latvia) 
(2) Interview with a former senior civil servant from the Ministry of Finance, 31 
May 2016 (Riga, Latvia) 
(3) Interview with two representatives of the Bank of Latvia, 19 August 2014 
(Riga, Latvia) 
(4) Interview with a former member of parliament, 21 July 2016 (Riga, Latvia) 
(5) Interview with a senior civil servant from Ministry of Finance, 17 September 
2014 (Riga, Latvia) 
(6) Interview with an economist from the Ministry of Finance, 13 October 2015 
(Riga, Latvia) 
(7) Interview with a senior employee of the Financial and Capital Market 
Commission, 18 September 2014 (Riga, Latvia) 
(8) Interview with a representative of the State Employment Agency, 23 January 
2013 (Riga, Latvia) 
(9) Interview with a representative of the State Social Insurance Agency, 23 
January 2013 (Riga, Latvia) 
(10) Interviews with National Bank of Hungary experts, 20 October 2015; 24 May 
2016; 4 July 2016 (Budapest, Hungary)  
(11) Interview with a former National Bank of Hungary executive director, 8 
August 2016 (Balatonfüred, Hungary) 
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(12) Interview with a former representative of the Fiscal Council, 18 December 
2015, (Budapest, Hungary)  
(13) Interview with a former member of the Fiscal Council, 12 November 2015 
(Budapest, Hungary) 
(14) Interview with a former employee of the IMF Resident Representative Office, 
14 June 2016 (Budapest, Hungary)   
(15) Interview with a former official at the Ministry of Finance, 23 August 2016 
(Budapest, Hungary)  
(16) Interview with a former high level decision maker at Ministry of National 
Economy, 12 September 2016 (Budapest, Hungary)   
(17) Interview with Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
expert, 13 July 2016 (Brussels, Belgium) 
(18) Interview with an analyst at the European Commission Directorate-General 
for Communication, Representation in Hungary, 24 February 2017 
(Budapest, Hungary) 
(19) Interview with a high level political representative of Hungary in the 
European Commission, 20 September 2016 (Szentendre, Hungary) 
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Appendix 2. GDP change over the previous year (real terms) in EU member-
states (2004-2014) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium 3,6 2,1 2,5 3,4 0,8 -2,3 2,7 1,8 0,2 0,2 1,3 
Bulgaria 6,4 7,1 6,9 7,3 6,0 -3,6 1,3 1,9 0,0 0,5 1,8 
Czechia 4,9 6,5 6,9 5,6 2,7 -4,8 2,3 1,8 -0,8 -0,5 2,7 
Denmark 2,7 2,3 3,9 0,9 -0,5 -4,9 1,9 1,3 0,2 0,9 1,6 
Germany 1,2 0,7 3,8 3,0 1,0 -5,7 4,2 3,9 0,4 0,4 2,2 
Estonia 6,3 9,4 10,3 7,7 -5,4 -14,7 2,3 7,6 4,3 1,9 2,9 
Ireland 6,7 5,7 5,1 5,3 -4,5 -5,1 1,8 0,3 0,2 1,4 8,6 
Greece 5,1 0,6 5,7 3,3 -0,3 -4,3 -5,5 -9,1 -7,3 -3,2 0,7 
Spain 3,2 3,7 4,2 3,8 1,1 -3,6 0,0 -1,0 -2,9 -1,7 1,4 
France 2,8 1,7 2,4 2,4 0,3 -2,9 1,9 2,2 0,3 0,6 1,0 
Croatia 3,9 4,1 4,9 5,3 2,0 -7,3 -1,5 -0,3 -2,3 -0,5 -0,1 
Italy 1,6 0,9 2,0 1,5 -1,1 -5,5 1,7 0,6 -2,8 -1,7 0,1 
Cyprus 5,0 4,9 4,7 5,1 3,6 -2,0 1,3 0,4 -2,9 -5,8 -1,3 
Latvia 8,3 10,7 11,9 10,0 -3,5 -14,4 -3,9 6,4 4,0 2,4 1,9 
Lithuania 6,6 7,7 7,4 11,1 2,6 -14,8 1,6 6,0 3,8 3,5 3,5 
Luxembourg 3,6 3,2 5,2 8,4 -1,3 -4,4 4,9 2,5 -0,4 3,7 4,3 
Hungary 5,0 4,4 3,9 0,4 0,9 -6,6 0,7 1,7 -1,6 2,1 4,2 
Malta 0,4 3,8 1,8 4,0 3,3 -2,5 3,5 1,3 2,8 4,6 8,7 
Netherlands 2,0 2,1 3,5 3,8 2,2 -3,7 1,3 1,6 -1,0 -0,1 1,4 
Austria 2,7 2,2 3,5 3,7 1,5 -3,8 1,8 2,9 0,7 0,0 0,7 
Poland 5,1 3,5 6,2 7,0 4,2 2,8 3,6 5,0 1,6 1,4 3,3 
Portugal 1,8 0,8 1,6 2,5 0,2 -3,0 1,9 -1,8 -4,0 -1,1 0,9 
Romania 10,4 4,7 8,0 7,2 9,3 -5,5 -3,9 2,0 2,1 3,5 3,4 
Slovenia 4,4 3,8 5,7 7,0 3,5 -7,5 1,3 0,9 -2,6 -1,0 2,8 
Slovakia 5,3 6,8 8,5 10,8 5,6 -5,4 5,0 2,8 1,7 1,5 2,8 
Finland 3,9 2,8 4,1 5,2 0,7 -8,3 3,0 2,6 -1,4 -0,8 -0,6 
Sweden 4,3 2,8 4,7 3,4 -0,6 -5,2 6,0 2,7 -0,3 1,2 2,6 
United 
Kingdom 2,3 3,1 2,5 2,5 -0,3 -4,2 1,7 1,6 1,4 2,0 2,9 
Source: Eurostat 
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Appendix 3. Public budget balance in EU member-states (2004-2014) in GDP 
percentage 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium -0,2 -2,8 0,2 0,1 -1,1 -5,4 -4,0 -4,2 -4,2 -3,1 -3,1 
Bulgaria 1,8 1,0 1,8 1,1 1,6 -4,1 -3,1 -2,0 -0,3 -0,4 -5,5 
Czechia -2,4 -3,0 -2,2 -0,7 -2,0 -5,5 -4,2 -2,7 -3,9 -1,2 -2,1 
Denmark 2,1 5,0 5,0 5,0 3,2 -2,8 -2,7 -2,1 -3,5 -1,2 1,1 
Germany  -3,7 -3,4 -1,7 0,2 -0,2 -3,2 -4,2 -1,0 0,0 -0,1 0,6 
Estonia 2,4 1,1 2,9 2,7 -2,7 -2,2 0,2 1,2 -0,3 -0,2 0,7 
Ireland 1,3 1,6 2,8 0,3 -7,0 -13,8 -32,1 -12,8 -8,1 -6,2 -3,6 
Greece -8,8 -6,2 -5,9 -6,7 -10,2 -15,1 -11,2 -10,3 -8,9 -13,2 -3,6 
Spain 0,0 1,2 2,2 1,9 -4,4 -11,0 -9,4 -9,6 -10,5 -7,0 -6,0 
France -3,6 -3,4 -2,4 -2,6 -3,3 -7,2 -6,9 -5,2 -5,0 -4,1 -3,9 
Croatia -5,2 -3,9 -3,4 -2,4 -2,8 -6,0 -6,3 -7,9 -5,3 -5,3 -5,1 
Italy -3,5 -4,1 -3,5 -1,5 -2,6 -5,2 -4,2 -3,7 -2,9 -2,9 -3,0 
Cyprus -3,7 -2,2 -1,0 3,2 0,9 -5,4 -4,7 -5,7 -5,6 -5,1 -9,0 
Latvia -0,9 -0,4 -0,5 -0,5 -4,2 -9,5 -8,6 -4,3 -1,2 -1,2 -1,4 
Lithuania -1,4 -0,3 -0,3 -0,8 -3,1 -9,1 -6,9 -8,9 -3,1 -2,6 -0,6 
Luxembourg -1,3 0,1 1,9 4,2 3,3 -0,7 -0,7 0,5 0,3 1,0 1,3 
Hungary -6,5 -7,8 -9,3 -5,0 -3,7 -4,5 -4,5 -5,4 -2,4 -2,6 -2,6 
Malta -4,3 -2,6 -2,5 -2,1 -4,2 -3,2 -2,4 -2,4 -3,5 -2,4 -1,7 
Netherlands -1,8 -0,4 0,1 -0,1 0,2 -5,1 -5,2 -4,4 -3,9 -2,9 -2,2 
Austria -4,8 -2,5 -2,5 -1,4 -1,5 -5,3 -4,4 -2,6 -2,2 -2,0 -2,7 
Poland -5,0 -4,0 -3,6 -1,9 -3,6 -7,3 -7,3 -4,8 -3,7 -4,1 -3,7 
Portugal -6,2 -6,2 -4,3 -3,0 -3,8 -9,8 -11,2 -7,4 -5,7 -4,8 -7,2 
Romania -1,1 -0,8 -2,1 -2,7 -5,4 -9,1 -6,9 -5,4 -3,7 -2,2 -1,3 
Slovenia -2,0 -1,3 -1,2 -0,1 -1,4 -5,8 -5,6 -6,7 -4,0 -14,7 -5,5 
Slovakia -2,3 -2,9 -3,6 -1,9 -2,4 -7,8 -7,5 -4,3 -4,3 -2,7 -2,7 
Finland 2,2 2,6 3,9 5,1 4,2 -2,5 -2,6 -1,0 -2,2 -2,6 -3,2 
Sweden 0,4 1,8 2,2 3,4 1,9 -0,7 0,0 -0,2 -1,0 -1,4 -1,6 
United 
Kingdom -3,1 -3,1 -2,8 -2,6 -5,2 -10,1 -9,3 -7,5 -8,1 -5,3 -5,3 
Source: Eurostat 
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Appendix 4. General Government Debt in EU member-states (2004-2014) in 
GDP percentage 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium 96,5 94,7 91,0 87,0 92,5 99,5 99,7 102,6 104,3 105,5 107,5 
Bulgaria 36,0 26,8 21,0 16,3 13,0 13,7 15,3 15,2 16,7 17,1 27,1 
Czechia 28,5 27,9 27,7 27,5 28,3 33,6 37,4 39,8 44,5 44,9 42,2 
Denmark 44,2 37,4 31,5 27,3 33,3 40,2 42,6 46,1 44,9 44,0 44,3 
Germany 64,8 67,0 66,5 63,7 65,2 72,6 81,8 79,4 80,7 78,2 75,3 
Estonia 5,1 4,5 4,4 3,7 4,5 7,0 6,6 6,1 9,7 10,2 10,5 
Ireland 28,2 26,1 23,6 23,9 42,4 61,5 86,0 110,9 119,9 119,7 104,1 
Greece 102,9 107,4 103,6 103,1 109,4 126,7 146,2 172,1 159,6 177,4 178,9 
Spain 45,3 42,3 38,9 35,6 39,5 52,8 60,1 69,5 85,7 95,5 100,4 
France 65,9 67,4 64,6 64,5 68,8 83,0 85,3 87,8 90,6 93,4 94,9 
Croatia 40,3 41,2 38,7 37,3 39,0 48,3 57,3 63,9 69,5 80,4 84,0 
Italy 100,1 101,9 102,6 99,8 102,4 112,5 115,4 116,5 123,4 129,0 131,8 
Cyprus 64,8 63,4 59,3 54,0 45,6 54,3 56,8 66,2 80,1 103,1 108,0 
Latvia 14,0 11,4 9,6 8,0 18,2 36,3 47,3 43,1 41,6 39,4 40,9 
Lithuania 18,7 17,6 17,2 15,9 14,6 28,0 36,2 37,2 39,8 38,8 40,5 
Luxembourg 7,3 7,4 7,8 7,7 14,9 15,7 19,8 18,7 22,0 23,7 22,7 
Hungary 58,7 60,5 64,5 65,5 71,6 77,8 80,2 80,5 78,4 77,2 76,7 
Malta 71,9 70,0 64,5 62,3 62,6 67,6 67,5 70,2 67,7 68,4 63,4 
Netherlands 50,3 49,8 45,2 43,0 54,7 56,8 59,3 61,7 66,2 67,7 67,9 
Austria 65,2 68,6 67,3 65,0 68,7 79,9 82,7 82,4 81,9 81,3 84,0 
Poland 45,0 46,4 46,9 44,2 46,3 49,4 53,1 54,1 53,7 55,7 50,4 
Portugal 62,0 67,4 69,2 68,4 71,7 83,6 96,2 111,4 126,2 129,0 130,6 
Romania 18,9 15,9 12,4 12,0 12,4 21,9 29,8 34,2 37,0 37,6 39,2 
Slovenia 26,8 26,3 26,0 22,8 21,8 34,6 38,4 46,6 53,8 70,4 80,4 
Slovakia 40,6 34,1 31,0 30,1 28,5 36,3 41,2 43,7 52,2 54,7 53,5 
Finland 42,7 40,0 38,2 34,0 32,7 41,7 47,1 48,5 53,9 56,5 60,2 
Sweden 48,9 49,1 43,9 39,2 37,7 41,3 38,6 37,8 38,1 40,7 45,5 
United 
Kingdom 
38,6 39,8 40,7 41,7 49,7 63,7 75,2 80,8 84,1 85,2 87,0 
Source: Eurostat 
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Appendix 5. IMF program countries in 2009 (by program types) 
 
Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facilities 
Stand-By 
Arrangements 
Exogenous Shock 
Facilities 
Afghanistan YES   
Armenia YES YES  
Belarus  YES  
Bosnia and Herzegovina YES  
Burkina Faso YES   
Burundi YES   
Central African Republic YES   
Congo YES   
Costa Rica  YES  
Côte d’Ivoire YES   
Djibouti YES   
El Salvador YES  
Gabon  YES  
Gambia YES   
Georgia  YES  
Ghana YES   
Grenada YES   
Guatemala YES  
Haiti YES   
Hungary  YES  
Iceland  YES  
Kyrgyz Republic  YES 
Latvia  YES  
Liberia YES   
Malawi   YES 
Mali YES   
Mongolia  YES  
Mozambique YES   
Niger YES   
Pakistan  YES  
Romania  YES  
São Tomé and Príncipe YES   
Senegal   YES 
Serbia YES  
Seychelles  YES  
Sierra Leone YES   
Tajikistan YES   
Tanzania   YES 
Togo YES   
Ukraine  YES  
Zambia YES   
Source: IMF  
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Appendix 6. The benchmark yield of Hungarian Government 3-month 
Treasury-Bill (in percentage) 
05 August 2008 8,7 
12 August 2008 8,72 
19 August 2008 8,69 
26 August 2008 8,73 
02 September 2008 8,74 
09 September 2008 8,75 
16 September 2008 8,89 
23 September 2008 8,91 
30 September 2008 9,08 
07 October 2008 9,22 
14 October 2008 10,12 
21 October 2008 10,76 
28 October 2008 13,29 
04 November 2008 12,67 
11 November 2008 12,35 
18 November 2008 12,16 
25 November 2008 11,27 
 
 
Source: Government Debt Management Agency  
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Appendix 7. Development of Credit Default Swap (CDS) in selected EU 
member-states (1 January 2008- 1 January 2014) in basis points 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Appendix 8. Personal income tax percentage share of total tax revenue in OECD 
countries (period averages) 
  2006-2008 2009-2011 2012-2014 
Australia 37,22 38,50 39,94 
Austria 22,53 22,30 23,02 
Belgium 28,10 28,28 28,38 
Canada 36,76 35,77 36,30 
Chile 4,95 6,95 7,08 
Czech Republic 11,30 10,53 10,70 
Denmark 52,74 53,27 53,40 
Estonia 18,65 15,98 17,04 
Finland 30,44 29,94 29,73 
France 17,25 17,11 18,44 
Germany 25,23 24,74 26,02 
Greece 14,89 13,74 17,66 
Hungary 18,55 16,67 14,16 
Iceland 34,51 37,35 36,88 
Ireland 29,95 30,51 32,09 
Israel 21,99 18,48 17,99 
Italy 25,93 26,55 26,20 
Japan 19,30 18,99 18,91 
Korea 15,66 14,34 15,54 
Latvia 20,41 20,45 20,25 
Lithuania 21,77 13,00 13,11 
Luxembourg 20,92 21,28 22,59 
Mexico 17,80 18,52 20,34 
Netherlands 18,22 21,45 18,99 
New Zealand 41,15 38,32 37,06 
Norway 21,45 23,59 24,53 
OECD - Average 23,64 23,20 23,57 
Poland 14,72 13,99 14,09 
Portugal 16,75 18,18 21,13 
Slovak Republic 10,09 9,68 9,82 
Slovenia 15,18 15,39 14,47 
Spain 20,34 22,10 22,76 
Sweden 30,83 28,06 28,34 
Switzerland 31,22 31,53 31,04 
Turkey 16,35 14,64 14,35 
United Kingdom 29,65 29,02 27,45 
United States 38,13 35,98 38,84 
Source: OECD 
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Appendix 9. Personal income tax percentage share of total tax revenue OECD 
average and Hungary  
Source: OECD 
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Appendix 10. Hungary’s tax revenues structure by tax types’ share of total tax 
revenue (1991-2017)  
 
Taxes on income, 
profits and capital 
gains 
Social security 
contributions 
(SSC) 
Taxes on 
payroll and 
workforce 
Taxes 
on 
propery 
Taxes on 
goods and 
services 
1991 27,6% 35,9% 0,2% 1,2% 33,2% 
1992 21,8% 39,0% 0,2% 1,0% 36,0% 
1993 20,7% 39,1% 0,2% 0,8% 37,1% 
1994 21,0% 38,7% 0,3% 1,0% 37,1% 
1995 21,0% 35,6% 0,3% 1,2% 40,6% 
1996 22,0% 34,3% 0,3% 1,5% 40,7% 
1997 21,7% 33,8% 2,5% 1,5% 39,3% 
1998 22,3% 33,5% 2,6% 1,6% 38,9% 
1999 23,4% 30,2% 3,6% 1,7% 40,3% 
2000 24,3% 29,3% 3,6% 1,7% 40,5% 
2001 25,6% 29,7% 3,4% 1,8% 38,7% 
2002 26,3% 32,6% 1,1% 1,8% 37,4% 
2003 24,6% 32,4% 0,8% 2,1% 39,2% 
2004 23,5% 31,7% 0,9% 2,3% 40,7% 
2005 23,6% 32,6% 1,0% 2,3% 39,6% 
2006 24,5% 33,2% 0,7% 2,2% 38,3% 
2007 25,1% 33,6% 0,8% 2,0% 37,6% 
2008 25,8% 33,4% 0,8% 2,2% 36,9% 
2009 24,4% 32,4% 0,9% 2,1% 39,5% 
2010 20,7% 31,4% 1,1% 3,1% 42,9% 
2011 17,2% 34,1% 1,3% 3,1% 43,6% 
2012 18,0% 32,7% 1,4% 3,2% 44,0% 
2013 17,7% 32,6% 1,5% 3,4% 44,0% 
2014 18,1% 32,5% 1,5% 3,4% 43,8% 
2015 18,3% 32,3% 1,5% 3,3% 43,9% 
2016 19,3% 33,2% 1,6% 2,8% 42,4% 
2017 18,3% 33,9% 1,9% 2,8% 42,5% 
Source: OECD 
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Appendix 11. Employment in EU memberstates (for aged 20-64, thousand 
persons, 2007-2014)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium 4701 4747 4769 4856 4817 4847 4901 4920 
Bulgaria 3448 3505 3441 3387 3302 3304 3323 3309 
Czechia 5132 5163 5209 5192 5146 5175 5213 5206 
Denmark 2869 2859 2845 2822 2811 2788 2767 2777 
Germany 40992 41032 41030 40178 40437 40538 40814 40990 
Estonia 664 670 666 661 665 658 655 648 
Ireland 2293 2312 2260 2206 2182 2174 2192 2199 
Greece 4894 4910 4953 4945 4859 4828 4784 4747 
Spain 22281 22908 23107 23210 23280 23281 23043 22814 
France 28251 28447 28689 28802 28781 28983 29123 29121 
Croatia 1884 1890 1886 1871 1841 1825 1811 1868 
Italy 23996 24357 24227 24203 24272 24832 24816 25039 
Cyprus 383 386 393 409 420 426 425 425 
Latvia 1083 1097 1069 1034 1007 1006 986 966 
Lithuania 1487 1484 1500 1494 1453 1441 1436 1445 
Luxembourg 211 213 227 229 234 246 251 258 
Hungary 4184 4144 4135 4171 4190 4265 4300 4413 
Malta 165 168 170 172 176 182 190 198 
Netherlands 8411 8554 8598 8578 8582 8684 8742 8677 
Austria 4064 4100 4132 4147 4176 4222 4261 4278 
Poland 16610 16765 17039 16879 16968 17085 17101 17153 
Portugal 5196 5203 5161 5166 5138 5087 5010 4976 
Romania 9483 9457 9485 8958 8799 8849 8832 8883 
Slovenia 1007 1021 1016 1017 998 996 990 991 
Slovakia 2646 2679 2680 2696 2668 2695 2703 2707 
Finland 2642 2669 2644 2634 2637 2637 2622 2617 
Sweden 4750 4797 4799 4827 4887 4909 4963 5005 
United 
Kingdom 30236 30569 30666 30728 30943 31161 31333 31532 
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Appendix 12. People at risk of poverty or social exclusion in EU memberstates 
(thousand persons, 2007-2014)  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium       2 261             2 194             2 145             2 235             2 271             2 356             2 286             2 339     
Bulgaria       4 663             3 421             3 511             3 719             3 693             3 621             3 493             2 909     
Czechia       1 613             1 566             1 448             1 495             1 598             1 580             1 508             1 532     
Denmark          905                887                962             1 007                969                965             1 025             1 006     
Germany     16 760           16 345           16 217           15 962           16 074           15 909           16 212           16 508     
Estonia          293                291                312                289                307                311                313                338     
Ireland       1 005             1 050             1 150             1 220             1 319             1 382             1 377             1 279     
Greece       3 064             3 046             3 007             3 031             3 403             3 795             3 904             3 885     
Spain     10 373           10 786           11 336           12 029           12 363           12 628           12 630           13 402     
France     11 382           11 150           11 200           11 712           11 840           11 760           11 245           11 540     
Croatia  :   :   :          1 322             1 384             1 384             1 271             1 243     
Italy     15 222           15 082           14 799           14 891           16 858           17 975           17 229           17 146     
Cyprus          195                181                188                202                207                234                240                234     
Latvia          765                740                808                798                821                731                702                645     
Lithuania          967                910                943             1 068             1 011                975                917                804     
Luxembourg            73                  72                  85                  83                  84                  95                  96                  96     
Hungary       2 916             2 794             2 924             2 948             3 093             3 272             3 398             3 097     
Malta            79                  81                  82                  86                  90                  94                102                101     
Netherlands       2 558             2 432             2 483             2 483             2 598             2 492             2 648             2 751     
Austria       1 376             1 699             1 577             1 566             1 593             1 542             1 572             1 609     
Poland     12 958           11 491           10 454           10 409           10 196           10 128             9 748             9 337     
Portugal       2 653             2 757             2 648             2 693             2 601             2 667             2 879             2 863     
Romania       9 940             9 115             8 795             8 425             8 265             8 673             8 392             8 043     
Slovenia          335                361                339                366                386                392                410                410     
Slovakia       1 152             1 111             1 061             1 118             1 112             1 109             1 070                960     
Finland          907                910                886                890                949                916                854                927     
Sweden       1 264             1 528             1 641             1 648             1 730             1 679             1 748             1 752     
United 
Kingdom     13 527           14 069           13 389           14 211           14 044           15 099           15 586           15 271     
Source: Eurostat 
